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Abstract 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to examine the extent of which economic 
instruments can be used to minimise or offset environmental damage in the coastal 
and marine and environments. The key focus is on coastal development, and in 
particular port development, that has impacts both onshore and offshore. In 
fulfilment of this aim, two main studies were conducted.  
In the first study, a qualitative review of the legislative and policy framework 
surrounding dredging and dumping of dredged spoils was conducted. While there are 
some incentives currently embedded in the legislative framework, it is found that 
there is scope for the use of alternative incentive based measures such as taxes, 
damage quotas and bonds. By implementing these measures in conjunction with 
regulation, there is potential to reduce damage to the socially optimal level. 
However, given the nature of the marine environment, the implementation of such 
measures is largely limited by the lack of information with respect to the actual cost 
of damage. Moreover, even if such mechanisms are used, this would still result in 
residual damage to the environment. Hence, the study concluded that there is a 
greater role for offsets, given the aim is to adequately compensate for residual 
impacts.  
Following on from the conclusion of the first study, the second study explores 
what types of offsets can be used to compensate for damage in the marine and coastal 
environments. More specifically, using a choice experiment and a hypothetical 
development which impacts upon some shorebird habitat, respondents were asked to 
choose their most preferred offset option to compensate for damage caused to 
migratory shorebirds. Respondent choices were analysed using a multinomial logit 
model. It was found that there is a clear preference for the use of direct offsets, 
ceteris paribus. With respect to location, there was a willing to accept an offset 
located interstate or overseas provided this resulted in the protection of a larger 
number of birds. The study also indicated scope for the use of alternative offsets 
which protect species under greater threat than the species directly affected by the 
development. That is, there is scope for the use of trading up of species. Such results 
are significant as this indicates that the Queensland public are generally willing to 
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consider alternative offsets provided that the conservation benefits of these 
alternative offsets are sufficiently larger than the default (like-for-like) offset. 
 
 ivTHE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 
Table of Contents 
Keywords ................................................................................................................................................. i 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. ix 
Statement of Original Authorship .......................................................................................................... xi 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The impacts of coastal development ............................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Natural Resource Management .................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Incentive based approaches and offsets ....................................................................................... 7 
1.4 The role of environmental offsets ................................................................................................ 9 
1.5 Significance and purpose of the study ......................................................................................... 9 
1.6 Contributions to knowledge ....................................................................................................... 10 
1.7 Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 2: POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS OF INCENTIVE BASED APPROACHES13 
2.1 Current incentives in legislation ................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 The potential for incentive based mechanisms .......................................................................... 19 
2.2.1 A tax levy or fee on dredging spoils ............................................................................... 19 
2.2.2 Damage quotas or cap and trade systems ....................................................................... 20 
2.2.3 Assurance bonds ............................................................................................................. 21 
2.3 Limits of incentive based systems ............................................................................................. 22 
2.3.1 A tax levy or fee on dredging spoils ............................................................................... 22 
2.3.2 Damage quotas or cap and trade systems ....................................................................... 23 
2.3.3 Assurance bonds ............................................................................................................. 23 
2.4 Summary and Implications ........................................................................................................ 24 
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMICS OF OFFSETS ................................................................................... 27 
3.1 Offset policies in practice .......................................................................................................... 27 
3.2 Classification of offsets ............................................................................................................. 30 
3.3 General features of offsets ......................................................................................................... 31 
3.4 General problems with offset implementation ........................................................................... 36 
3.4.1 Ecological Issues ............................................................................................................ 36 
3.4.2 Transaction Costs ........................................................................................................... 36 
3.4.3 Ethical considerations ..................................................................................................... 37 
3.5 Ecological equivalence of offsets: HEA and REA .................................................................... 38 
3.6 Economic equivalence ............................................................................................................... 40 
3.6.1 Value Equivalency Analysis (VEA) ............................................................................... 40 
3.6.2 Moving away from the impacted site: Lessons from non-market valuation and 
distance decay ................................................................................................................. 43 
3.6.3 Externalities of offsets .................................................................................................... 44 
 THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTS v 
3.7 Summary and Implications ........................................................................................................ 44 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................... 47 
4.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 48 
4.1.1 Non-market valuation techniques ................................................................................... 48 
4.1.2 Choice Modelling ........................................................................................................... 49 
4.2 Research Design......................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2.1 Background to choice experiment and survey ................................................................ 52 
4.2.2 Case scenario for choice experiment .............................................................................. 53 
4.2.3 Attributes and Levels ...................................................................................................... 54 
4.2.4 Experimental Design ...................................................................................................... 56 
4.2.5 Pre-choice experiment questions .................................................................................... 59 
4.2.6 Follow up questions ........................................................................................................ 59 
4.3 Participants ................................................................................................................................. 61 
4.4 Procedure and Timeline ............................................................................................................. 61 
4.5 Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 61 
4.5.1 The models ..................................................................................................................... 62 
4.5.2 Calculation of willingness to accept ............................................................................... 66 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS ................................................................................................................... 69 
5.1 Descriptive statistics of general sample ..................................................................................... 70 
5.1.1 Gender & age .................................................................................................................. 70 
5.1.2 Education and Income .................................................................................................... 71 
5.1.3 Regional distribution ...................................................................................................... 74 
5.1.4 Respondents with and without children .......................................................................... 75 
5.2 Familiarity and attitude towards offsets and the environment ................................................... 76 
5.2.1 Familiarity with offsets ................................................................................................... 76 
5.2.2 Concern for environmental issues ................................................................................... 77 
5.2.3 Involvement in environmental activities ......................................................................... 78 
5.2.4 Attitude towards different types of offsets ...................................................................... 79 
5.2.5 Attitude towards offsets in Queensland and other locations ........................................... 82 
5.3 Follow up questions regarding choice component of survey ..................................................... 87 
5.3.1 Certainty of answers ....................................................................................................... 87 
5.3.2 Clarity of choice scenarios .............................................................................................. 88 
5.3.3 Attention given to attributes ........................................................................................... 88 
5.3.4 Relevance of attributes ................................................................................................... 89 
5.4 Choice Modelling....................................................................................................................... 90 
5.4.1 Full base MNL model and reduced form MNL models .................................................. 91 
5.4.2 Model 5 estimated over the full sample and split samples .............................................. 94 
5.4.3 Willingness to accept ...................................................................................................... 98 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................... 101 
6.1 General overview of aims of the thesis .................................................................................... 101 
6.2 Key Results .............................................................................................................................. 101 
6.2.1 The potential and limitations of incentives ................................................................... 101 
6.2.2 Potential for offsets ....................................................................................................... 102 
6.3 Contributions to knowledge ..................................................................................................... 106 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research ............................................................................................. 107 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 109 
Appendix A Legislative Review .............................................................................................. 109 
Appendix B Survey .................................................................................................................. 123 
Appendix C Variables used in analysis .................................................................................... 124 
Appendix D Goodness of fit tests for gender ........................................................................... 127 
Appendix E Goodness of fit tests for age ................................................................................. 128 
Appendix F Likelihood Ratio Test for Model Fit .................................................................... 129 
 viTHE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 
Appendix G  Testing of statistical significance of explanatory variables for models in 
Chapter 5 ...................................................................................................................... 130 
Appendix H  Testing of IIA assumption .................................................................................. 140 
Appendix I  MNL Models using partitioning .......................................................................... 144 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 160 
 THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTS vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1. Queensland ports map as at 30 June 2013 ............................................................................ 4 
Figure 1.2. Mitigation Hierarchy ............................................................................................................. 7 
Figure 1.3. Logic Flow of Thesis .......................................................................................................... 11 
Figure 2.1. Relationship between Sea Dumping Act and EPBC Act .................................................... 16 
Figure 4.1. Efficiency of design ............................................................................................................ 58 
Figure 4.2. Example Choice Scenario ................................................................................................... 58 
Figure 4.3. Regional division of sample ................................................................................................ 64 
Figure 5.1. Income distribution of sample ............................................................................................ 73 
Figure 5.2. Regional distribution of sample .......................................................................................... 74 
Figure 5.3. Respondents with and without children at home ................................................................ 75 
Figure 5.4. Familiarity with offsets before the survey .......................................................................... 76 
Figure 5.5. Awareness of environmental offsets ................................................................................... 77 
Figure 5.6. Level of concern for different environmental issues ........................................................... 78 
Figure 5.7. Member of an environmental conservation society or organisation ................................... 78 
Figure 5.8. Frequency of bird watching ................................................................................................ 79 
Figure 5.9. Agreement with the use of coastal and marine offsets ........................................................ 80 
Figure 5.10. Approval of the use of direct & indirect offsets ................................................................ 81 
Figure 5.11. Offsets in another Australian state or territory .................................................................. 83 
Figure 5.12. Offsets in another country ................................................................................................. 84 
Figure 5.13. Acceptance of offsets from another Australian state or territory ...................................... 85 
Figure 5.14. Acceptance of offsets from another country ..................................................................... 86 
Figure 5.15. Certainty of answer given during the offset scenario exercise .......................................... 87 
Figure 5.16. Confused by choice scenarios ........................................................................................... 88 
Figure 5.17. Attention given to attributes .............................................................................................. 89 
Figure 5.18. Relevance of offset characteristics .................................................................................... 90 
 
 viiiTHE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1. Ship Projections at Great Barrier Reef Ports: All Vessels, 2012-2032* ................................ 3 
Table 4.1. Final attributes and levels..................................................................................................... 54 
Table 4.2. Calculation of willingness to accept ..................................................................................... 67 
Table 5.1. Comparison of gender ratios between sample and the adult Queensland population........... 70 
Table 5.2 Comparison of age compositions between the sample and the adult Queensland 
population............................................................................................................................. 70 
Table 5.3 Educational distribution of sample ........................................................................................ 71 
Table 5.4. Highest level of education attained for Queensland population 2011 .................................. 72 
Table 5.5. Comparison of household income per week ........................................................................ 73 
Table 5.6. Full Base MNL model and reduced form MNL models ...................................................... 93 
Table 5.7. Model 5 (MNL model) estimated over the full sample and split samples............................ 94 
Table 5.8. Willingness to accept estimates ........................................................................................... 99 
 
 THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTS ix 
List of Abbreviations 
ASC Alternative Specific Constant 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
TEEB The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIS Environmental Impact Statement 
EPBCA Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) 
EPSDA Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth)  
EPSDR Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Regulations 1983 (Cth)  
GBR Great Barrier Reef 
GBRMP Act Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) 
GBRMP 
Authority 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
GBRMPR Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Regulations 1983 (Cth) 
HEA Habitat Equivalency Analysis 
IGAE Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992 
(Australia)  
IIA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
ITQ Individual Transferrable Quota 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
London 
Convention 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 
London 
Protocol 
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 
LOSC United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
MNL model Multinomial Logit model  
NAGD National Assessment Guidelines for Dredging 2009 
NERP National Environmental Research Program 
Noumea 
Convention 
Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and 
Environment for the South Pacific Region 1986 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
OCS Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1979 
 xTHE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 
ORU The Online Research Unit 
OUV Outstanding Universal Value 
Ramsar 
Convention 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat 1971 
REA Resource Equivalency Analysis 
The Rio 
Declaration 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 
RUT Random Utility Theory 
SSLA Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) 
TAC Total Allowable Catch 
UN United Nations 
VEA Value Equivalency Analysis 
WHC World Heritage Committee 
World Heritage 
Convention 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage 1972 
WTA Willingness to accept 
WTP Willingness to pay 
 
 
 THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTS xi 
Statement of Original Authorship 
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet 
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the 
best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously 
published or written by another person except where due reference is made. 
 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Date:  03  /   08  / 2015 
QUT Verified Signature
 xiiTHE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my very great appreciation to my supervisors Dr. Sean 
Pascoe and Dr. Louisa Coglan for their support and direction throughout my Masters 
candidature. Thank you for mentoring me and for giving me the opportunities to 
better develop my skills as a researcher.  
I am grateful to the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation (FRDC 
project 2008/306) for providing me with financial support throughout my Masters 
candidature.  
I am grateful to Dr. Sarah Jennings (University of Tasmania) for her assistance 
throughout my Masters candidature, in arranging financial support, providing 
feedback for my thesis and offering kind words and encouragement. 
I am thankful to the National Environmental Research Program (NERP), 
Marine Biodiversity Hub for their support in my research. A very big thank you to 
Professor Michael Burton (University of Western Australia) and Dr. Abbie Rogers 
(University of Western Australia) for: allowing me to use the shorebirds pilot study 
survey as a base for my survey, sharing knowledge with respect to choice 
experiments and providing me with advice and feedback for my survey.  
I express my gratitude to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) for in-kind support received throughout my candidature. I am 
thankful to the friends and colleagues at CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere Flagship 
for all their encouragement and assistance during my candidature. My special thanks 
are extended to Dr. Ana Norman-Lopéz and Dr. James Innes for always taking the 
time to answer my questions and providing me with feedback for my work.   
Thank you to the staff of the QUT School of Economics and Finance for 
assisting me throughout my Masters candidature. I would like to express my thanks 
to the support received from fellow students: Peggy Schrobback, Jean-Baptiste 
Marre, Amar Doshi, Suzanne Bonner, Stephen Whyte and Naomi Moy.  
I would like to thank members of the Queensland public who participated in 
my survey.  
 THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN COMPENSATING FOR DAMAGE IN THE COASTAL AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTS xiii 
I am grateful to God for all the blessings received and I would like to thank my 
family and friends for believing in me and for the love and support shown while 
completing my thesis. I couldn’t have done it without you.     
 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The natural environment is heavily relied upon for the goods and services it 
provides to facilitate human development. However, it is evident that such reliance 
cannot take place without subjecting the environment to some form of damage. 
Regulation has been put in place in an attempt to use resources more sustainably and 
reduce pressure on the environment; however this is not always effective. In such 
cases, alternative measures which work towards further minimising damage or 
offsetting damage should be examined.  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which economic 
instruments can be used to minimise or offset environmental damage in the marine 
environment. Particular attention is paid to the potential for offsets to account for 
residual damage, even if other economic instruments are successful in minimising 
environmental damage. These are examined for the case of coastal development, and 
in particular port development, that has impacts both onshore and offshore.  
In this chapter, the current pressures faced by the marine and coastal 
environments are outlined and the importance of implementing alternative measures 
to minimise and offset damage are examined. More specifically, in the first section of 
this chapter, the issues associated with coastal and port development in Queensland 
are examined. The second section of the chapter briefly describes the current state of 
natural resource management. The next section of the chapter describes the role and 
limits of incentive based mechanisms in marine resource management, drawing on 
experiences in fisheries resource management. The fourth section introduces the 
concept of environmental offsets and explains why offsets are required in natural 
resource management. In the last three sections of this chapter, the significance and 
purpose of this study, the contributions to knowledge and an outline of the remainder 
of the thesis are presented.  
1.1 THE IMPACTS OF COASTAL DEVELOPMENT 
Coastal development, and port development in particular, has impacts both 
onshore and offshore. Onshore impacts include the loss of coastal habitat for 
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shorebirds and other coastal wildlife, while the process of dredging (and subsequent 
spoil disposal) to enable ship access results in impacts offshore (Bray, 2008). 
The process of dredging and subsequent dumping of dredged material is 
required to facilitate many activities. For example, dredging may be required for land 
reclamation, beach renourishment or to prepare a site for the construction of certain 
infrastructure, such as pipelines, tunnels, jetties, marinas or bridges (Bray, 2008; 
Erftemeijer & Robin Lewis III, 2006; Nielsen, Hesp, & Lord, 1991). However, one 
common and important use of dredging is the creation or maintenance of a port, 
harbour or channel (van Raalte, 2006). The development of new infrastructure, such 
as a port, generally requires the process of ‘capital dredging’. Capital dredging 
involves the excavation of large amounts of material in order to create deeper 
channels and berths. Depending on the purpose of the port and the size of vessels 
expected to use the port, extensive capital dredging may be required (Mangan, 
Lalwani, & Fynes, 2008; Synnot, 2013). The subsequent dredging of a harbour to 
maintain the deepness of the channel and port entrances is called ‘maintenance 
dredging’ (van Raalte, 2006). Failure to remove sediment could lead to delays in the 
transportation chain, which could (depending on the magnitude of the loss) 
ultimately result in the closure of the port (Collins & Colclough, 1992). 
Dredging (and subsequent spoil disposal) is particularly important in 
Queensland, given that there is a heavy reliance on ports to facilitate a growing 
mineral and energy export market, as well as the trade of other commodities 
(Queensland Ports Association., 2013; State of Queensland (Department of Transport 
and Main Roads), 2014). Ports are located along the whole Queensland coast (see 
Figure 1.1) (State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads), 2014), 
with the overall volume of shipping is expected to more than triple in the next 18 
years in the area of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) (see Table 1.1) (Polglaze Griffin 
Miller (PGM) Environment, 2012). In particular large amounts of activity are 
projected in the ports of Gladstone and Hay Point (see Table 1.1)  (Polglaze Griffin 
Miller (PGM) Environment, 2012). Thus, it is apparent that the process of dredging 
and dumping of dredged material will be required if such productivity is to be 
maintained. However, as these processes also cause negative impacts upon the 
environment, such impacts must also be carefully considered. Some of these impacts 
are further examined below. 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 
 
Table 1.1. Ship Projections at Great Barrier Reef Ports: All Vessels, 2012-2032* 
GBR Ports – All Vessels 
Port 2012
#
 2017 2020 2025 2032 
Abbot Point 174 336 808 1360 1640 
Cairns 342 388 408 445 501 
Cape Flattery 30 44 45 45 45 
Gladstone 1453 2397 2823 3021 3029 
Hay Point 809 1258 1513 2082 2380 
Lucinda 1 21 21 21 21 
Mackay 216 259 305 333 333 
Mourilyan 27 26 26 26 26 
Port Alma 121 190 460 845 921 
Quintell Beach 21 40 40 40 40 
Townsville 753 912 999 1025 1161 
OVERALL 3947 5871 7448 9243 10097 
*Data presented at end of financial year 
# 2012 data ‘actuals’, as provided by GBR Ports  
 
Source:  Polglaze Griffin Miller (PGM) Environment (2012) Great Barrier Reef Shipping: Review of 
Environmental Implications. Polglaze Griffin Miller & Associates Pty Ltd, Safety Bay, WA. ‘Table 9. 
Ship Projections at GBR Ports: All Vessels, 2012-2032*, p.61-62.  (Document No.: R1212; Date: 21 
December 2012; Prepared for: Abbot Point Working Group, under direction from BHP Billiton and 
North Queensland Bulk Ports). Retrieved from: 
http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/884f8778-caa4-4bd9-b370-
318518827db6/files/23qrcdoc3.pdf 
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Figure 1.1. Queensland ports map as at 30 June 2013 
 
Source: “Queensland ports map as at 30 June 2013” By State of Queensland (Department of Transport 
and Main Roads) (2014) [Trade Statistics for Queensland Ports 2012-13], p.2 Retrieved from: 
http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/Business-and-industry/Transport-sectors/Ports/Trade-statistics-for-
Queensland-ports.aspx  
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The main environmental concern of capital dredging is the removal and 
destruction of natural habitats and their surrounding areas (Bray, 2008). With respect 
to onshore impacts, dredging may result in the damage of wetlands or intertidal flats 
which could lead to the displacement of coastal and marine life from their habitats 
(e.g. shorebirds and turtles) (Bray, 2008; van Raalte, 2006).  In terms of offshore 
impacts, the concern arises from the resulting water quality surrounding the dredged 
area. Given that dredging may lead to increased levels of turbidity, this can lead to 
negative impacts upon marine ecosystems (Synnot, 2013). For example, a recent 
study has found that prolonged exposure to sedimentation and turbidity, as caused by 
offshore dredging,  can have damaging effects on coral reef ecosystems, as this 
increases susceptibility of corals to disease (Pollock et al., 2014). Moreover, 
increased levels of turbidity can inhibit light penetration, which has been identified 
as a leading cause seagrass mortality (Erftemeijer & Robin Lewis III, 2006). Loss of 
seagrass beds can have devastating impacts upon marine ecosystems, given the 
diverse range of organisms which rely on seagrass for protection, food and as a 
filtration system. This in turn can also lead to other problems, such as impacts upon 
the productivity of commercial fisheries (Australian Institute of Marine Science., 
1996-2014).  
Although maintenance dredging has similar effects to capital dredging (e.g. 
issues with water quality and turbidity) the primary concern of maintenance dredging 
is the continual dumping of dredged spoil (van Raalte, 2006). This could lead to 
chronic disturbance of the marine environment, which could prolong issues of 
decreased water quality and turbidity (Bray, 2008). Furthermore, the effects of spoil 
dumping may also be aggravated due to the movement of water caused by severe 
weather. Strong currents can cause discharged spoil to re-emerge and spread, leading 
to prolonged suspension of sediments in the water (Pringle, 1996; Wolanski et al., 
1991). As a result, damage caused by dumping may be spread further than 
anticipated, making the quantum estimate of damage unpredictable and difficult to 
monitor (Pringle, 1996; Wolanski et al., 1991).  
In recent years, concerns have been raised in relation to the impacts of 
Queensland port and coastal development upon the environment. In particular, there 
has been contention in relation to the impacts of dredging and spoil disposal in the 
Gladstone area, and the large scale expansion of Abbot Point in the Great Barrier 
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Reef region (Synnot, 2013; The Senate Environment and Communications 
References Committee, 2014). Associated with these port developments are the 
development of other heavy industry, as well as urban development in the town 
servicing the ports also contributing to pressure on the coastal environment (Douvere 
& Badman, 2012).  
In 2012, the World Heritage Committee (WHC) engaged in a joint reactive 
monitoring mission with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
to conduct an investigation as to the status of the reef and assist Australia in its 
creation of strategic plans. The mission found that while the reef still held its 
outstanding universal value (OUV), there were potential threats to the status of the 
reef, including coastal development and additional environmental pressures (Douvere 
& Badman, 2012). Since the occurrence of the mission, Australia has taken steps to 
address these concerns, which include but are not limited to strategic assessments 
and new port strategies which restrict the level of dredging outside of major point 
areas (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, 2015).  
1.2 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Under key current environmental legislation, the onus is on the developer to 
prove they have followed the steps in the mitigation hierarchy (see Figure 1.2) 
(Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 
2012a). That is, the developer must first take all reasonable steps to avoid the 
damage. Damage which cannot be avoided must then be minimised or mitigated. 
However, even if the first two actions are taken, it is acknowledged that some 
residual damage is likely to remain.  
The use of incentive based, rather than command and control, management 
approaches is gaining increasing attention in other areas of natural resource 
management, particularly in the marine environment. In many cases, incentive based 
approaches have been more successful than strict regulation in achieving desired 
environmental outcomes. However, elimination of environmental impacts from 
development is virtually impossible, and in nearly all cases some residual impacts are 
likely to remain. A proposed solution to deal with any residual impacts is to offset 
them through other environmental actions (ten Kate, Bishop, & Bayon, 2004). Given 
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this, both incentive based management and offsets may play a role in future coastal 
and marine management in Queensland, and Australia in general.  
1.3 INCENTIVE BASED APPROACHES AND OFFSETS 
Incentive based approaches may help avoid or minimise initial damage, while 
offsets may be useful instruments to deal with any residual damage (see Figure 1.2).  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Mitigation Hierarchy 
 
Under incentive based approaches, the behaviour of individuals is changed in 
response to a given incentive, be it financial or otherwise (Ekpe, 2012). Incentive 
based measures are in direct contrast to approaches which expect or demand 
compliance (i.e. the command and control or regulatory approach) (Turner, Pearce, 
& Bateman, 1994). Policies which utilise direct financial incentives to influence 
behaviour include, but are not limited to: taxes, charges or fees, subsidies and bonds. 
In the alternative to financial incentives, there exists the use of incentives which are 
created through the use of a market where property rights can be traded (e.g. the cap 
and trade system) (Pascoe et al., 2010).  
Incentive based approaches have been widely applied in the context of marine 
resource management to combat the problem referred to as the tragedy of the 
commons. The tragedy of the commons refers to the problem caused when a resource 
is open for all to share, in that no one person can exclude the use of others (Hardin, 
1968). In the absence of regulation, this non-exclusivity and lack of private property 
rights leaves little incentive for anyone to take care of marine resources. As each 
person races to consume the resource in a manner which maximises their own 
Incentive Based 
Approaches 
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welfare (without regard for others or the resource itself) this can lead to damage to 
the resource and an overexploitation of its use (Hardin, 1968). In the worst case, this 
overuse may even result in extinction of the resource (Turner, Pearce & Bateman, 
1994). One industry which has largely embraced the use of incentive based 
mechanisms to minimise the damage caused by the tragedy of the commons is 
fisheries (Grafton et al., 2006). This includes the use of individual transferable 
quotas, subsidies and the potential for penalties with respect to by-catch.  
One popular incentive based mechanism in fisheries is the use of property 
rights allocation, such as individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) (Tietenberg, 2003). 
In general terms, the ITQ provides each fisherman with a share of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) (Townsend, McColl, & Young, 2006). Provided the TAC is 
appropriately set, the overexploitation of resources is eliminated as fishers no longer 
need to compete or race to fish, given that they are guaranteed a share. Moreover, if 
the ITQ is sub-divided, such that part of the quota is allocated to a specific amount of 
by-catch, then fishers are given an incentive to be more careful when fishing 
(Townsend et al., 2006). 
Another incentive which may be offered to reduce damage is a subsidy. In the 
fishing industry, a subsidy may be provided to reduce the cost of purchasing less 
harmful fishing gear (Cox & Schmidt, 2006). Alternatively, the fishing authority 
could employ the use of a decommissioning subsidy or buyback, where excess 
fishing vessels are bought out to reduce the risk of overfishing (Clark, Munro, & 
Sumaila, 2005).  
Finally another mechanism for ensuring that fishers account for their damage 
to the environment would be the imposition of a charge or penalty based on the 
damage inflicted by the fisher (e.g. on the amount of by-catch or damage to a 
particular environment). The charge or penalty can effectively increase the cost of 
fishing and give the fisher the incentive to change their fishing methods, such that 
there is a reduction in the level of by-catch and environmental damage (Pascoe et al., 
2010). However, despite the potential benefits of introducing a tax, fee or charge on 
the amount of damage produced (e.g. by-catch), the application of this mechanism 
remains largely theoretical (Pascoe et al., 2010).  
The above examples illustrate how incentive based mechanisms may be used to 
manage natural resources. However, such mechanisms are not without flaws. Though 
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incentive based mechanisms can reduce damage, there may be instances where there 
will still be residual damage left after such mechanisms have been applied. 
Moreover, if there is residual damage, this is more problematic for other marine 
habitats which are not considered a renewable resource. For example, if effectively 
managed, the damage to the fishing stock may be reversed with time, given that the 
stock may regenerate (Turner et al., 1994). However, for other marine habitats where 
little scientific knowledge is available, it is unclear whether such damage may be 
reversed or what the end result might be. Consequently, other methods of 
internalizing negative externalities should be examined. 
1.4 THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OFFSETS 
As seen in the mitigation hierarchy above (see Figure 1.2), offsets are measures 
which compensate for residual harm which could not have been avoided or mitigated 
(ten Kate et al., 2004). That is, they are an option of last resort. In general, most 
offset policies call for the use of an offset which results in a like-for-like 
environment (i.e. a direct in-kind offset) (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). The aim is 
to restore or create an environment which most closely replicates the original 
environment damaged during development. This is generally achieved with the use 
of a direct offset (i.e. an action which uses on-ground improvement to a site) located 
as close as possible to the impacted site, resulting in the protection of the impacted 
species or habitats in equivalent quantities to the amount lost due to the development 
(McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). However in some cases, 
this direct like-for-like offset option is not feasible due to the nature of the impacted 
environment. In particular, the damage (and restoration) of the marine and coastal 
environments may be physically difficult to achieve, but also hard to calculate due to 
high scientific uncertainty (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, 
Population and Communities, 2012a). Hence, alternative offsets must be identified 
and designed appropriately, so that they provide at least the same amount of 
compensation (or better) as the like-for-like offset. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of knowledge and 
understanding of offsets used to compensate for damage caused to the coastal and 
marine and environments. The role of offsets is investigated using two main studies. 
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In the first study, the role of offsets is explored qualitatively through a review of the 
current regulatory framework for dredging and dumping of dredged spoil in 
Australia, as well as exploring other potential incentive based mechanisms which 
could be used to prevent damage caused to the coastal and marine environments.  
The second study uses a choice experiment to investigate what types of offsets 
are acceptable to the Queensland public. The second study has two main objectives. 
The first objective is to identify whether the distance of an offset from the impacted 
site and method used to create the offset can significantly impact the social 
acceptability of an offset. Furthermore, the study tests whether there is potential for 
the trading up of species. The second objective is to examine whether an individual’s 
characteristics can significantly influence the willingness to accept one offset over 
another. 
1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in the following ways. First, the thesis 
examines incentives for reducing environmental damage due to coastal development, 
port development and disposal of dredging spoils. Secondly, as terrestrial offset 
methods cannot be as easily applied to the marine environment (i.e. because of limits 
on restoration due to physical difficulty or high scientific uncertainty); this problem 
is addressed by presenting a case for the use of economic valuation in conjunction 
with ecological concepts.  Lastly, an examination of trade-offs under different offset 
options is given to help design alternative offsets that ensure at least no loss of utility 
to the public. That is, the social acceptability aspects of offset creation are addressed 
by identifying the potential reasons for why certain types of offsets are deemed 
acceptable or not. These findings provide policy makers and developers with key 
insights as to what may be done to improve offset design in the future.  
1.7 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is structured in the following manner and is illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
Chapter 2 considers management approaches for limiting environmental damage in 
offshore activities, using dredging as a case study. The chapter analyses the 
incentives embedded within the current regulatory framework for dredging and 
dumping of dredged material in Australia. Alternative incentive based management 
options for managing dredging and spoil discarding are then investigated. The 
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chapter concludes that, under both current command and control and incentive based 
systems, some residual impacts will still exist, therefore requiring some form of 
offset if no-net-loss is to be achieved. In chapter 3, the notion of an environmental 
offset in marine environments is further developed, with reference to ecological and 
economic concepts. The development, criteria, ecological and economic issues in 
valuation and limitations of offsets are explored.  Chapter 4 describes the research 
design of a Queensland shorebirds offset case study, where members of the 
Queensland population were surveyed to elicit their preferred offset strategy in the 
context of compensating for damage to the coastal and marine environments. The 
results of the offset study are presented in chapter 5. The final chapter discusses the 
results of both studies and outlines overall conclusions and limitations, with 
recommendations for future research. 
  
 
Figure 1.3. Logic Flow of Thesis 
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Chapter 2: Potential and limitations of 
incentive based approaches  
The first two stages of the mitigation hierarchy are to avoid or mitigate the 
environmental damage. Offsets are generally considered a “last resort”; to be applied 
to residual damage only when other approaches to avoid, minimise and mitigate 
damage have been undertaken. Although the focus of this thesis is on offsets, what 
needs to be offset (i.e. the residual damage) is largely a function of the actions taken 
to avoid and mitigate damage. There is a role for economic instruments to contribute 
to this end, and hence may form part of an overall package of management measures 
that also includes offsets. Such a package may be more essential for dealing with 
offshore impacts of coastal development, such as dredging, as developers and 
managers have less direct control (or even information on) the impacts and outcomes 
of the associated activities. Hence, to illustrate the potential and limitations of 
incentive based approaches, we consider the case of dredging and spoil disposal. 
In the case of offshore activities, such as dredging, the use of incentive based 
management instruments may help achieve lower levels of environmental damage 
than command-and-control measures. The activities of dredging and spoil disposal 
are currently regulated by a complex set of international treaties, legislation, 
regulation and policies. While the regulatory framework provides a requirement for 
minimising or mitigating damage, the costs of adhering to this requirement may 
create incentives to avoid going through the processes which reduce environmental 
damage. 
Incentive based approaches have been used to reduce environmental damage in 
industries such as fisheries (Grafton et al., 2006), to reduce carbon emissions in 
energy and transport sectors (Sumner, Bird, & Dobos, 2011; Tietenberg, 2003) and 
have also been used in the context of conserving biodiversity (Ekpe, 2012). The 
application of incentive based approaches is thus potentially useful in reducing 
environmental damage from coastal development.  
In this chapter, the potential benefits and limitations of incentive based 
approaches in minimising damage to the marine environment are explored.  In the 
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first section (2.1), the incentives embedded in the current legal framework of 
dredging and dumping of dredged spoil in Australia are analysed. The next section 
(2.2) investigates the potential alternative incentive based measures which may assist 
in minimising damage to the socially optimal level. This is followed by an 
examination of the limitations associated with the application of incentive based 
measures and an introduction as to how environmental offsets may overcome these 
problems (see section 2.3). The last section (2.4) details the summary and 
implications of using incentive based mechanisms. 
2.1 CURRENT INCENTIVES IN LEGISLATION 
Environmental legislation in Australia, as in many countries, is largely derived 
from a series of international agreements that outline responsibilities and targets, 
particularly for activities occurring in the marine environment (Bates, 2013; Fisher, 
2014). The current set of international agreements, as well as the federal and state 
legislation, policies and guidelines which govern dredging and the dumping of 
dredged spoil in Australia, are outlined in Appendix A. In general, the process of 
dredging and spoil dumping is heavily regulated at various levels of government and 
there may be instances where multiple levels of regulation come into play depending 
on the chosen dumping site. For example, multiple layers of regulation are put in 
place for dredging and spoil disposal which occurs within the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2011a).  
The main international framework for sea dumping is provided by the 1972 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter (the London Convention) and the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (Tanaka, 
2012). In first instance, proponents of spoil dumping are expected to explore all other 
alternative options before sea dumping can take place (London Protocol articles 3(1) 
& 4(1)). If dumping at sea is approved, the costs of pollution should be borne by the 
proponent of the dumping activity. Such costs include the cost of pollution 
prevention and control requirements associated with dumping (London Protocol 
article 3(2)). 
The Australian process for sea dumping and relationship between the two Acts 
which govern sea dumping is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The requirements of the 
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London Convention and London Protocol is primarily implemented through the 
Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth) (EPSDA) (Palassis, 2011). If 
the dumping of material cannot occur by alternative methods, the proponent must 
pass the assessment and review processes before a permit is granted to dump at sea 
(EPSDA sections 18 & 19). This assessment includes proving that the controlled 
material falls within the approved list of material
1
 as per Annex I of the 1996 London 
Protocol (see EPSDA section 19(5)(a)), complying with the assessment process as 
outlined in Annex 2 of the London Protocol (see EPSDA section 19(5)(b)) and 
satisfying the requirements of the National Assessment Guidelines for Dredging 
2009 (Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2009b). However, 
if dumping may impact maters of national environmental significance, then the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBCA) 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process will come into play. The result of 
which must be considered when deciding to grant the permit to dump at sea (EPBCA 
sections 160 & 163; EPSDA section 19(3)) (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Department of the Environment, 2013a). An offence is committed if a person dumps 
controlled material outside of a permit (see EPSDA section 10A). If convicted, this 
offence is punishable by imprisonment or fine, the severity of which differs 
depending on the nature of the material which was dumped (EPSDA section 10A). If 
the Minister believes that a regulated occurrence
2
 may obstruct or endanger vessels, 
cause harm to human or marine life or interfere with Australia’s right to explore or 
exploit the seabed, subsoil and natural resources beneath Australian waters; then the 
Minister may take the appropriate steps to repair, remedy or mitigate any damage 
which was caused by the occurrence (EPSDA section 16).  
                                                 
 
1
 Material which may be considered for dumping under Annex 1 of the London Protocol includes, but 
is not limited to “dredged material”. 
2
 A regulated occurrence includes, but is not limited to “the dumping of controlled material into 
Australian waters” (See EPSDA section 16). 
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Figure 2.1. Relationship between Sea Dumping Act and EPBC Act 
Adapted from “Relationship between the Sea Dumping Act and the EPBC Act” by Commonwealth of 
Australia, Department of the Environment (2013a) Retrieved from: 
http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/pollution/dumping/relationship-epbc.html  
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The review as seen in Appendix A indicates that the current system is very 
heavy regulated and takes a command and control approach to ensure dredging and 
spoil dumping is conducted according to proper procedure.  However, the use of such 
an approach may limit the amount of incentives to reduce damage caused by 
dumping. For example, there is no incentive for proponents to voluntarily seek out 
alternative methods to reduce environmental damage at levels beyond mere 
compliance (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005; Osborn & Datta, 2006; Turner et al., 
1994). That is, there is little incentive for developers to invest in alternative dredging 
or spoil disposal methods (e.g. environmentally friendly technology that would 
reduce damage caused or would at least reduce the amount of spoil created).  
Another problem is the possibility of creating perverse incentives during the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process. As seen in appendix A, the EIA 
process aims to protect the environment by identifying significant impacts upon the 
environment before they occur. Such knowledge is used by the decision maker in 
part of the planning process to determine whether the project being assessed should 
go ahead (Elliot, 2014). The proponent of a particular project would be subject to the 
cost and time of preparing the environmental impact statement (EIS) (Hollick, 1980). 
If there is a possibility that the developer could be subjected to a lengthy assessment 
process, this can create incentives to speed up or bypass the assessment process 
entirely, which may in turn comprise the quality of the EIS prepared for the 
assessment.  
There are numerous ways in which the quality of the EIS can be compromised, 
intentionally or unintentionally, to provide a distorted assessment of the impacts. For 
example, the EIS may be subject to bias if is prepared by a third party, whom was 
chosen on the basis of cost as opposed to quality. That is, in an attempt to keep costs 
low, the resulting report may be deficient in detail and lacking in scientific rigor 
(Wright et al., 2013).  Furthermore, the prospect of being hired again may give the 
contracted party an incentive to produce a favorable EIS for the proponent of the 
project. For example, this may include understating environmental impacts, 
overstating benefits and deliberately providing more detail for the preferred option 
than other alternatives (Hollick, 1980; Lockie, Franetovich, Sharma, & Rolfe, 2008; 
Moy, 1983; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). The quality of the EIS may also be comprised if 
the extent of the impact is not known with any certainty (Wright et al., 2013).  This 
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problem is particularly relevant for areas such as the marine and coastal environment 
where there is high scientific uncertainty as to the nature of the damage, and a moral 
hazard issue in that any resulting damage may not be readily observable and hence 
not considered adequately. Problems also arise in the auditing phase of the EIA. That 
is, it may be such that the auditing firm has a direct financial incentive to create a 
favorable report so as to secure future contracts (Gunningham, 1993).   
Another issue with the current regulatory framework is the fee structure. At 
present, a fee is imposed on a proponent wishing to apply for a permit to dump at sea 
(see Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Regulations 1983 (Cth) (EPSDR) 
regulation 5). While this process is in line with the polluter pays principle, the 
current fee structure provides little incentive to stop dumping after the maximum 
threshold has been reached. At present, the current fee system runs on a two tier 
system, where the proponent of dumping need only pay the higher tier for quantities 
of spoil above the maximum threshold, which remains at a flat rate. Nevertheless 
limits on the quantity of dumping may be imposed in the conditions of the granted 
permit. These conditions may also stipulate when the dumping is to occur to 
minimise damage to the environment.  
The restrictions placed on the dumping are in line with the precautionary 
principle, such that damage is handled in a manner that ensures that the environment 
does not suffer from unknown consequences (International Maritime Organization, 
2014). As such, there is still a valid role for the regulatory approach and is still 
regarded as the foundation for pollution control (Osborn & Datta, 2006). However, 
given that incentives to further reduce damage within the regulatory system are 
limited and are mainly housed in the form of penalties which are put in place for 
non-compliance, it is prudent to explore other methods of natural resource 
management. More specifically, for cases where damage is unavoidable and is 
necessary to facilitate human productivity, such as dredging and dumping to 
maintain the ports and shipping industry, the exploration of such mechanisms is 
paramount. The potential and limitations for incentive based mechanisms to 
minimise damage caused by dredging and dumping are investigated below.  
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2.2 THE POTENTIAL FOR INCENTIVE BASED MECHANISMS 
2.2.1 A tax levy or fee on dredging spoils  
One way of correcting the negative externalities associated with dredging and 
dumping of dredged spoil is to impose a tax, charge or fee on the amount of material 
to be disposed. By forcing proponents of dumping to pay a tax equal to the marginal 
external costs of damage caused by dumping (i.e. a Pigouvain tax), these negative 
externalities would be internalized. As the tax ensures that dumping is the higher cost 
option, its implementation would effectively reduce excessive amounts of production 
and reduce pollution levels to the socially optimal levels of production and damage 
(Pigou, 1920).  
In the case of dumping, the effectiveness of a tax, charge or fee would be 
largely dependent upon information with respect to the extent of the damage caused 
by the disposal of dredged material. As seen above (see section 2.1) and in Appendix 
A, fees are currently utilised in the current framework, however imposes little 
incentive to discontinue dumping after the maximum threshold has been reached. To 
ensure that the price on dumping is effective, the tax could be directly tied to the 
quantity of spoil to be dumped. That is, the tax rate should be equal to cost of the 
damage caused to particular habitats. With respect to fisheries, Pascoe et al. (2010) 
proposed a by-catch tax system that imposed different tax rates for different types of 
species. Higher tax rates could be imposed for the most vulnerable species. In a 
similar fashion, a higher tax rate could be imposed for more sensitive or vulnerable 
habitats that were affected by the disposal of dredged material.  
The imposition of a tax, charge or fee has other advantages. Firstly, unlike 
command and control methods, the tax encourages persistent reduction in pollution 
levels. As any production above the socially optimal level of damage would lead to a 
loss, there is a strong incentive for firms to seek alternative methods to reduce their 
level of pollution in the long run (Turner et al., 1994). Secondly, in contrast to 
command and control regulation, which requires constant monitoring and 
enforcement, the levels of pollution can be changed accordingly by changing the tax 
rate (Goodstein & Polasky, 2014). Furthermore, to alleviate any concerns of revenue 
raising or inequity, tax revenue could be reinvested into subsidising less invasive 
dredging technology or the funding of research into better methods of spoil disposal 
(Garrod & Whitmarsh, 1995; Sumner et al., 2011).  
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2.2.2 Damage quotas or cap and trade systems  
Another incentive based mechanism which could be used to reduce the amount 
of dredged spoil to be dumped would be the use of a damage quota or cap and trade 
system. As previously discussed (see section 1.3)  above, such a scheme has been 
utilised in fisheries (i.e. individual transferable quotas) to prevent overexploitation of 
the target species and reduce the amount of by-catch caught (Tietenberg, 2003). 
Tradable permits have also been used as a mechanism to reduce air pollution in the 
US and Europe (Tietenberg, 2003). Under these cap and trade systems, a quota or 
limit on the amount of damage is chosen by the government. Once this cap or 
optimal level of damage has been established, permits which allow for a certain 
amount of damage are distributed amongst polluting entities (Goodstein & Polasky, 
2014). Permits may be allocated by way of grandfathering, auctioning or may be 
freely given away (Perdan & Azapagic, 2011). After permits have been allocated, 
entities are free to buy and sell permits as needed, causing the market to determine 
the quota price that internalizes the externality (Pearce & Turner, 1990; Turner et al., 
1994).  
A key feature in the cap and trade system is the permissible amount of damage 
or damage quota that must be chosen. In choosing the quota, due consideration must 
be given to the cost of damage caused to the marine environment. Like the tax, the 
amount of the quota consumed could be based upon the status of the affected habitat. 
That is, a higher amount of the quota may be consumed (i.e. more permits may be 
required by the dumping entity) if the habitat affected by dumping is particularly 
sensitive or is inhabited by an endangered species (Pascoe et al., 2010).   
The cap and trade system is generally favoured over other instruments. Firstly, 
the cap and trade system is cost effective, as governments need only distribute the 
initial allocation of permits and allow the market to determine the efficient 
equilibrium. That is, lower polluting entities which have the ability to reduce their 
emissions can sell permits to higher polluting entities for profit. In turn, higher 
polluting entities are forced to pay for damage which they cannot reduce (Pearce & 
Turner, 1990). Consequently, the system is efficient as permits are received by 
polluting entities who need them the most (Anderson, 2010). Secondly, the system 
also fosters innovation to reduce damage. That is, firms who wish to reduce their 
costs by avoiding the purchase of permits can seek alternative methods to reduce 
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damage. Similarly, firms may turn to new innovative methods to reduce damage if 
such an investment would lead to the sale of permits that generate revenue (Newell, 
Jaffe, & Stavins, 2006).   Thirdly, by introducing the cap or total permissible level of 
damage, it is argued that this system results in a more certain level of damage 
(Goodstein & Polasky, 2014). Lastly, the system avoids the problem of technological 
lock in (Pearce & Turner, 1990). Under a tax, firms are forced to invest in 
environmentally friendly technology in order to reduce costs.  Frequent updating of 
technology in response to changes in the tax rate may be difficult if previously 
adopted technology is already entrenched in the industry (Pearce & Turner, 1990). In 
addition, firms may be hesitant to invest in technology if changes in the tax rate are 
anticipated. Conversely, in the cap and trade system, firms are able to properly adjust 
their technological investments to match the given quota, which remains at a certain 
stable level (Pearce & Turner, 1990). 
2.2.3 Assurance bonds  
A less traditional approach in creating an incentive to reduce damage is the use 
of an assurance bond. The notion of an assurance bond is based on the concept of 
material use fees, whereby a fee is paid by the user of the resource that is equal to the 
expected cost of damage (Mills, 1972; Solow, 1971). Given that the fee is only 
refunded to the individual if the used material is returned to the environment without 
causing damage, there is an incentive for the user to act responsibly towards the 
environment (Mills, 1972; Solow, 1971). In a similar fashion, firms intending to 
dump spoil could be asked to provide an environmental assurance bond, which 
would guarantee payment in the event that disposal or restoration is not properly 
undertaken. Environmental assurance bonds have already been applied in the mining 
industry in order to eliminate the possibility of the firm abandoning the mine (B. 
White, Doole, Pannell, & Florec, 2012).   
There are several benefits in using environmental assurance bonds. Firstly, one 
main advantage of the environmental assurance bond system is its ability to account 
for uncertainty. For example, in the flexible environmental assurance bonding system 
as proposed by Costanza and Perrings (1990), it is possible to account for known as 
well as unknown environmental damage. That is, as well as known damage, the bond 
would also equal an estimate of the largest worst case scenario. Secondly it is 
recognised that in securing a bond, the polluting entity would have engaged the 
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assistance of a financial institution. As the risk of the project failing is spread 
between the polluting entity and the financial sector, this creates an incentive for the 
polluting entity to follow through with their promised level of restoration (B. White 
et al., 2012). Any failure to follow through with the promised level of restoration can 
have significant impacts upon the firm’s future reputation and financial standing. 
Another advantage is that in order to get the bond back, the polluting firm must 
prove that material has been disposed of appropriately or that restoration has been 
undertaken at a satisfactory level. Hence, the firm is forced to engage and invest in 
research which improves environmental outcomes  (Costanza & Perrings, 1990). 
This would also prompt firms to engage in higher levels of research for new 
innovative practices that have uncertain outcomes, thereby lowering monitoring costs 
(Perrings, 1989).  
 
2.3 LIMITS OF INCENTIVE BASED SYSTEMS 
From the above, it is evident that there is potential to implement alternative 
incentive based mechanisms to reduce sea dumping of dredged spoil. However, the 
implementation of these policies is impeded by various factors which are further 
described below. 
2.3.1 A tax levy or fee on dredging spoils  
A significant limitation on the effectiveness of the tax is the difficulty of 
setting an appropriate tax rate. As specified above, for the tax to achieve the optimal 
level of pollution, the marginal economic cost must be known. As there is difficulty 
in obtaining knowledge with respect to the developer’s costs of production and the 
extent of the damage to the marine environment (i.e. the social cost), the optimal tax 
rate cannot be set with any great certainty (Pearce & Turner, 1990; Turner et al., 
1994). This problem can greatly undermine the effectiveness of the tax.   
Furthermore, another problem faced by setting an environmental tax is the perception 
of the tax being regressive and an impediment to the international competitiveness of 
the industry in question (Hsu, 2011; Sumner et al., 2011). Such arguments of loss of 
competitiveness have been the basis of many industries in Europe receiving 
exemptions from green taxes (Ekins & Speck, 1999). However, as found by Ekins 
and Speck (1999), the use of such exemptions may reduce the effectiveness of the 
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tax.  As such, rather than use exemptions, they find that both production and 
environmental improvement may be better supported through the use of a tax and 
rebates (Ekins & Speck, 1999).  
2.3.2 Damage quotas or cap and trade systems  
Limitations have also been found with respect to the effectiveness of damage 
quotas or cap and trade systems. Firstly, given that the costs to the marine 
environment are not known with any great certainty, there is the difficulty in 
determining the maximum level of permissible damage and the consumption rate of 
the quota (Tietenberg, 2003). Secondly, given that there would be limited 
information with respect to players in the market and the prices associated with the 
quota, it is evident that market participants would be subject to high transaction 
costs. This was found to be an issue in  the US Sulphur allowance program 
(Tietenberg, 2010). A related limitation is the volatility of permit prices caused by 
the highly inelastic supply of permits and irregular changes in demand (Goulder, 
2013). This volatility could reduce the effectiveness of the cap and trade system, as 
firms may withdraw their participation in the market (Goodstein & Polasky, 2014). If 
dumping entities continue to withhold their permits in the hopes of increasing their 
market power, this can create a barrier to entry for new firms who wish to participate 
in trade (Osborn & Datta, 2006).  A final problem facing incentive based measures is 
the difficulty of “hot spots”: if polluting entities are clustered in similar regional 
areas, certain areas may be subjected to higher levels of dumping than others. The 
problem of hot spots is aggravated with the introduction of permit banking. That is, if 
permits are allowed to be banked for future use, this could cause a continual damage 
to one specific area (Goodstein & Polasky, 2014). In the marine environment, this is 
of particular concern if sensitive areas such as seagrass or coral reefs are constantly 
subjected to spoil dumping (Osborn & Datta, 2006).   
2.3.3 Assurance bonds  
Environmental assurance bonds are also subject to criticisms. Firstly, it has 
been argued that a bond alone may not be enough to encourage a change in 
behaviour so as to reduce damage. Accordingly it may be necessary to combine the 
bond with other incentive based mechanisms such as a tax (B. White et al., 2012). 
Secondly, if the polluting entity claims bankruptcy there is the risk that the bond will 
not be recovered and therefore funds cannot be drawn upon to undertake restoration. 
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However this argument is mitigated by the fact that the bond can be posted before the 
work commences (and placed in a trust fund) as this ensures the funds are available 
for restoration (Costanza & Perrings, 1990). Furthermore, this situation is less likely 
to occur when financial institutions are involved and have guaranteed the bond (B. 
White et al., 2012). Thirdly, although it may be possible to account for uncertainty 
by equating the value of the bond to known costs and cost of damages associated 
with the worst case scenario (Costanza & Perrings, 1990), the bond would be more 
effective if actual costs were known (Shogren, Herriges, & Govindasamy, 1993). 
Fourthly, the effectiveness of the bond is also threatened by issues of moral hazard. 
That is, given that the bond may increase revenue and power for the regulator, a 
situation may arise where the regulator may take the bond irrespective of the 
polluting entity’s compliance with the specified agreement (Shogren et al., 1993).  
2.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The current framework with respect to dredging and dumping of dredge spoil is 
a regulation based system. Damage is mainly controlled through regulation and 
standards which must be met by the developer before dumping can commence. 
Hence, the main incentives created from this framework are the penalties which are 
put in place for not complying with proper procedure. Perverse incentives may also 
be created during the process of applying for a permit to dredge or dump. 
Furthermore, although fees are imposed for dumping, the current fee structure may 
not be enough to ensure damage is contained to the socially optimal level. As such, 
there may be scope for the use of other incentive based measures which may enhance 
natural resource management, such as taxes, cap and trade systems and bonds. 
However, given that there is a lack of information with respect to the cost of the firm 
and the extent of the externality, the setting of an optimal tax, damage quota or bond 
becomes close to impossible. Moreover, although incentive based measures can 
reduce damage caused by dredging and subsequent dumping of dredged spoil, it is 
evident that some residual damage will remain. To alleviate this residual damage, it 
is then necessary to employ methods which restore the environment to its original 
state or better.  
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Measures which are implemented after the developer has sought all necessary 
steps to avoid and mitigate damage are referred to as environmental offsets. The 
general aim of an offset is to achieve no net loss or better (ten Kate et al., 2004). In 
the case of dredging and the dumping of dredge spoils, the developer would seek to 
achieve an environment which is like-for-like or similar to the state of the 
environment before development commenced. However, as the process of dredging 
and dumping can result in damage which is difficult to quantify and restore 
(Erftemeijer & Robin Lewis III, 2006; Pollock et al., 2014; Pringle, 1996; Wolanski 
et al., 1991), it is evident that a like-for-like offset site may not always be possible. 
Therefore, in situations where traditional like-for-like offsets cannot be identified due 
to technical infeasibility or high scientific uncertainty; offsets of broader scope 
should be investigated. Such approaches are considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Economics of offsets  
In the previous chapter, a discussion of incentive based approaches to avoid 
and/or mitigate damage was provided.  In this chapter the notion of an environmental 
offset is explored, using both ecological and economic concepts. The chapter begins 
by outlining some examples of environmental offsets in practice (see section 3.1), 
before proceeding with general classification (see section 3.2) and identification of 
the features of an offset (see section 3.3). In the fourth part of the chapter (see section 
3.4) the general problems associated with offset design, namely the institutional 
issues and ethical concerns are explored. In the fifth section (see section 3.5), the 
measures of ecological equivalence (i.e. habitat equivalency analysis and resource 
equivalency analysis) are described. Section six (see section 3.6) examines the 
economic concepts utilised in offset design. This includes a discussion of the value 
equivalency analysis approach, lessons from non market valuation and distance 
decay studies and consideration of externalities. In the last section, the summary and 
implications of the chapter are outlined. This provides the basis for the Queensland 
offset case study outlined in the following chapters.  
3.1 OFFSET POLICIES IN PRACTICE 
At present, there are many existing and developing environmental offset 
policies across the globe. According to Madsen, Carroll, Kandy, and Bennett (2011) 
there were 45 compensatory mitigation programs for biodiversity loss in existence in 
2011. In addition to this, a further 27 programs were being developed or explored 
(Madsen et al., 2011). In Australia, the federal Environmental Offsets Policy is 
established under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) (EPBCA) (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population 
and Communities, 2012a). The EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy was released 
in October 2012 with an accompanying offset calculator and guide for supplementary 
details regarding its implementation (Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). The EPBCA Environmental Offsets 
Policy has five key aims, which include, but are not limited to: providing clear 
guidance for the timely creation of offsets, which are proportionate to the impact, 
that conform to high scientific standards. In following the mitigation hierarchy, the 
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policy is triggered in the assessment stage of the EIA, after the developer has taken 
all reasonable steps to avoid or mitigate the damage; however a significant impact 
remains likely. The policy assumes the jurisdiction of the EPBC Act under which it 
is created. That is, the policy is concerned with matters of national environmental 
significance. This includes: world and national heritage sites, wetlands of 
international importance under the Ramsar Convention, listed threatened species and 
ecological communities, protected migratory species, Commonwealth marine areas, 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, environments affected by nuclear activities and 
actions involving Commonwealth land (Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). Water resources in relation to coal 
seam gas and large coal mining development have also been added to this list (see 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment Act 2013 (Cth)) 
(Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities 
2013; Department of the Environment, 2013e).  The policy provides guidance in 
relation to terrestrial and aquatic
3
 environmental offsets (Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a).  
Offsets are also present at State and Territory levels around Australia (Madsen, 
Carroll, & Moore Brands, 2010). For illustrative purposes, only the Queensland, 
New South Wales and Victorian offset schemes will be discussed here. At the time of 
writing, the latest version of the policy is the Queensland Environmental Offsets 
Policy 2014 Version 1.1 (State of Queensland, 2014). The new policy replaces the 
previous five offset policies
4
 and is the only policy which should be applied unless 
another policy is specified under the ("Environmental Offsets Regulation 2014 
(Qld),"). The Queensland Environmental Offsets Policy follows the mitigation 
hierarchy in that it requires all reasonable steps to avoid or mitigate damage to be 
taken before an offset is considered. Under the policy, an offset is only applied in 
cases where a significant residual impact will affect a ‘prescribed environmental 
                                                 
 
3
 This includes marine environments (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population 
and Communities, 2012a) . 
4
 These were the Queensland Government Environmental Offsets Policy (2008), the Queensland 
Biodiversity Offsets Policy (2011), the Offsets for Net Gain of Koala Habitat in South East 
Queensland Policy (2010), the Policy for Vegetation Management Offsets (2011) and the Marine Fish 
Habitat Offset Policy (version FHMOP005.2) (State of Queensland, 2014). 
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matter’ (State of Queensland, 2014). This encompasses matters of ‘national’ 5 , 
‘State’6 and ‘local’7 environmental significance which are specified under regulation 
(see section 10(1) of the ("Environmental Offsets Act 2014 (Qld),") (Qld)). 
According to section 10(2) of the Environmental Offsets Act 2014 (Qld), examples 
of prescribed environmental matters include, but are not limited to: “a fish habitat 
area declared under the Fisheries Act 1994” and “vulnerable wildlife prescribed 
under the Nature Conservation Act 1992”.  The new policy also makes provision for 
offsets in the marine and aquatic environments (State of Queensland, 2014). 
In New South Wales, offsets are established through the Biodiversity Banking 
and Offsets Scheme (Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water 
(NSW), 2009; Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW), 2007). The 
scheme is based on the concept of bio-banking, whereby a market is created through 
the buying and selling of biodiversity credits. This market is primarily aimed at 
terrestrial offsets, with landowners generating biodiversity credits to be sold to 
developers whom are required to offset their environmental impacts. A new offsets 
policy (NSW Biodiversity Offsets Policy for Major Projects) has also been 
established in NSW for developments classified as a major project
8
 (State of NSW 
and Office of Environment and Heritage, 2014). At the time of writing, the policy 
was still in its transitional implementation period, however the policy states its 
application is still compulsory during this period. While the policy applies to the 
majority of impacts on biodiversity, some situations will require the matter to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, such as “marine mammals”, “wandering sea birds” 
and “species endemic to Lord How Island”. (State of NSW and Office of 
Environment and Heritage, 2014).  
The Victorian offset program relates to the offsetting of native vegetation 
which has been cleared on land (Department of Environment and Primary Industries 
(The State of Victoria), 2014b). Landowners can choose to offset the impact 
                                                 
 
5
 This is conditional upon Queensland accreditation with respect to environmental offsets under the 
EPBCA 1999 (Cth) (State of Queensland, 2014). 
6
 For matters of State environmental significance see Environmental Offset Regulation 2014 (Qld). 
Schedule 2. (State of Queensland, 2014). 
7
 For matters of local environmental significance see  Environmental Offset Act 2014 (Qld) section 
10(1)(c) (State of Queensland, 2014).  
8
 According to State of NSW and Office of Environment and Heritage (2014, p.9). Major projects 
include state significant development and state significant infrastructure under the NSW planning 
system.  
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themselves or employ the use of a broker, such a BushBroker, to assist them in 
finding an offset site produced by a third party (Department of Environment and 
Primary Industries (The State of Victoria), 2014a, 2014b).  
Apart from Australia, existing and developing offset programs were found in 
North America, Central and South America, Africa, Europe, Asia, and New Zealand 
(Madsen et al., 2011). While these programs are diverse in their conservation aims 
and application, the structural foundations of most offset programs remain the same. 
The classification and general features of offsets are therefore discussed below.  
3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF OFFSETS  
Biodiversity offsets can be classified as either direct or indirect (Bates, 2013; 
Quintero & Mathur, 2011). Direct offsets generally involve activities that result in an 
environmental improvement or activities that lead to the restoration or conservation 
of habitats (Bates, 2013). Although direct offsets are generally preferable due to their 
potential ability to restore the damaged site or surrounding area to its original state or 
better before the damage occurred, physical constraints or lack of knowledge may 
prevent this from occurring (Quintero & Mathur, 2011). On the other hand, indirect 
offsets involve activities which do not directly benefit the affected species through 
immediate restorative action, but offset the impact using some other method 
(Quintero & Mathur, 2011). For example, this could include the funding of 
biodiversity banking or trading, as well as activities which assist conservation 
through research and education. However, as there is no universal guide in creating 
offsets, there are now many variations on offset classification (ten Kate et al., 2004; 
ten Kate & Inbar, 2008).  
In the Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy, a direct offset is one 
which results in a measurable and tangible conservation gain for the impacted 
species (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities, 2012a). The second type of offset referred to in the Australian offset 
policy is an ‘other compensatory measure’ (Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). These types of offsets 
are ones which do not directly address the damage caused through on-ground 
activity, but are specifically aimed at improving conservation gains for the impacted 
species in future through methods such as research and education. The EPBCA 
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Offsets Policy requires that the offset package be comprised of a minimum of 90% 
direct offsets and a maximum of 10% of other compensatory measures (Department 
of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). An 
exception to this offset ratio is only allowed where scientific uncertainty is so high 
that direct offsets cannot be determined or a better result may be achieved through 
the use of other compensatory measures (Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). 
3.3 GENERAL FEATURES OF OFFSETS  
As stated previously, no one universal process exists for creating an 
environmental offset (ten Kate et al., 2004; ten Kate & Inbar, 2008). Furthermore, 
despite the fact that most offsets have certain elements in common, these elements 
will vary depending on the circumstances of which the offset is required. Due to this, 
many offset calculators and frameworks have been created (Madsen et al., 2011; 
Madsen et al., 2010; ten Kate et al., 2004). The following factors are considered 
important in the design of an environmental offset.  
(i) Currency and measurement of compensation  
One of the first steps which must be taken by the developer is the identification 
of potential impacts caused by the development. Evidently, the task is complex and 
the currency of compensation will depend on the type of environment being offset 
(Bull, Suttle, Gordon, Singh, & Milner-Gulland, 2013; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 
2007; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). At present, a range of methods exist to identify and 
measure the effects upon an environment. Quétier and Lavorel (2011) find that such 
methods can either be specific or broad in scope.  For example, there are methods 
where  impacts on a particular type of species are identified (see for example the US 
Conservation Banking scheme which targets endangered species (Madsen et al., 
2010)). Alternatively, there are also broader methods of measurement, such as those 
which analyse the current health of a habitat or whole ecosystem (see for example 
the Victorian Habitat Hectares scoring system whereby to establish equivalence, the 
habitat zone (i.e. native vegetation area measured in hectares) is multiplied by a 
preset habitat score indicative of the habitat’s condition (Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (The State of Victoria), 2004)).  
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When creating the offset, the developer must also consider the suitability of the 
impacted species to adapt to the proposed offset site or if regeneration of the same 
environment is even possible at all (Bonnie & Wilcove, 2008). For example, 
consideration should be given to whether the affected species or habitat is 
particularly hard to restore or would involve the recreation of long established 
ecosystems (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). In some offset policies, it may be possible to 
protect a species which is not affected by the development, provided it is classified as 
more endangered (or has higher conservation priority) than the impacted species. 
This concept is referred to as the ‘trading up’ of species  (ICMM IUCN, 2012; ten 
Kate et al., 2004).  
 
(ii) Location 
The location of an offset site is of critical importance to ensure that no net loss 
is achieved. Generally, there is a preference for the offset to be located in close 
proximity to the impacted site, such that the same ecological processes are likely to 
be recreated and the benefits are received by the area that was impacted. However, 
scope for the implementation of offsets in areas located further away from the 
impacted site may arise if the main intention of the offset is to uphold conservation 
priorities as opposed to achieving a like-for-like environment (ten Kate et al., 2004). 
The preference for an offset which occurs in close proximity to the impacted site is 
reflected in the Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy (Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). However 
the Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy also has some leeway for the 
creation of offsets further away from the impacted site, provided that this results in 
greater conservation benefits for the affected species (Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). In the Brazilian Forest 
offsets policy, landowners with large properties (i.e greater than 50 hectares) are 
required to preserve 20% of the native vegetation on their land. If this requirement 
cannot be met, the property owner should then create an offset using land within the 
vicinity of their property to maintain the same type of vegetation (ten Kate et al., 
2004).  
  
Chapter 3: Economics of offsets 33 
(iii) Size and Scale 
In instances where there may be problems with restoration, it may be necessary 
to increase the size of the offset (Moilanen, Teeffelen, Ben-Haim, & Ferrier, 2009; 
Quétier & Lavorel, 2011).  Thus, to account for the diversity and complexity of 
biodiversity lost and in an attempt to secure ecological function, the size of the offset 
is calculated using an appropriate biodiversity offset multiplier or ratio (Levrel, 
Pioch, & Spieler, 2012; Moilanen et al., 2009). According to the type of environment 
to be assessed and the policy already in place, the multiplier or ratio is generally 
either calculated according to preset guidelines (see Victorian Habitat Hectares) or 
on a case by case basis (see for example US Conservation Banking) (Madsen et al., 
2010; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). Another example is seen in the Queensland offsets 
policy; where in order to ensure that the offset is proportional to the impact, a 
maximum multiplier of four
9
 can be applied (State of Queensland, 2014).   
(iv) Timing and duration  
To properly achieve no net loss or better, the proponent of the project must first 
face the challenge of identifying the exact point in time at which the damage 
occurred (ie. the baseline of the damage) and when recovery should begin 
(McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). Evidently, the identification of appropriate 
baselines for damage and recovery can be contentious and depends on a multitude of 
factors, including but not limited to; the sensitivity of the species or ecosystem and 
the severity of the damage caused (Bonnie & Wilcove, 2008; Quétier & Lavorel, 
2011). For example, if it is forecast that optimal results for recovery of a species 
could take place within a particular season or period; any delays in beginning 
restoration could potentially have detrimental effects in achieving no net loss 
(Bonnie & Wilcove, 2008; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011).  
Potential time lags must also be considered here, as any risk of delay in 
recovery could greatly decrease the chance of achieving no net loss (Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). It has been suggested that concerns 
arising from the problem of time lags may be alleviated with the use of biodiversity 
                                                 
 
9
 An exception to this is connectivity impacts, in which case the multiplier is 1 (State of Queensland, 
2014).   
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banking. Biodiversity banking involves the use of a market mechanism, whereby 
developers buy biodiversity credits from a conservation bank in order to offset their 
environmental impacts (Mead, 2008). This mechanism has already been adopted by 
many offset schemes, including, but not limited to: the NSW BioBanking scheme, 
the US Conservation Banking, US Wetland  and Stream Mitigation Banking and the 
Canadian Fish Habitat Banking  scheme  (Alvarado-Quesada, Hein, & Weikard, 
2014; Madsen et al., 2010). However, as discussed below, the ethical issues 
associated with bio-banking may mean this solution is not acceptable in some cases.    
In addition to time considerations in achieving no net loss, there is also the 
issue of how long the proponent should be responsible for maintaining the site after 
no net loss is achieved (Bonnie & Wilcove, 2008; ten Kate et al., 2004).  In general, 
it is preferred that the developer should be held accountable for the offset site in 
perpetuity, however the time varies according to the length and intensity of the 
impact, recovery and the legal status of the offset site (Fallding, 2014; McKenney & 
Kiesecker, 2010).   
 
(v) Uncertainty of outcome  
A related consideration to the aspect of time is uncertainty. Arguably the 
amount of uncertainty will differ according to the type of offset chosen. For example, 
the removal or control of invasive species has a more predictable outcome then 
attempting to totally recreate the damaged site in a different location (Hilderbrand, 
Watts, & Randle, 2005; Maron et al., 2012). However even if the offset scheme has 
passed several feasibility studies, unforeseen circumstances could still lead to delays 
or even the possibility of completely failing to achieve ecological equivalence 
(Burgin, 2008). Although many attempts have been made to counter the effects of 
uncertainty by increasing the compensation ratio, it is recognised that scaling the 
offset multiplier or ratio in this way does not necessarily secure the desired 
ecological outcome (Dunford, Ginn, & Desvousges, 2004; Levrel et al., 2012; 
Moilanen, Teeffelen, Ben-Haim, & Ferrier, 2009). Furthermore, although consistent 
monitoring of the offset site can reduce uncertain outcomes, the practical limitations 
of constant monitoring must also be acknowledged (Bonnie & Wilcove, 2008).   
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(vi)  Additionality  
An essential criterion for offsets is that of additionality. According to 
McKenney and Kiesecker (2010, p.170) “ “Additionality” refers to the need for 
offsets to provide a new contribution to conservation, additional to any existing 
values”. To satisfy the criteria of additionality, the developer must ensure that the 
offset creates an additional conservation gain. In other words, an offset should result 
in an environmental improvement, which is in addition to other environmental 
improvements that would have proceeded in the absence of the offset (Bos, Pressey, 
& Stoeckl, 2014; Gardner et al., 2013; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010).  If the criteria 
of additionality is not satisfied, the offset will be invalid, given that residual impacts 
will still be present (ICMM IUCN, 2012).  
       
(vii) Social acceptability of the offsets  
One final aspect of an offset which must be considered by the environmental 
manager is the social acceptability of an offset. Given that the development and the 
offset project may directly or indirectly affect both the surrounding and wider 
community, any failure to account for the social aspects of these activities may result 
in negative consequences for the developer (e.g delays and tarnished reputation) (ten 
Kate et al., 2004). The Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy also 
encourages offsets which result in social, economic or environmental co-benefits. 
However, the EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy makes clear that this should not 
be the main goal of the offset, but rather it is secondary to the main goal of achieving 
a conservation gain for the protected matter (Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a).   
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3.4 GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH OFFSET IMPLEMENTATION  
3.4.1 Ecological Issues  
A significant problem in designing biodiversity offsets is the physical 
challenge of recreating a habitat similar to the one which was impacted (i.e. a like-
for-like offset) (Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007). For example, seagrass offsets are 
particularly difficult to implement given the uncertainty of the environment, the 
limited information available with respect to prospective offset sites and the 
inadequacy of advanced planting techniques (Bell, Saunders, Lovelock, & 
Possingham, 2014). Moreover, although species banking has been utilised for 
terrestrial biodiversity offsets as a solution to prevent delays in recovery, it appears 
attempts to use species banking for marine biodiversity (eg. fish banking) is limited 
(Cannon & Brown, 2008). Reluctance to implement marine species banking may be 
attributed to the position that such schemes should only be utilised for small impact 
projects given the regulatory and jurisdictional challenges and fear of high financial 
costs (Agardy, 2008; Cannon & Brown, 2008).  
3.4.2 Transaction Costs 
A related problem is the transaction costs incurred when setting up biodiversity 
offsets. According to McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, and Kuperan (2005, p.530) 
transaction costs may be defined as “...the resources used to define, establish, 
maintain, and transfer property rights”. Coggan, Buitelaar, Whitten, and Bennett 
(2013) found that transaction costs of offset schemes are influenced by many factors 
including characteristics of the transaction and parties of the transaction, as well as 
the nature of the institutional environment and agreements. More specifically, of 
these factors it was found that asset specificity and policy design were prominent 
influences (Coggan et al., 2013). Hence, when applied to the marine environment, it 
appears that transaction costs of a marine offsets may be high given that the nature of 
the environment makes offset sites difficult to locate and the fact that the marine 
offset market is limited in comparison to terrestrial schemes.  
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3.4.3 Ethical considerations  
Environmental legislation across Australia encompasses a general duty of care 
to protect the environment from pollution (Tooma, 2011), as well as provisions in 
relation to sustainable development in line with the principles outlined in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Bates, 2013). However, ethical problems are 
still present in the design of biodiversity offsets. Initially, there exists the problem of 
whether it is ethical to place a price on biodiversity at all (Spurgeon, 1992). 
Similarly, other ethical problems arise from the concept of trading biodiversity 
credits or bio-banking schemes. As mentioned above, these schemes involve the 
creation of an equivalent biodiversity site before the damage occurs, which can be 
purchased by the developer from a third party organisation (ten Kate et al., 2004). 
The concern arises from the potential to bypass the mitigation hierarchy and the 
ability to trade biodiversity like a common commodity (Baird, 2003; Hayes & 
Morrison-Saunders, 2007; Maron et al., 2012).  
On the other side of the spectrum to biodiversity banking, there exists the 
concept of offsets which involve killing for conservation. Numerous studies have 
shown that the eradication or control of invasive species can have significant impacts 
on preventing species extinction and can assist in helping the environment recover its 
natural state  (Donlan & Wilcox, 2008; Pascal, Lorvelec, Bretagnolle, & Culioli, 
2008). Moreover, the negative effects of invasive species upon conservation were 
even recognised at the 1992 Rio Summit (Pascal et al., 2008). Thus, this offers huge 
potential for use in biodiversity offsets schemes. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
concerns regarding animal welfare and social acceptability are associated with this 
approach. For example, certain weight must be given to the most humane method of 
killing the invasive species in question and ensuring that no non-target species are 
affected (Courchamp, Chapuis, & Pascal, 2003; Cowan & Warburton, 2011). 
Furthermore, unsuccessful species eradications may result in greater mass killings of 
animals in an attempt to rectify past mistakes (Cowan & Warburton, 2011). Hence, it 
is generally acknowledged that this type of offset should only be utilised if it is 
deemed as absolutely necessary, the benefits far outweigh the costs and the method 
of killing is humane (Cowan & Warburton, 2011; van Dooren, 2011).  
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3.5 ECOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE OF OFFSETS: HEA AND REA 
In meeting the no net loss goal, biodiversity offsets are expected to attain the 
level of ecological equivalence (or better) of the impacted site before the damage 
occurred. According to Strange et al. (2002, p. 290) “Ecological equivalence refers to 
capacity of a restored, created or enhanced habitat to reproduce the ecological 
structures and functions provided by a resource before injury.” To achieve, 
ecological equivalence, two main techniques have been utilised. These are service to 
service or habitat equivalency analysis (HEA) and resource to resource or resource 
equivalency analysis (REA) (Cole, 2010).  Although HEA and REA remain the same 
in many respects, their main difference lies in the unit of measurement. For HEA it is 
habitats or whole ecosystems through services lost, while for REA what is measured 
is the number of injured animals or species (eg. fish, birds or turtles etc) (Cole, 2010; 
Martin-Ortega, Brouwer, & Aiking, 2011; Strange et al., 2002).   
The concept of HEA was initially explored by Unsworth and Bishop (1994) 
and Mazzotta, Opaluch, and Grigalunas (1994). Since this time, the HEA/REA 
frameworks have been used in the US by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) in their natural resource damage assessments for oil spills 
and other hazardous substances (Dunford, Ginn, & Desvousges, 2004; Martin-Ortega 
et al., 2011; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1995).  Today, both 
HEA and REA are also used in the context of determining biodiversity offsets 
(Dunford et al., 2004; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011).  
Despite the many variations in HEA and REA  (see for example (Hampton & 
Zafonte, 2002; Mazzotta et al., 1994; National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1995; Penn & Tomasi, 2002; Strange et al., 2002; Zafonte & 
Hampton, 2007), the following three steps are generally used as the basis for both 
methods. First, a “debit calculation” is undertaken to calculate the net present value 
of the injury or the amount of natural services or resources which would have 
remained if the damage had not occurred (Hampton & Zafonte, 2002; Strange et al., 
2002). Secondly, a “credit calculation” is performed to determine how much 
restoration is required to offset the damage (i.e. return to baseline) (Hampton & 
Zafonte, 2002; Strange et al., 2002).  Thirdly, the restoration project is sufficiently 
scaled to ensure the compensatory project is proportionate to the damage done 
(Fonseca, Julius, & Kenworthy, 2000; Hampton & Zafonte, 2002; Strange et al., 
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2002). The discount rate plays an important role in both HEA and REA as it is 
necessary to count gains and losses by their value in the present year (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1995).  In the US, an annual discount rate 
of three percent has been advocated by NOAA, on the basis that this best reflected 
the social rate of time preference (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1999). In Australia, the annual probability of extinction is used as 
the discount factor when calculating the offset. This discount factor is based on the 
annual probability of extinction provided by International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List for threatened species (Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a, 2012b).  
Overall it is evident that in conducting HEA or REA, much care must be given to the 
identification of the baselines and timeframes for damage and recovery, as well as 
the discount rate (Mazzotta et al., 1994; Penn & Tomasi, 2002; Strange et al., 2002).   
Notwithstanding the wide use of HEA and REA in calculating habitat and 
resource based compensation today, these methods are not without flaws. REA’s 
main weakness is its inability to conduct individual analysis for every species 
affected due to concerns of impracticality, time consumption and cost (Hampton & 
Zafonte, 2002; Mazzotta et al., 1994; Zafonte & Hampton, 2007). To alleviate this 
problem, some have suggested the grouping of similar species together. However,  
care must be taken when choosing the surrogate species, as the proxy species must be 
suitable enough to represent a group of species which all have different attributes 
(Hampton & Zafonte, 2002). Nevertheless, although the risk of inaccuracy remains, 
the use of a proxy still appears to be well received (Hampton & Zafonte, 2002).  
Concern has also arisen with regards to possibility of HEA underestimating the 
amount of compensation required to achieve ecological equivalence. That is, as HEA 
only aims to ensure the restored habitat produces the same quantity of services which 
were lost, this measurement does not necessarily result in the same quality of 
services (Paetzold, Warren, & Maltby, 2010).   
HEA and REA have also been criticised for the assumptions which they make. 
Firstly, both methods assume that the injured habitats or resources can be easily 
replaced with perfect substitutes (Dunford et al., 2004; Flores & Thatcher, 2002; 
Martin-Ortega et al., 2011).  However the substitutability assumption is bold, given 
the fragile and delicate nature of some habitats or species, coupled with the 
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uncertainty of future events as mentioned above (Flores & Thatcher, 2002; Martin-
Ortega et al., 2011).  Secondly, both methods make inaccurate assumptions about the 
value of the injured and restored services or resources. For example, given that each 
individual has a different level of utility, it is unrealistic to assume that each person 
values the compensatory project in the same way (Flores & Thatcher, 2002; Zafonte 
& Hampton, 2007). Furthermore, both HEA and REA methods make an inaccurate 
assumption that the value of the compensatory service or resource will remain 
constant over time. However, this assumption is dangerous as it could lead to an 
under or overestimation of compensation, depending on the variations in supply and 
demand of the service or resource being offset (Dunford et al., 2004; Zafonte & 
Hampton, 2007). Such limitations in HEA and REA should therefore be carefully 
considered when designing biodiversity offsets.  
3.6 ECONOMIC EQUIVALENCE 
While HEA and REA remain important for achieving ecological equivalence, 
there may be some instances where other methods of measuring equivalence are 
more appropriate. For example, HEA and REA cannot be used to measure 
equivalence in situations where the compensatory project does not result in the same 
habitat or resource which was lost (Borrego, 2011). Moreover, HEA and REA are 
unable to capture or value the significant losses in social welfare caused by the 
damage to the environment (Borrego, 2011). By the same logic, HEA and REA do 
not account for the any of the social benefits (i.e. positive externalities) which may 
occur from the compensatory project. Therefore, in such situations, a case is 
presented for economic valuation. 
3.6.1 Value Equivalency Analysis (VEA) 
In economics, the value of environmental damage and restoration is measured 
with reference to total economic value. Total economic value is comprised of three 
main components. The first component is referred to as use value (Pearce & Turner, 
1990). While use values can encompass the commercial value of the resource which 
was lost (e.g. measured by loss in income), use values may also include the value of 
the resource held by individuals for non-commercial purposes. More specifically, 
non-commercial use can include direct use of the environment (e.g. for recreational 
or health purposes) and indirect uses of the environment such the value of resource’s 
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ecological functions (e.g. coastal protection (King, 1995), CO2 capture and storage, 
waste absorption and detoxification and other marine services (Armstrong, Foley, 
Tinch, & van den Hove, 2012)).  
The second component of total economic value is referred to as non-use value. 
Non-use values may be further split into existence and bequest values. The former, is 
the value that an individual attributes to the mere existence of the resource without 
even using it. Put another way, it is the value of simply knowing that the resource 
exists. This value may be explained with reference to the altruistic nature of human 
beings, such that some people may sympathise with the animals and other people that 
utilise the environment (Pearce & Turner, 1990). On the other hand, bequest value is 
the desire to bequest the same environment or resource to future generations (King, 
1995). In both cases, the motive to ensure that the environment is properly 
maintained is measured by how much a person is willing to pay to keep the resource 
in its current state or better (King, 1995; Pearce & Turner, 1990).  
The final component of total economic value is referred to as option value. The 
option value is the value attributed to the ‘option’ of being able to enjoy the resource 
at any given time. Hence, the option value is reflected in a person’s willingness to 
pay for an environmental improvement under the assumption that the resource could 
be used in the future (King, 1995).   
The method for measuring compensation using economic valuation is referred 
to as value equivalency analysis (VEA). This procedure involves measuring the 
damage and benefit restoration of the natural resource through a monetary metric. In 
other words, it is similar to the debit, credit, and scaling steps used in HEA and REA 
above, however the metric is the social value of the loss and restoration, expressed in 
monetary terms (Borrego, 2011). The advantage of using money to value damage 
and restoration is twofold. Firstly, by using a single unit of measurement for the 
value of the damage and restoration, the equivalence of the compensatory project 
against the damage may be verified (Farber, Costanza, & Wilson, 2002). Secondly, 
unlike HEA and REA, VEA provides an approximation of the value of the resource 
to society (Farber et al., 2002; Pearce & Turner, 1990). In general, value equivalency 
analysis can be subclassed into the value to value approach or the value to cost 
approach (C. A. Jones & Pease, 1997). The value to value approach calculates 
compensation by measuring the damage caused and benefit of restoration either in 
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terms of the public’s willingness to pay (WTP) to protect the environment or 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation. Whereas the value to cost method 
calculates compensation by measuring the economic value of the services which 
were lost (Borrego, 2011; C. A. Jones & Pease, 1997).  
To implement VEA, two main types of non-market valuation methods may be 
employed. These are the revealed preference valuation methodology and the stated 
preference valuation method. In the former, values are estimated using observed 
behaviour, whereas the latter asks respondents to state preferences in response to a 
hypothetical situation (Pearce & Turner, 1990). Examples of each method are further 
discussed in Chapter 4, however some general limitations are discussed here.  
In general, non-market valuation is subject to the problems of: inconsistent and 
inaccurate measurements, survey bias and criticisms of immorality (Spurgeon, 1992). 
These problems are also evident for the marine environment. Foremost, most of the 
impacts occur underwater and are not readily observable by the general public, who 
are also less familiar with the implications of such impacts on marine biodiversity. 
Public misconceptions about the usefulness of some marine resources may also lead 
to underestimation in value (Beaumont, Austen, Mangi, & Townsend, 2008). 
Another issue is the fact that valuation is subjective, such that a persons’ given 
valuation may be influenced by their socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes 
towards the context of the study (Ledoux & Turner, 2002).  
Despite this, there have been attempts to value marine services (see for 
example (Beaumont et al., 2008; Ledoux & Turner, 2002; Ressurreição et al., 2011; 
TEEB, 2013)). However, while such initiatives result in valuable information for 
calculating restoration values, the inability to capture the value of all marine services 
means that large gaps in knowledge still exist (Armstrong et al., 2012).  
The reliability of derived values for marine species estimates at the species 
level is also uncertain, with the values not aligning to ecological function. There is 
evidence to suggest that differences in WTP exist for certain types of species over 
others based on physical appearance and likeability (Loomis & White, 1996; 
Richardson & Loomis, 2009). However, as pointed out by Ressurreição et al. (2011), 
the differences in WTP based on species may not be as large as previously thought. 
More specifically, Ressurreição et al. (2011) find that public is capable of providing 
valid valuation about biodiversity without singling out certain species.  
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Consequently, these issues must be carefully considered if VEA is to be utilised in 
the design of offsets.  
3.6.2 Moving away from the impacted site: Lessons from non-market valuation 
and distance decay 
A common feature observed in many environmental valuation studies is the 
effect of distance upon how an individual values a certain site. Generally, it has been 
found that the further the respondent is from the site in question, the less willing they 
are to pay for its conservation. This trend is referred to as the ‘distance decay effect’ 
(Hanley, Schläpfer, & Spurgeon, 2003; Loomis, 2000; Schaafsma, Brouwer, & Rose, 
2012).   
The following have been cited as possible causes of distance decay. Firstly, it 
may be that the further an individual is from the site, the more difficult it becomes to 
use, and therefore less value is attributed to the site (Hanley et al., 2003; Pate & 
Loomis, 1997; Rolfe & Windle, 2012a). Secondly, some evidence has shown that the 
distance decay effect is also aggravated by the presence of numerous close substitute 
sites. More specifically the closer the individual is to a substitute site or sites, the 
more likely they will visit these sites over the policy site and therefore the less value 
is attributed to the policy site that is further away (Bateman, Day, Georgiou, & Lake, 
2006; Schaafsma et al., 2012). Thirdly, the knowledge of some individuals may be 
limited to sites within their local area. Hence, being unaware of the existence of the 
policy site or the lack of connection to a site may also lead to a decline in protection 
values (Hanley et al., 2003; Rolfe & Windle, 2012a). However, some studies have 
shown that distance decay is limited for iconic or nationally significant sites. Rolfe 
and Windle (2012b) found that there were similar protection values between 
residents surrounding the Great Barrier Reef and the residents of Brisbane. They 
propose that this result could be attributed to the iconic nature of the Reef and the 
fact that it is valued by Queensland residents (Rolfe & Windle, 2012b). Similarly, 
another study by Rolfe and Windle (2012a) found that residents across the nation 
generally held the same protection values for the Great Barrier Reef despite their 
distance from the site. Reasons for the lack of distance decay may be the 
irreplaceable nature of the Great Barrier Reef and the widespread knowledge of its 
condition, given its status as a national treasure (Rolfe & Windle, 2012a). 
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3.6.3 Externalities of offsets  
In general, damage created by the development results in negative externalities 
as the full cost of damage is not borne by the developer (Pearce & Turner, 1990). 
Hence, the use of an environmental offsets may be one way of correcting the 
negative externalities associated with the development. However, there may also be 
instances where positive externalities may result from the development of an offset. 
Biodiversity offsets can also create many positive externalities to the broader 
community. The potential for offsets to bring gains to a community is recognised in 
the Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy, as offsets which bring social, 
economic and or environmental co-benefits are encouraged. Nevertheless, the policy 
makes clear that while such co-benefits are endorsed, this goal is only secondary to 
ensuring the offset delivers conservation gains for the affected species (Department 
of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a).  Note 
this is not to say that offsets should be encouraged on the basis that the offset can 
create positive externalities. Offsets are of course a measure of last resort. Rather, if 
offsets are required, then regard should be given to the possibility of creating positive 
externalities.  
3.7 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
In following the mitigation hierarchy, it may not always be possible for 
developers to completely avoid and/or minimise (or mitigate) the damage created by 
their project. If environmental offsets are to be used, the offset criteria above must be 
carefully considered to ensure there is no net loss to the species affected. In general, 
to achieve ecological equivalence, it is seen that most offset policies prefer the use of 
an offset which achieves an environment which is ‘like-for-like’ or equivalent to 
what was lost. This usually encompasses the use of a direct offset located as close as 
possible to the impacted site. Nevertheless, the like-for-like offset may not be viable 
for areas where the impacts of the damage cannot be calculated due to high scientific 
uncertainty (e.g. the marine environment). In these cases, developers are required to 
use alternative types of offsets. This could include, but are not limited to: the 
protection of similar habitats in locations further away from the impacted site, the 
protection of different, but more endangered species or the funding of research and 
education such that the impacted species may be better managed in the future. Given 
that ecological equivalence may not be immediately achieved with the use of 
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alternative offsets, economic equivalence can be used to determine if such offsets are 
perceived as adequate compensation. In the next chapters, some of these issues will 
be further examined through the use of a hypothetical case study and a choice 
experiment.  
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Chapter 4: Research Design  
The previous chapter examined the concept of an environmental offset. The 
general features of offsets, implementation problems and measures of both ecological 
and economic equivalence were discussed. In this chapter, the research design is 
described of the study used to ascertain which types of offsets were preferred by the 
Queensland public, in the context of compensating for damage to coastal and marine 
environments, and also what were the additional benefits required to make different 
options preferable.  
The main approach that has been adopted to undertake the analysis is choice 
modelling, a non-market valuation method which has also been used in other studies 
to establish preferences in a non-valuation context (Wattage, Mardle, & Pascoe, 
2005). The first section of the chapter gives an overview of the methodology. In this 
section an overview of stated and revealed preference approaches, including choice 
modelling and other non-market valuation techniques is provided. This is followed 
by the theoretical underpinnings of choice modelling and its application in the 
context of environmental management. Section 4.2 of the chapter describes the 
research design which outlines the background, context and construction of the 
choice set and survey used in the study. The target group of the study are described 
in the third section of the chapter (see section 4.3). The fourth section of the chapter 
(section 4.4) outlines the procedure and timeline for when the study was conducted 
and completed. The final section of the chapter (section 4.5) outlines how the choice 
models were analysed. This includes an outline of how models were constructed and 
the calculation of respondents’ willingness to accept.     
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4.1  METHODOLOGY  
4.1.1 Non-market valuation techniques 
In the context of evaluating non-market benefits of the environment, one 
commonly applied technique is the revealed preference methodology. First 
established by Samuelson (1938, 1948), the revealed preference theory postulates 
that the preferences of a consumer can be revealed by examining the choices or 
purchases which they make. Specific types of revealed preference techniques are the 
travel cost method and hedonic pricing method (Hanley, Shogren, & White, 2001). 
Under the travel cost method, the value of enjoying a particular site or resource may 
be revealed through examining the individual’s expenditure on the trip to use the site 
or resource. The observed travel cost could include but is not limited to the cost to 
getting to and from the site, accommodation or access or entry fees spent to use the 
resource or site. Consequently, the travel cost method is mainly used in the context 
of valuing sites used for recreational activities (Hanley, Shogren, et al., 2001). On the 
other hand, the hedonic pricing method infers the value of the resource or 
environment by examining the price of goods which are related to the particular 
resource or environment in question. For example, the price a consumer is willing to 
pay for a particular residential property can serve as an indication of how valuable 
the attributes of the property are to the consumers (Hanley, Shogren, et al., 2001).  
The revealed preference method is attractive due to its use of actual market 
data, but it is not without flaws. One challenge faced by advocates of revealed 
preference is that external factors could cause a change in travel cost or price in the 
related good. Failure to account for this may lead to incorrect assumptions about the 
value of the resource or environmental site (Goodstein & Polasky, 2014). The second 
limitation of the revealed preference methodology lies in the very core of the 
technique itself. That is, as the revealed preference method relies on observed 
consumer behaviour, this method cannot be employed to elicit preferences for new 
products or goods which are not sold in real markets (e.g. environmental or public 
goods) (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001; Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). The 
preferences for environmental offsets must therefore be elicited through the use of 
other techniques.  
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An alternative method of valuing nonmarket benefits is stated preference 
approaches. The stated preference method of evaluation involves giving respondents 
a hypothetical situation, whereby the respondent is directly asked about their 
preferences for environmental improvement (Freeman III, Herriges, & Kling, 2014). 
One of the most commonly applied stated preference methods for environmental 
valuation is the contingent valuation method (Carson, 2011; Carson et al., 2001). The 
contingent valuation technique involves the use of a survey to ask respondents how 
much they would be willing to pay to bring forth an environmental improvement or 
would be willing to accept to allow damage to the environment (Hanley, Shogren, et 
al., 2001). This method is referred to as contingent valuation as the answers given by 
respondents are ‘contingent’ or conditioned on the way the question is asked. 
Accordingly, much care must be taken in constructing the questionnaire to avoid 
careless responses from participants which may lead to incorrect willingness to pay 
or accept estimates (Carson, 2011; Carson et al., 2001). Another criticism of the 
contingent valuation method is the incapability of the method to examine a large 
number of preferences at once.  To do so would require the use of subsequent 
surveys and would therefore run the risk of obtaining valuations which may be 
affected from the previous survey (Carson, 2011). To alleviate such problems, other 
techniques may be employed.  
4.1.2 Choice Modelling 
Discrete choice experiments are a stated preference method of valuation, 
whereby respondents are asked to choose from a set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives (here offset options), characterised by a number of attributes (i.e. the 
elements of an offset) which vary according to a given number of specified levels 
(Adamowicz, Louviere, & Swait, 1998). Unlike the contingent valuation 
methodology, the choice modelling technique is praised for its ability to consider 
multiple attributes and options at once  (Bennett & Blamey, 2001). By combining the 
attributes at various levels, many alternatives may be constructed to form a choice 
set. The utility gained from each offset strategy (and therefore offset attributes) can 
then be estimated through analysing the tradeoffs between choices (Adamowicz, 
Louviere, et al., 1998; Hensher, Rose, & Green, 2005).   
According to the traditional concept of consumer theory, a consumer will 
maximise their utility subject to their budget constraint. Consequently, it is expected 
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that a rational consumer will choose product X over product Y, only if the utility 
derived from product X is higher than that of product Y (Hensher et al., 2005). 
However, as proposed by Lancaster (1966), utility is not derived from choosing the 
product as a whole, but rather from the characteristics of the chosen product. In 
addition to Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value, choice modelling is based in 
random utility theory (RUT) (Manski, 1977; McFadden, 1974; Thurstone, 1927). 
According to RUT, an individual’s utility (U) is composed of two main components. 
The first component is the systematic or known component of utility Vni , whereas the 
second component is the random or unexplainable component of utility ɛni. 
Following Hensher et al. (2005) the formal derivation of individual (n)’s  utility for 
site i can now be seen as: 
 
 
 
 
As the random component of utility remains unobservable to the researcher, the 
aim is to elicit an individual’s utility from the observable component of utility. There 
are many variables which may influence a person’s utility. As specified by Hanley, 
Wright, and Adamowicz (1998), variables which are generally examined as being a 
part of a person’s utility are the individual characteristics of the respondent (S) (e.g. 
this includes but is not limited to socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics) and 
the attributes of the site in question (Z). Following Hanley et al. (1998) the utility 
equation may be specified as: 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability of an individual choosing option i over option j is seen in the 
equation below. This equation states that, the probability that an individual will 
choose option i, from choice set C, is equal to the probability that the utility received 
from option i is greater than the utility received from any other option in the choice 
set (option j) (Hanley et al., 1998).  
 
 >  
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To estimate the above equation, certain assumptions must be made about the 
distribution of the error terms. That is, the errors are assumed to be Gumbel-
distributed and independently and identically distributed (IID) (McFadden, 1974). 
Following Hanley et al. (1998), if these assumptions are satisfied, then the 
probability of choosing site i over any other site j can be formally defined as:  
 
 
where μ is a scale parameter. Typically, an individual’s probability of choosing 
a site is most commonly modeled using a multinomial logit (MNL) model (Hensher 
et al., 2005; Louviere, 2001). The MNL model is characterized by the assumption of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption states that the 
probability of choosing between two alternatives should not be affected by any of the 
other alternatives (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). The MNL model is estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; McFadden, 1974).  
There are of course disadvantages to using the choice modelling approach. As 
a stated preference method, choice modelling suffers the possibility of hypothetical 
bias (Hensher, 2010). A specific problem related to choice modelling is the cognitive 
burden placed on respondents when completing the choice set (Bennett & Blamey, 
2001). If the choice set is too complex, this may lead to respondent fatigue or 
respondents ignoring certain attributes to make the exercise easier. Alternatively, in 
an attempt to minimise the difficulty of the task, respondents may misuse the status 
quo option as the easy way out (Bennett & Blamey, 2001). Another problem is the 
possibility of respondents protesting against the choice set exercise. For example, if 
respondents disliked the policy or options presented to them, they may protest by 
continually choosing the status quo or another option (Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001).  
If any of these cases were to arise, the results of the choice experiment would result 
in biased estimates. However, as will be seen in the practical application of the 
choice modelling for this thesis, there are ways of mitigating these issues.   
Choice modelling has become a popular tool in natural resource management.  
One of the earliest studies to use choice modelling for environmental management 
was a study conducted by Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams (1994), which 
examined the preferences for water-based recreation in Canada. Since this time, the 
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popularity of choice modelling in environmental management has grown (Hanley, 
Mourato, & Wright, 2001). For example, choice modelling has been used in the 
context of eliciting the willingness to pay for improvements to various sites and 
resources. This includes, but is not limited to the generation of values for: 
recreational moose hunting (Boxall, Adamowicz, Swait, Williams, & Louviere, 
1996)), wetlands (Birol & Cox, 2007), rivers (Hanley, Wright, & Alvarez-Farizo, 
2006; Morrison & Bennett, 2004), urban parks (Concu, 2007), lakes (Schaafsma et 
al., 2012) and the Great Barrier Reef (Rolfe & Windle, 2013). With respect to 
environmental offsets, choice experiments have been utilised to value community 
preferences for seagrass and shorebird offsets in Western Australia (Kay, 2013; 
Richert, 2013; Rogers, Burton, Richert, & Kay, 2014).  
For this thesis, the aim of the second study was to determine which offset 
strategy (and characteristics of the offset strategy) was most preferred by the 
Queensland public. Particular attention is given to the role of distance from the 
impacted site, the type of offset used and the potential to implement the trading up of 
species. As there was no existing market data in relation to offset choices and the 
study required the examination of multiple attributes, it was evident that the choice 
experiment technique was the most appropriate method for achieving this goal. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.2.1 Background to choice experiment and survey  
The survey used in this study
10
 was primarily based on an earlier study in 
relation to community preferences for marine biodiversity offsets in Western 
Australia (hereby referred to as the WA study) (Rogers et al., 2014). The earlier WA 
study was undertaken as part of a project for the National Environmental Research 
Program (NERP) Marine Biodiversity Hub in 2013 (Rogers et al., 2014). The WA 
study was primarily aimed at assessing preferences for different offset options. In 
contrast, the present study has extended the analysis to look at tradeoffs between 
options as well as deriving willingness to accept (i.e. compensation) for different 
options. In particular, this study has expanded on the WA study by focusing more on 
                                                 
 
10
 A copy of the survey used in this study is available upon request.  
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the role of distance, and method and the potential for the trading up of species. 
Moreover, unlike the WA study, this study estimates the additional number of 
shorebirds required to become equivalent to the baseline or default preferred offset. 
The present study also examined respondents’ opinions with respect to receiving 
offsets into their home state and sending offsets to other locations. 
The survey was comprised of five main parts. In first part of the survey, 
respondents were introduced to the concept of offsets and were asked about their 
familiarity with offsetting different environmental impacts. The second part of the 
survey concerned the choice set exercise. In this section, respondents were given a 
hypothetical, but realistic scenario that described a development and its impact on the 
coastal and marine environment. This was followed by a series of choice scenarios of 
which respondents were asked to choose their most preferred. Immediately after 
completing the choice set exercise, questions relating to the opinions of the choice 
set exercise were then presented to respondents. Parts three and four were designed 
to ascertain the motivation behind respondents’ choices. The final part of the survey 
concerned the collection of general socio-demographic information and involvement 
in environmental activities. Descriptions of the choice set design, introductory 
questions and follow up questions are presented below.  
4.2.2 Case scenario for choice experiment 
The case scenario for the choice experiment involved a development which 
would impact the Queensland coastal and marine environment. Respondents were 
told that the development would have a significant impact upon 1000 migratory 
shorebirds.  The hypothetical scenario and offset characteristics were based on the 
ecology and annual migration route of the 36 species of migratory shorebirds which 
visit Australia each year. These birds breed in the northern part of the globe and 
migrate to Australia along a flight path called the East Asian-Australasian flyway 
(Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2009a, 2009c). As part 
of the list of protected migratory species, these birds are considered a matter of 
national environmental significance and are therefore given protection under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). The birds’ 
reliance on stop over points to build up reserves along the flyway was used as the 
basis for the hypothetical developer’s proposal to locate offsets in Queensland, 
interstate and in other countries along flyway.  
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4.2.3 Attributes and Levels  
As aforementioned, several factors may be considered in the design of an 
environmental offset. In this study, the following five attributes were chosen to 
represent the offset strategy: Location, Distance, Type of offset, Species Protected 
and Expected outcome. The final attributes and their levels are displayed in Table 4.1 
below. Furthermore, to ensure that respondents would not protest against the success 
of these proposed offsets, respondents were told that each offset had been verified by 
independent scientists.     
Table 4.1. Final attributes and levels 
Attribute Levels 
Location  
Queensland;  
Another Australian state or territory;  
Another country  
 
Distance  
(from the impacted  
site in km) 
 
100, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 5000, 6000  
 
Type Direct offset (e.g. on ground rehabilitative action); 
Indirect offset (e.g. funding for research or education)  
 
Species The impacted species of shorebird;  
A different but more endangered species of shorebird  
 
Expected Outcome  
(number of birds  
protected)  
1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 birds  
 
 
 
Location: The majority of offset policies specify that the location of an offset 
site is of significant importance to the success of an offset (Madsen et al., 2010). 
Although in most cases, it is preferred that the offset should occur as close as 
possible to the impacted site, it is proposed in this hypothetical scenario that the 
offset may occur in different locations given the migratory nature of the species 
affected. That is, it may be possible to offset the damage in another state or territory 
in Australia or in another country, provided that any suggested location would be 
along the birds’ flight path. There is also some evidence to suggest that bird colonies 
may be translocated to newly rehabilitated sites, however the success of the 
translocation is dependent upon the characteristics of the species to be translocated 
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and distance from the impacted site (H. P. Jones & Kress, 2012).  To minimise the 
influence of any preconceptions about a specific location, the levels of this attribute 
were kept in generic terms: Queensland, another Australian state or territory and 
another country.   
Distance: The attribute of distance was included to capture exactly how far 
respondents thought each offset option should be from the impacted site. The levels 
of distance allocated to each option were: within 100km, 500km, 1000km, 2000km, 
3000km, 5000km and 6000km. However, as not all of these distances would be 
applicable to all locations, (e.g. being within 100km of the impacted site was only 
applicable for the Queensland location) some distances were restricted to certain 
locations in the design of the choice set. For example, Queensland was allocated 
distance levels under 5000km; whereas sites located interstate and in another country 
were allocated distance levels of above 1000km and 2000km respectively.  
Type of offset: The two levels assigned to the attribute ‘Type of offset” were 
direct and indirect offsets. The definitions for direct and indirect offsets used in this 
hypothetical scenario were based on the classification of offsets used in the EPBCA 
Environmental Offset Policy (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, 
Population and Communities, 2012a). For the purpose of simplicity, the term indirect 
offset was used instead of ‘other compensatory measure’. Direct offsets were defined 
as projects involving on-ground restorative actions. The example given was the 
creation of a new feeding area through the planting of appropriate vegetation, which 
would be fenced off to provide protection from predators and other disturbances. On 
the other hand, indirect offsets were simply defined as projects which may involve 
the funding of research that would lead to the more efficient management of the 
species in future.  
Species Protected: The currency of compensation was represented by the 
attribute of species protected. Although the hypothetical scenario specified that the 
development would affect a range of marine and coastal species, for reasons of 
simplicity and practicality, only impacts on shorebirds were considered. In this 
scenario, the offset options offered by the developer would either protect the same 
species of shorebird impacted by the development or a different, but more 
endangered species of shorebird. Specific species names were omitted from the 
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survey to minimise confusion between the impacted species and the more 
endangered species.  
Expected Outcome: The size and scale of the offset was represented by the 
attribute of expected outcome, defined by the total number of birds protected by the 
offset. In this scenario, the default offset option was designed to result in no net loss 
and was therefore given the expected outcome of 1000 birds, equivalent to the 
number of birds impacted by the development. On the other hand, as alternative 
offsets may result in greater conservation benefits for the species protected; 
alternative offsets were allocated expected outcome levels of 1000, 2000, 3000 & 
4000 birds.  
4.2.4 Experimental Design 
In this study, unlabelled alternatives were used and were given generic titles 
(i.e., Option 1, Option 2 and Default Option). Given the nature of the study, it would 
not make sense to name the alternatives. Consequently, unlabelled alternatives were 
used in this study to ensure that the focus of respondents would remain on the task at 
hand (Hensher et al., 2005).  
In general, choice experiments include an alternative which allow a respondent 
to opt-out of the choice scenario presented to them. However, such options need not 
be framed as a complete withdrawal from the choice situation, but may also be 
provided in the form of a status-quo alternative (e.g. current policy) (Banzhaf, 
Johnson, & Mathews, 2001). Indeed, there have been some reservations about the 
use of an opt-out option. These include, but are not limited to: concerns that this may 
result in a lack of data collected and that respondents may abuse this option to escape 
making difficult choices (Bennett & Blamey, 2001; Dhar & Simonson, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the opt-out or status quo option is still utilised given its ability to make 
the choice scenario more realistic and for its ability to avoid problems associated 
with forced choice, such as overinflated estimates (Dhar & Simonson, 2003; Hensher 
et al., 2005).  
From the above, it is seen that the current offset policy prefers a developer to 
create an offset which is located as close as possible to the impacted site, using a 
direct offset to protect the impacted species. Consequently, given that this type of 
offset to be implemented in first instance by the developer, it was believed that its 
  
Chapter 4: Research Design 57 
presence in the choice set was warranted.  The status quo or current policy option 
was included in the choice set under the name of the ‘Default option’ (see Figure 4.2) 
and was described in the survey in the following manner: “An offset located in 
Queensland, within 100km from the impacted site, which uses a direct offset (i.e. on 
ground improvement to habitat) to protect the impacted species of shorebird and will 
result in the protection of 1000 birds in total”. Hence, this option was not only 
included to make the choice set more realistic to respondents, but was also used to 
ascertain whether the alternative offsets were preferred over the default offset option. 
In an ideal world, the survey would consider all possible combinations of the 
different attributes. According to Hensher et al. (2005, p.109) a full factorial design 
is defined as “...a design in which all possible treatment combinations are 
enumerated”. If the full factorial design were to be used in this study, this would 
have resulted in a total of 336 (3 x 7 x 2 x 2 x 4) treatment combinations. Evidently, 
a design of this size would have been expensive to implement and unmanageable (if 
not impossible) for the respondent to complete. Thus, due to practicality and budget 
constraints, only a fraction of the full factorial design was used in the study (i.e. 
fractional factorial design).  
An efficient fractional factorial design was generated using the program Ngene 
1.1.1 (Choice Metrics Pty Ltd, 2012). The priors which were used to generate the 
design were based on the WA study (Rogers et al., 2014). To ensure that a 
reasonable size choice set was achieved, a total of 28 choice sets were generated, 
which was blocked by a factor of 4, such that each participant would receive 7 choice 
scenarios each. The final design was estimated to be the most efficient design, given 
that D-Error was at a minimum after 10,000 runs (see Figure 4.1) (Rose & Bliemer, 
2013).  An example choice scenario which was used in the survey is presented below 
(see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.1. Efficiency of design 
 
 
     Option 1    Option 2    Default option     
 
Location       
 
 
Another Australian 
State or Territory     
 
Another Country      
 
Queensland 
 
 
Distance from 
impacted site in 
QLD  (km) 
 
5,000     
 
 
6,000     
 
 
Within 100 
 
 
 
Type of offset 
 
 
 
Direct  
(e.g. on-ground habitat 
improvement) 
 
Indirect  
(e.g. Research 
program) 
 
 
Direct  
(e.g. on-ground 
habitat improvement) 
 
 
Species  
Protected   
 
  
 
Impacted  
shorebird species 
 
More endangered  
shorebird species   
   
Impacted  
shorebird species 
 
 
Expected 
Outcome (Total 
Birds Protected) 
 
2,000     
 
 
2,000     
 
 
1,000 
 
 
 
Preferred option: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Example Choice Scenario  
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4.2.5 Pre-choice experiment questions  
Before undertaking the choice experiment component of the survey, 
respondents were introduced to the concept of offsetting. This was followed by two 
questions which ascertained respondents’ familiarity with offsets. In the first 
question, respondents were asked whether they were familiar with the notion of an 
offset before the survey. Respondents could choose from the following three 
answers: (1) they did not know what an offset was; (2) they were vaguely aware of 
what an offset was or (3) they knew what an offset was.  
If respondents were vaguely aware or knew what an offset was, respondents 
were then asked to choose from a list (i.e. carbon, biodiversity, marine biodiversity 
or other type of offset), which types of offsets they were aware of before the survey. 
Respondents who chose other were then given the opportunity to state in their own 
words what other types of offsets they were aware of.  
4.2.6 Follow up questions 
Part 2 of the survey – after the choice set: Opinions of the choice set exercise  
To check for potential bias in responses, respondents were asked to complete a 
series of follow up questions after completing the choice set. On a five point scale
11
 
respondents were asked how certain they were of the answers given in the offset 
scenarios. Following the approach of Greiner, Bliemer, and Ballweg (2014) 
respondents were also asked state how often they considered or paid attention to each 
attribute on a five point scale
12
.  The attribute attendance component of the 
questionnaire was added to check whether respondents were ignoring attributes, as 
this would lead to bias when willingness to accept estimates was calculated (Kragt, 
2013).  Respondents were also asked on a ‘yes/no’ basis whether they thought the 
characteristics used to describe offsets were relevant. Respondents who answered 
‘no’ were then given an opportunity to state which characteristics should not / should 
have been included in the description.  
 
 
                                                 
 
11
 Not at all, Not much, Somewhat, Reasonably or Very.  
12
 Not at all, Not much, Somewhat, Reasonably or Very. 
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Part 3 of the survey: Environmental Issues  
In a similar fashion to the survey used in the WA study (Rogers et al., 2014), 
part three of the survey was designed to ascertain the motivation behind respondents’ 
choices with respect to concern for different environmental issues. In this section of 
the survey, respondents were asked to state their concern for various types of 
environmental issues including: the environment in general; biodiversity loss and 
migratory shorebirds. Again, concern was measured using a five point scale
13
.  
Part 4 of the survey: The use of offsets  
The fourth part this study concentrated on respondents’ attitudes towards the 
use of offsets and the location of an offset. In this section, respondents were asked 
questions in relation to whether they agreed with the use of offsets in the coastal and 
marine environment on a five point scale.
14
 This was followed by two more specific 
questions which asked respondents to state ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whether they agreed with 
the use of (1) direct offsets and (2) indirect offsets. Respondents who did not agree 
with direct or indirect offsets were then given an opportunity to state in their own 
words why they did not agree.  
In the last part of this section, respondents were given four hypothetical 
scenarios and were asked to choose the statement which best reflected their feelings 
towards the offset. The first two scenarios concerned moving an offset to other 
locations (i.e. interstate or another country) to compensate for damage which 
occurred in Queensland. In contrast, the next two scenarios concerned situations 
where Queensland was to accept offsets from another Australian state or another 
country to compensate for damage created in those locations.  
Part 5 of the survey: Collection of socio-demographic information  
The final part of the survey concerned the collection of basic socio-
demographic data, such as: gender, age, education, income, postcode and if the 
respondent had children or not. This section also ascertained the respondents’ 
frequency of bird watching and affiliation with an environmental conservation 
society or organisation.  
                                                 
 
13
 Not at all, Not much, Somewhat, Reasonably or Very. 
14
 Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree or strongly agree.  
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4.3 PARTICIPANTS  
A general sample of the Queensland public was targeted to complete the 
survey. Participants were limited to Queensland residents, aged 18 years or older. 
The efficient design generated by Ngene 1.1.1 (Choice Metrics Pty Ltd, 2012) 
provided an S-estimate of 8.6084. Consequently, a sample size of 36 participants was 
required to complete the survey (this was found by multiplying S-estimate of 8.6084 
by the number of blocks (4) in the choice set). However to ensure the sample size 
was large enough to gain statistical power, a sample size of 480 people was chosen 
(i.e. 120 responses to each of the 4 blocks each containing 7 choice sets). To conduct 
this study, ethical clearance was obtained from the Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC). The 
QUT Ethics approval number for this study is 1400000293. 
4.4 PROCEDURE AND TIMELINE 
To ensure that a general sample of Queensland residents was obtained, a data 
collection agency ‘The Online Research Unit’ (ORU) was employed to program and 
administer the survey online. Respondents were sourced from ORU’s panel of 
participants whom received an incentive specified by ORU for completing the 
survey. Data collection took place in May 2014, with a total of 500 responses 
collected.  
4.5 ANALYSIS  
All choice models were specified as multinomial logit models and were 
estimated in NLOGIT 5 (Econometric Software Inc, 2012). For this thesis, the 
general-to-specific approach to modelling was adopted (Campos, Ericsson, & 
Hendry, 2005; Davidson, Hendry, Srba, & Yeo, 1978; Hendry, 1995; Song & Witt, 
2003). The first model was the full base MNL model which incorporated all offset 
attributes and individual characteristics. This model was estimated using the general 
sample. Following this, several subsequent models were estimated which iteratively 
removed variables that were not significant, and were tested against the full model 
using the Likelihood Ratio test. The best reduced form model, that was not 
significantly different from the full model, was estimated over partitioned sub-
groups: groups which did and did not pay attention to attributes during the choice set 
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exercise, as well as groups that were (potentially) and were not protesting against 
offsets. The models used in the analysis are presented below. 
.  
4.5.1 The models 
General modelling: The Full Base MNL Model 
To derive the general choice model, the following utility functions were 
specified.  
 
 
 
 
U(1,2) represents the utility function for options 1 and 2 (i.e. the alternative 
offset options), whereas U(3) represents the utility function of the status quo option 
(i.e. the default offset option). A full list of variables and their respective coding is 
presented in Appendix C. In this study, the explanatory variables for all utility 
models include the attributes of the offset: the interstate location (LOC2), the 
overseas location (LOC3), distance from the impact in kilometres scaled by 1000 
(NEWDIST), type of offset (TYPE), species protected (SPECIES) and expected 
outcome measured in number of birds, scaled by 1000 (NEWOUT). When 
modelling, it is possible that respondent choices may be influenced by other factors 
not observed in the choice set (i.e. things other than the attributes) (Meyerhoff & 
Liebe, 2009). To catch these unobserved influences, an alternative specific constant 
(ASC) is included in the utility function of the status quo option U(3) and is 
represented by ‘ASCSQ’.  The sign of the ASC can indicate the respondents’ 
preference for the status quo option. A positive sign indicates a positive preference 
for the status quo option, whereas a negative sign indicates a move away from the 
status quo option (Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams, & Louviere, 1998).  To find 
whether certain characteristics can influence the decision to choose the status quo 
option, the ASC can be interacted with specific variables  (Kragt, Bennett, Lloyd, & 
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Dumsday, 2007). Here, the influence of certain characteristics on the ASC is found 
by incorporating the individual characteristics in the utility function for the status 
quo option U(3). Such characteristics include: the age of the respondent (AGE_M), 
whether the respondent is female (FEMALE), whether the respondent does not care 
for all three environmental issues (i.e. the environment in general and biodiversity 
loss and migratory shorebirds) (OPCARE3), whether the respondent has dependent 
children (DEPT), having a TAFE qualification (TAFE), having a university or post 
graduate degree (BACHPG), income (scaled by 1000) (NEWINC), being a 
Queensland coastal resident (COASTAL), being a resident from inland Queensland 
(INLAND), being a bird watcher (YBWATCH), finding the choice sets confusing 
(CONFUSE) and being uncertain of the answer given in the choice set (UNCRTN).  
In the survey, respondents were asked to supply their residential postcode. This 
information was necessary to test whether the individual’s location would impact 
upon their choice of offset. From the postcodes supplied, respondents were divided 
into three regions (see Figure 4.3)
15
. Respondents residing in highly populated city 
areas, such as Brisbane city, the Sunshine Coast and the Gold Coast were allocated to 
region 1.  Those living along the Queensland coast, closer to the Great Barrier Reef, 
were allocated to region 2. The remaining respondents, whom lived further away 
from the coastline, were then allocated to region 3. Hence, three dummy variables 
named ‘BRISBANE’, ‘COASTAL’ and ‘INLAND’ were created to represent regions 1, 
2 and 3 respectively. Each of these variables was coded 1 if the respondent was from 
that region and 0 if not.  
                                                 
 
15
 Note that the regional division on the map is representative only. 
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Figure 4.3. Regional division of sample  
 
Specific modelling  
For the specific modelling component of this study, the reduced form of the 
full base model is used. The model is again specified as a multinomial logit model. 
For this model (model 5), the variables UNCRTN, TAFE, BACHPG, YBWATCH, 
DEPT & NEWINC are removed from the utility function for option 3 (i.e. the default 
offset option). These were removed on the basis that they were not significant in the 
full base model (Model 1) and subsequent reduced form models (Models 2 – 4). 
While the ‘COASTAL’ variable was not significant in previous specifications 
(models 1- 4), this dummy variable was left in the model as it is needed to 
distinguish between regional groups. This new reduced form specification is given 
below: 
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Testing of model fit  
In the survey, respondents were asked to disclose their income bracket from a 
given list of income ranges. Respondents could also choose not to disclose their 
income. Respondents who did not disclose their income were coded as missing data 
and were subsequently dropped in the analysis for models 1 - 4.  
Here it is noted that Model 5 does not include an income variable. To properly 
compare the model fit of Model 5 to the other models (Model 1 – 4), it was necessary 
to manually remove respondents who did not specify their income. This was to 
ensure that the model was estimated using the same sample for previous models 
estimated (Models 1-4) (i.e. that had included income as an explanatory variable and 
had subsequently dropped the non-responses). Once it was found that Model 5 did in 
fact have the best model fit (see Appendix F & G), this model was subsequently 
estimated using the full sample of respondents (see Model 6). Similarly, as the 
models which account for attendance, non attendance and potential protesting against 
offsets (Models 7 – 9) use the same model specification as Model 5, respondents who 
did not specify their income were included in these sub-samples.     
 
Accounting for the level of attention paid to attributes  
As stated above, in the follow up questions to the choice set exercise, 
respondents were asked how often they considered each offset attribute on a five 
point scale. To account for the effect of attribute attention on the choice of offset, 
respondents were partitioned into two sub-groups and were distinguished with the 
dummy variable ‘CONSIDER’. Respondents who indicated that they were 
‘somewhat’, ‘reasonably’ or ‘very’ considerate of all five attributes during the choice 
set exercise were coded 1. All other respondents were deemed not to have paid 
attention to attributes and were coded 0. Model 5 was then estimated over both 
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groups. The premise of creating a variable which included the ‘somewhat’ level was 
to ensure that respondents with different levels of utility were included in the 
analysis (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006).  Model 7 is the group which are classified as 
having paid attention, whereas model 8 is the group which did not pay attention.   
Partitioning by potentially protesting against offsets    
Before beginning this study, it was expected that not all respondents would be 
agreeable to the use of offsets for various reasons. Such responses would be 
important for the study to accurately gauge the preferences of the Queensland public. 
If such responses were removed from the choice set, this may lead to sample 
selection bias (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006). However, for reasons of completeness, 
respondents who did not approve of direct, indirect and offsets in general and/or 
consistently stated that they did not like offsets in principle while completing the 
alternative hypothetical scenarios in the survey, were removed from the sample for 
one model. This group of respondents were identified using a dummy variable 
‘nooffset’, where the variable was coded 1 if the respondent disapproved of offsets in 
the manner stated above and 0 if otherwise. This group was examined on the basis 
that this attitude may have caused respondents to give protest answers in the choice 
set. The specific model was then estimated over the group who were potentially 
protesting against offsets and the group who did not show signs of protesting against 
offsets (i.e. the remaining part of the sample) (Model 9). 
 
4.5.2 Calculation of willingness to accept 
The rate at which people make tradeoffs between certain attributes is referred 
to as their marginal rate of substitution. In other words, it is how much of one 
attribute that the respondent is willing to forgo in exchange for adjustment in the 
amount of another attribute. If a cost attribute is included in the design of the choice 
set, it is possible to express the respondents’ marginal rate of substitution as their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a particular attribute. Provided that the estimated 
parameters are statistically significant, the WTP may be calculated by dividing the 
coefficient of the non monetary attribute by the coefficient of the cost attribute, and 
multiplying this by negative one  (Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001; Hensher et al., 
2005; Train, 2009).  
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Such a measure is useful in the context of environmental management as policy 
makers would be able to elicit how much the respondents’ would be willing to pay to 
improve a particular attribute (Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001). However, in the case 
of environmental offsets, the inclusion of a cost attribute would be both unrealistic 
and irrelevant, given that it is the developer who incurs the cost of creating the offset. 
Consequently, in this study, the cost attribute was replaced by the attribute ‘expected 
outcome’ which represented the total number of shorebirds that would be protected 
by the offset. Hence, by substituting the expected outcome parameter for the cost 
attribute, we were able to calculate the respondents’ willingness to accept, rather than 
the willingness to pay. This gives the additional number of birds that would need to 
be protected to make the offset acceptable to the public. The equations used to 
estimate the WTA and their interpretations are found in Table 4.2 below.  
Table 4.2. Calculation of willingness to accept 
Calculation for willingness to accept Interpretation of result 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected before 
an offset located interstate would be 
acceptable 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected for an 
offset located overseas would be 
acceptable 
 
 
 
The number of additional birds 
protected per 1000km for the offset 
to be acceptable  
 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected for an 
indirect offset to be acceptable 
 
 
 
The number of additional 
endangered birds it would take to 
make the offset site acceptable.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
The following chapter details the results of the study undertaken to ascertain 
the preferences for environmental offsets in Queensland. More specifically, offsets 
which compensate for damage to the marine and coastal environments are examined.  
The first section of the chapter (section 5.1) details the socio-demographic 
statistics of the general sample. The second section (5.2) outlines the familiarity and 
attitude towards offsets and the environment. The third section (5.3) examines the 
results with respect to participants’ opinions regarding the choice experiment. The 
chapter concludes by providing the results of the choice experiment (section 5.4).  
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5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF GENERAL SAMPLE  
5.1.1 Gender & age  
The following section compares the gender and age composition between the 
sample and the adult Queensland population in June 2014. Table 5.1 presents the 
gender composition of the sample collected. The results of the chi-squared test 
confirm that there is no significant difference between the gender composition of the 
adult Queensland population and the general sample (see Appendix D).   
Table 5.1. Comparison of gender ratios between sample and the adult Queensland population  
Gender % of sample % Adult Queensland 
population (June 2014)
#
 
Female 51.4% 50.65% 
Male 48.6% 49.35 % 
# 
Derived from “Australian Demographic Statistics, Dec 2014, ‘Table 53. Estimated Resident 
Population by Single Year of Age, Queensland.’ Time series spreadsheet, cat. No. 3101.0.”  By 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015), Retrieved from: 
http://abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Dec%202014?OpenDocument  
 
A comparison of the age distribution of the sample and the adult Queensland 
population in June 2014 is presented in Table 5.2. The majority of the sample 
comprised of respondents from the 31-45 and 46-60 year old age brackets, followed 
closely by the 18-30 and 61-75 year olds. Only a small proportion (5.2%) of 
respondents identified as being over the age of 75. A chi-squared test was conducted 
to test the similarity in age distribution between the sample and the adult Queensland 
population (see Appendix E). The results of the chi-squared test indicate that there is 
no significant difference between the age distribution of the adult Queensland 
population and the general sample.  
Table 5.2 Comparison of age compositions between the sample and the adult Queensland population 
Age % of sample % Adult Queensland 
population (June 2014)
#
 
18-30 22.8% 24.21 % 
31-45 27.2% 27.13 % 
46-60 24.6% 24.79% 
61-75 20.2% 17.01% 
Over 75 5.2% 6.86 % 
# 
Derived from “Australian Demographic Statistics, Dec 2014, ‘Table 53. Estimated Resident 
Population by Single Year of Age, Queensland.’ Time series spreadsheet, cat. No. 3101.0.”  By 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015), Retrieved from: 
http://abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Dec%202014?OpenDocument  
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It is therefore concluded that the age and gender compositions between the 
adult Queensland population and the general sample are comparable.  
5.1.2 Education and Income 
In terms of education, a large proportion of respondents had obtained a TAFE 
qualification or university degree (see Table 5.3). Of those who had identified as 
only completing secondary education, there were slightly more respondents who had 
completed a year 12 certificate and below, than a year 10 certificate and below. 
Respondents with post graduate degrees comprised 10% of the sample.  
In comparison, the Census data reports a higher proportion of the Queensland 
population had completed high school or below
16
 (see Table 5.4). In comparison to 
the number of respondents in the sample who had completed a TAFE qualification 
(34.4%), the Census reports a smaller number of the Queensland population had 
achieved a type of certificate or diploma qualification.
17
 The sample also shows 
approximately double the amount of university or bachelor degrees than the 
Queensland population and approximately three times the proportion of post-
graduates. This indicates that the sample is generally more highly educated than the 
general population. 
Table 5.3 Educational distribution of sample 
Education % of whole sample 
Year 10 certificate and below 15.2% 
Year 12 certificate and below 17.8% 
TAFE qualification 34.4% 
University degree 22.6% 
Post Graduate degree 10.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
16
 Note the combined total of ‘Year 11 or below’ and ‘Year 12’ is 47.5% (See Table 5.4). 
17
 Note the combined total of ‘Certificate III/IV’, ‘Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate’ and 
‘Advanced Diploma and Diploma’ is approximately 26% (See Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.4. Highest level of education attained for Queensland population 2011 
Type of Education 
 
% of population  
(15 years and over) 
Year 11 or below (includes Cert I/II/not further defined) 
Year 12 
Certificate III/IV 
Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate  
Advanced Diploma and Diploma 
Bachelor Degree 
Postgraduate Degree  
29.7% 
17.8% 
17.0% 
1.4% 
7.5% 
11.7% 
2.7% 
Adapted from “Highest Level of Education (all persons aged 15 years and over) ) - States and 
Territories: Queensland”, by Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011), Highest Level of Education (all 
persons aged 15 years and over), 2011 Census Second Release Media Fact Sheet, Retrieved from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/4a256353001af3ed4b2562bb00121564/mediafacts
heets2nd/$file/Topic%20-%20Highest%20Level%20of%20Education.pdf  
 
The distribution of the sample with respect to annual household incomes before 
tax is given in Figure 5.1. The most frequent reported income was the income 
bracket of $70,000 to $100,000. Of those respondents who chose to disclose their 
income bracket, the approximate average annual household income before tax was 
$70,504.44.
18
 In contrast, the mean and median weekly income of the sample was 
less than the weekly income of the Queensland population (Table 5.5). However, it is 
noted that this comparison is approximate only, given that the midpoints of each 
income bracket (rather than exact values) were used to calculate the sample’s 
income. 
                                                 
 
18
 Each income bracket was converted into a continuous variable by using the midpoint of each 
income bracket. For example, the midpoint of the income bracket $20,000 - $35,000 was 
(20,000+35,000)/2 =$27,500.00. These converted income values were then used to find the annual 
average annual household income.  
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Figure 5.1. Income distribution of sample 
 
Table 5.5. Comparison of household income per week 
Gross household 
income 
 
Sample, 
Approximate 
household income per 
week
19
 
Queensland population,  
Gross household income per 
week, 2011-12
#
 
Mean income  
Median income 
$1,355.85 
$1,153.84 
$1, 805.00 
$1, 402.00 
#
Adapted from: “Table 17. States and Territories, All households.” by  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2013), Household Income and Income Distribution, Australia 2011-12, Cat no. 6523.0 , Canberra, 
p.44 Retrieved from 
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/B0530ECF7A48B909CA257BC80016E4D3/
$File/65230_2011-12.pdf 
 
Slight differences are seen with respect to the education and income 
comparisons. However, such differences may be attributed to differences in 
measurement (e.g inclusion of 15-17 year olds in the Census when measuring 
education) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) and calculation of income 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013).  
 
                                                 
 
19
 The weekly income was found by first removing all respondents who did not disclose their income 
bracket. Of the respondents who did disclose their income, annual income (i.e. the midpoint of each 
income bracket) for each respondent was divided by 52 weeks. The weekly average and median 
incomes were then calculated from this list.  
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5.1.3 Regional distribution  
The regional distribution of the full sample is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The 
results indicate that the majority of respondents (77%) were residents of region 1 (i.e. 
Brisbane and surrounding cities such as the Sunshine Coast and the Gold Coast). Just 
over one-fifth were residents of region 2 (the Queensland coastline region) and only 
a very small number of the sample were residents of region 3 (i.e. inland 
Queensland). These results are expected given that many Queenslanders reside along 
the Queensland coastline and density increases towards the capital city of Brisbane 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014).  
 
Figure 5.2. Regional distribution of sample 
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5.1.4 Respondents with and without children 
The proportion of the sample with and without children is illustrated in Figure 
5.3. For this thesis, respondents with children are classified as having dependent 
children only. Approximately a third of the sample had children. Only a small 
proportion of the sample (2%) reported having both dependent and independent 
children. Respondents with both dependent and independent children are counted as 
part of the subgroup with dependent children. Remaining respondents (i.e. 
respondents with independent children or no children at all) are classified as 
respondents with ‘no children at home’. 
 
Figure 5.3. Respondents with and without children at home 
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5.2 FAMILIARITY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS OFFSETS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT  
5.2.1 Familiarity with offsets 
After being given a brief introduction to offsets (but before beginning the 
choice experiment component of the survey) respondents were asked how familiar 
they were with the notion of offsetting before this survey (see Figure 5.4). Under half 
of the respondents in the sample (48%) did not know what an offset was before the 
survey. On the other hand, 43% were vaguely aware of what an offset was and only 
9% stated that they knew what an offset was.  
 
Figure 5.4. Familiarity with offsets before the survey 
 
The subsample of respondents who identified as either being vaguely aware of 
or knew what an offset was were then asked to select which types of offsets (i.e. 
carbon offset, biodiversity offset, marine biodiversity or other) they were familiar 
with before the survey (see Figure 5.5). It is seen that by far the most recognisable 
type of offset was the carbon offset. A larger part of the subsample was more aware 
of marine biodiversity offsets than biodiversity offsets. Only a small number of 
respondents specified they were aware of other types of offsets.  
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Figure 5.5. Awareness of environmental offsets 
 
5.2.2 Concern for environmental issues  
In part 3 of the survey, respondents were asked to state their concern for three 
main types of environmental issues: (1) Environmental problems in general; (2) 
Biodiversity loss; and (3) Migratory shorebirds. As seen in Figure 5.6 below, the 
majority of respondents were generally concerned for all three environmental issues, 
with the level of concern being reasonably the same across categories. Most 
respondents were reasonably concerned, if not very or somewhat concerned about all 
three issues. Only a small proportion of the sample was not much or not at all 
concerned about these issues. 
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Figure 5.6. Level of concern for different environmental issues 
 
5.2.3 Involvement in environmental activities 
In an attempt to ascertain the motivation behind respondents’ choices, and to 
account for potential bias in responses, respondents were also asked about their 
involvement in environmental activities. Respondents were asked if they were part of 
an environmental conservation society or organisation and how frequently they went 
bird watching. As seen in Figure 5.7, only 5% of the sample reported affiliation with 
an environmental conservation society or organisation. 
 
Figure 5.7. Member of an environmental conservation society or organisation 
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In terms of bird watching, only 22% of the sample went bird watching 
occasionally, whereas only a smaller number of respondents (8%) identified 
themselves as avid bird watchers (i.e. frequent & very frequent bird watchers) (see 
Figure 5.8). The majority of the sample stated that they never or rarely went bird 
watching.   
 
 
Figure 5.8. Frequency of bird watching 
 
5.2.4 Attitude towards different types of offsets 
The fourth part of the survey was designed to ascertain whether respondents 
were willing to approve the use of offsets in the context of the coastal and marine 
environments. This part of the survey also examined whether respondents were 
willing to accept the use of offsets in locations other than the impacted site. 
The first question in this section of the survey asked respondents whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the use of offsets (in general) in the coastal and marine 
environment. The results indicate that over half (57%) of the sample approved the 
use of offsets (see Figure 5.9). However, of those approving the use of offsets, more 
respondents just agreed with, rather than strongly agreed with the use of offsets. 
Conversely, only a small proportion of respondents did not approve of the use of 
offsets (13%). Of those respondents who did not approve of the use of offsets, more 
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respondents disagreed, rather than strongly disagreed with the use of offsets. Just 
under a third of respondents (30%) were of neutral standing. 
 
Figure 5.9. Agreement with the use of coastal and marine offsets 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of which types of offsets were deemed 
acceptable to the Queensland public, two subsequent questions on the approval of 
direct and indirect offsets were asked. The results are seen in Figure 5.10 below. 
Interestingly, when respondents were asked whether they approved of specific types 
of offsets, the results for approval of direct offsets were remarkably different from 
the results obtained in the previous question. That is, a clear majority of respondents 
(approximately 94%) approved the use of direct offsets. While lower than the 
approval rate for direct offsets, it appears that most of the sample (74%) still approve 
of the use of indirect offsets in the coastal and marine environments.  
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Figure 5.10. Approval of the use of direct & indirect offsets 
 
Respondents who answered ‘No’ to the approval of direct and indirect offsets 
were then asked to explain why they disagreed with these offsets. From the responses 
received which did not approve of direct offsets, most were of the view that the 
natural environment should be protected from harm in first instance or were 
concerned that direct offsets would not help the environment. In terms of the 
disagreement of indirect offsets, a clear recurring theme was the preference for direct 
offsets over indirect offsets. These responses indicated that indirect offsets were 
disliked on the basis that they do not directly address the damage caused by the 
development. In general most respondents were sceptical of the benefits resulting 
from indirect offsets, often regarding such offsets as the ‘easiest way’ for a developer 
to negate responsibility for their actions.   
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5.2.5 Attitude towards offsets in Queensland and other locations  
Alternative hypothetical situation experiment  
The next section of the survey investigated whether respondents were 
agreeable to the idea of a developer offsetting in locations other than the impacted 
site. In each case, respondents were told that each offset would result in a larger 
population for the affected species. This exercise involved giving respondents four 
alternative hypothetical scenarios, where they were asked to choose the statement 
which best reflected their feelings. The statements were framed according to the 
following themes:  
 The view that the offset should always occur near the impacted site;  
 Feelings of responsibility towards the state (Queensland) or nation 
(Australia) as a Queensland/Australian resident;   
  The expectation that the offset should result in greater conservation 
benefits for the species affected; and  
 The general dislike of offsets in principle.  
 
Alternative hypothetical Situation 1: Moving the offset interstate 
In the first case, respondents were asked the following question “How do you 
feel about direct offsets (i.e. on ground habitat restoration) being implemented in 
another Australian state or territory to compensate for damage caused by 
infrastructural development in Queensland?”.  
The results of the interstate offset case are seen in Figure 5.11. In this case, 
under half of the sample (42%) felt that the offset should always remain in close 
proximity to the impacted site. The second most popular response was concerned 
with providing greater conservation benefits for the species affected (30%). Only 
18% were indifferent to the location of the offset on the basis that greater 
conservation benefits would occur within Australia.  Approximately 10% of 
respondents indicated that they disliked the use of offsets in principle.  
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Figure 5.11. Offsets in another Australian state or territory 
 
Alternative Hypothetical Situation 2: Moving the offset overseas  
In the second alternative hypothetical situation, respondents were asked the 
following question: “How do you feel about direct offsets (i.e. on ground habitat 
restoration) being implemented in another country to compensate for the damage 
caused by the infrastructural development in Queensland?”.  
The results of the overseas case are seen Figure 5.12. In this case most 
respondents (46%) were again of the view that the offset should remain as close as 
possible to the impacted site (i.e. in Queensland).  More respondents indicated that 
they would rather see the offset remain in Australia than relocate the offset to another 
country, even if the relocation would lead to an increased population of the species 
affected.  Hence, the feeling of responsibility towards Australia was much stronger in 
the international case than the interstate case. Furthermore, as in the interstate case, 
approximately 10% indicated a general dislike of offsets in principle.    
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Figure 5.12. Offsets in another country 
 
 
Alternative Hypothetical Situation 3: Accepting offsets from interstate 
In the third hypothetical situation, respondents were asked the following 
question:  “How do you feel about direct offsets (i.e. on ground habitat restoration) 
being implemented in Queensland to compensate for the damage caused by an 
infrastructural development in another Australian state or territory?” 
The response to this question is seen in Figure 5.13. In this case, approximately 
half of the respondents still maintained the view that the offset should remain in 
close proximity to the impacted site. That is, approximately half of the sample were 
willing to forgo an offset occurring in Queensland provided the offset remained as 
close as possible to the impacted site interstate.  In this case, more respondents were 
willing to accept the offset on the basis of providing greater conservation benefits to 
the species affected (22%), rather than for reasons of gaining conservation benefits 
for Queensland (19%). Again, the proportion of respondents who stated a dislike for 
offsets in principle was consistent with the previous two cases.  
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Figure 5.13. Acceptance of offsets from another Australian state or territory 
 
 
Alternative Hypothetical Situation 4: Accepting offsets from overseas 
In the last alternative hypothetical situation, respondents were asked the 
following question: “How do you feel about direct offsets (i.e. on ground habitat 
restoration) being implemented in Queensland, to compensate for the damage caused 
by an infrastructural development in another country?” 
The response to the last alternative hypothetical scenario is seen in Figure 5.14 
below. Again, this scenario showed a clear preference for the offset to remain as 
close as possible to the impacted site. Therefore, respondents preferred the offset to 
remain overseas.  Of the remaining responses, more respondents were willing to 
accept the offset into Queensland, provided the offset would result in greater 
conservation benefits to the species affected (22%), than for reasons of providing 
greater conservation benefits to Queensland (16%). Interestingly, there was a small 
increase in the number of respondents who claimed they did not like offsets in 
principle (11%).   
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Figure 5.14. Acceptance of offsets from another country 
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5.3 FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS REGARDING CHOICE COMPONENT OF 
SURVEY 
After completing the choice scenarios, respondents were given a series of 
follow up questions to check the potential reliability of the responses. In these follow 
up questions, respondents were asked: how certain they were of their answer given in 
the choice set; if they believed the scenarios were confusing; how often they 
considered each attribute and if they believed the attributes used to describe the 
offsets were relevant. 
 
5.3.1 Certainty of answers 
Firstly, respondents were asked to state how certain they were of the choice 
scenario answers given on a Likert-type scale (see Figure 5.15). In general, most 
respondents were confident in the choices which they made. Although only a small 
proportion of the sample were very certain of their answers given (12.4%), the 
majority of respondents were reasonably (43%), if not somewhat certain (34.6%) of 
their responses. Only 10% were either not at all or not much certain of their 
responses.  
Not at 
all, 1.20%
Not much, 
8.80%
Somewhat, 
34.60%
Reasonably, 
43%
Very, 12.40%
 
Figure 5.15. Certainty of answer given during the offset scenario exercise 
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5.3.2 Clarity of choice scenarios 
Respondents were also asked whether they believed the scenarios were 
confusing (see Figure 5.16). The results show that close to two thirds of the sample 
(63%) were of the view that the scenarios were not confusing.  
 
 
Figure 5.16. Confused by choice scenarios 
 
5.3.3 Attention given to attributes 
The distribution of how much attention was given to each attribute by the 
whole sample is provided in Figure 5.17. It is seen that most of the sample were 
very, if not reasonably considerate of all five attributes. A small proportion of the 
sample claimed that they only sometimes considered each attribute, with an even 
smaller percentage stating that they did not consider these attributes much or not at 
all. Overall, the results also indicate that in general, no one attribute was significantly 
favoured over another. This is shown by the consistency of responses at each level of 
attention.  
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Figure 5.17. Attention given to attributes 
 
5.3.4 Relevance of attributes 
The last follow up question asked respondents whether they believed the 
attributes used to describe the offset strategies were relevant. As seen in Figure 5.18 
the bulk of the sample believed that the characteristics were considered relevant 
(86%). Respondents who believed that characteristics were not relevant were then 
given the opportunity to state (in their own words) which characteristics they 
believed should not have and should have been included.  
When asked which characteristics should not have been included, a large 
proportion of respondents failed to give an answer. Of those respondents who 
attempted this question, some respondents believed that location should not have 
been used to describe the offset strategies. Only a few respondents believed that 
distance, type of offset and species protected were irrelevant.  
When respondents were asked which characteristics should have been included 
to describe offset strategies, approximately the same proportion of non responses was 
received as the previous question. Of the respondents who attempted this question, 
quite a few respondents recommended that the characteristics should have been more 
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specific in the detail provided (e.g. the names of the offset location rather than 
generic names).  
 
 
Figure 5.18. Relevance of offset characteristics 
 
 
5.4 CHOICE MODELLING 
The following sections outline the results of the choice experiment. All models 
were specified as multinomial logit models. The first part of this section details the 
model fit of the full base MNL model and reduced form MNL models, the latter of 
which were constructed by iteratively removing non-significant variables. The final 
model which had the best model fit (model 5) was then estimated over the following 
groups: the full sample (Model 6), those who are classified as having paid attention 
to all attributes while completing the choice set (Model 7), those who did not pay 
attention to all attributes while completing the choice set (Model 8) and the group of 
respondents excluding those who were potentially protesting against the use of 
offsets (Model 9). The results of these models (models 5 – 9) are discussed followed 
by an examination of WTA estimates. 
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5.4.1 Full base MNL model and reduced form MNL models 
The results of the general base model (Model 1) and subsequent reduced form 
models (models 2 – 5) are produced in Table 5.6 below. After completing Log-
likelihood tests to check model fit (see Appendix F) and Wald tests to check the 
significance of variables in the model (see Appendix G), it was found that model 5 
had the best model fit. Although the COASTAL (region 2) variable is not significant 
in model 5, it is included in the model as it is used to differentiate between the 3 
regions. While OPCARE3 was not significant at the 5% level, it was significant at 
the 10% level and was therefore kept in the model.  
As stated previously, an important assumption of the MNL model is IIA (Ben-
Akiva & Lerman, 1985). Model 1 (the full base MNL model) and Model 6  (the same 
model specification as in model 5, which was run over the full sample) were tested 
for the assumption of IIA (Hausman & McFadden, 1984). The results indicate that 
these models do not violate the IIA assumption (see Appendix H).  
As seen in Model 5, the negative and significant ASC indicates that 
respondents generally preferred option 1 and option 2 (i.e. the alternative offset 
options) over the default offset option (Adamowicz, Boxall, et al., 1998). In terms of 
the characteristics of the offsets, the significant and negative coefficients for both 
location parameters (LOC2 and LOC3) indicate a dislike for offsets which take place 
interstate and an even stronger dislike for offsets which occur overseas, relative to 
offsets that occur within the state in which the impact occurred (i.e. in this case 
Queensland). The significant and negative coefficient on the distance parameter 
(NEWDIST) indicates that in general, respondents are less likely to choose an offset 
which is located further away from the impacted site. The coefficient for the type of 
offset (TYPE) parameter is also significant and negative, indicating that there is a 
preference for direct offsets over indirect offsets. The significant and positive 
coefficient for the species attribute (SPECIES) indicates that in general, respondents 
prefer that the offset protects the more endangered species of shorebird, as opposed 
to the species directly affected by the development; while the positive and significant 
outcome parameter (NEWOUT) signifies that respondents prefer offsets which 
protect a greater number of birds.  
The results of Model 5 also show that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between respondent’s age (AGE_M), their gender (FEMALE) and 
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location (INLAND) and their likelihood of choosing the default offset option. More 
specifically, as age increases, the chances of a respondent choosing the default offset 
increases. A preference for the default offset is also shown for female respondents 
and for those from region 3 (inland Queensland).  
In contrast, there is a significant negative relationship between not caring for 
the environment (OPCARE3) and choosing the default offset option. That is, these 
respondents are less likely to choose the default offset option. Respondents who 
found the choice exercise confusing (CONFUSE) were also less likely to choose the 
default offset option.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, model 5 was estimated over the sample which 
removes respondents who did specify their income. This was necessary in order for 
the model to become comparable to models 1 – 4 when testing for model fit (see 
Appendix F & G). However, given that the income variable (NEWINC) was 
removed in model 5, it was possible to run the model over the full sample without 
having to remove respondents that did not specify their income. This therefore 
resulted in more data. The results of the model which was estimated over the full 
sample and other sub-groups are presented in Table 5.7 below.  
 
 
  
Chapter 5: Results 93 
Table 5.6. Full Base MNL model and reduced form MNL models  
Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig
LOC2 -0.3041 0.1021 *** -0.3045 0.1021 *** -0.3039 0.1021 *** -0.3047 0.1021 *** -0.3051 0.1021 ***
LOC3 -0.8330 0.1107 *** -0.8330 0.1107 *** -0.8327 0.1106 *** -0.8324 0.1106 *** -0.8325 0.1106 ***
NEWDIST -0.0525 0.0249 ** -0.0523 0.0249 ** -0.0523 0.0249 ** -0.0518 0.0248 ** -0.0517 0.0248 **
TYPE -0.3411 0.0523 *** -0.3413 0.0522 *** -0.3415 0.0522 *** -0.3416 0.0522 *** -0.3416 0.0522 ***
SPECIES 0.1214 0.0528 ** 0.1213 0.0528 ** 0.1213 0.0528 ** 0.1211 0.0528 ** 0.1210 0.0528 **
NEWOUT 0.4470 0.0277 *** 0.4469 0.0277 *** 0.4467 0.0277 *** 0.4464 0.0277 *** 0.4463 0.0277 ***
AGE_M 0.0297 0.0025 *** 0.0295 0.0024 *** 0.0295 0.0024 *** 0.0302 0.0023 *** 0.0304 0.0023 ***
FEMALE 0.1905 0.0795 ** 0.1921 0.0794 ** 0.1899 0.0793 ** 0.1872 0.0792 ** 0.1896 0.0792 **
OPCARE3 -0.1826 0.1125 -0.1783 0.1121 -0.1883 0.1101 * -0.1893 0.1101 * -0.1930 0.1099 *
DEPT -0.1039 0.0842 -0.1040 0.0842 -0.1048 0.0841
TAFE 0.0271 0.0945 0.0250 0.0943
BACHPG 0.0928 0.0974 0.0932 0.0974
NEWINC -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0008
COASTAL 0.1483 0.0964 0.1458 0.0962 0.1432 0.0957 0.1447 0.0957 0.1458 0.0957
INLAND 1.3999 0.2722 *** 1.3892 0.2709 *** 1.3815 0.2703 *** 1.3677 0.2697 *** 1.3641 0.2695 ***
YBWATCH 0.0407 0.0861 0.0388 0.0860
CONFUSE -0.5004 0.0849 *** -0.4901 0.0814 *** -0.4940 0.0811 *** -0.4982 0.0810 *** -0.4923 0.0807 ***
UNCRTN 0.0604 0.1399
ASCSQ -0.6208 0.1866 *** -0.6108 0.1851 *** -0.5671 0.1757 *** -0.6211 0.1705 *** -0.6809 0.1550 ***
LL function -3074.33 -3074.43 -3075.04 -3075.82 -3076.16
Chi^2 0.1860 1.4108 2.9662 3.6619
AIC 6186.7 6184.9 6180.1 6179.6 6178.3
AIC/N 1.96 1.959 1.958 1.957 1.957
N 3157 3157 3157 3157 3157
K 19 18 15 14 13
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Model 1: BASE MODEL 
 Model 2: Removing 
UNCRTN
 Model 3: Removing 
UNCRTN, BACHPG,TAFE 
& YBWATCH) 
 Model 4: Removing 
UNCRTN, BACHPG,TAFE, 
YBWATCH & DEPT
 Model 5: UNCRTN, 
BACHPG,TAFE, 
YBWATCH, DEPT & 
NEWINC
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5.4.2 Model 5 estimated over the full sample and split samples  
Table 5.7 displays the results of model 5 estimated over the full sample (model 6) and various sub-groups (models 7-9).  
Table 5.7. Model 5 (MNL model) estimated over the full sample and split samples   
Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig Coeff Std Err Sig
LOC2 -0.3152 0.0972 *** -0.4010 0.1140 *** -0.0675 0.1894 -0.3096 0.1006 ***
LOC3 -0.8232 0.1041 *** -1.0404 0.1261 *** -0.3308 0.1921 * -0.8467 0.1086 ***
NEWDIST -0.0533 0.0236 ** -0.0470 0.0277 * -0.0779 0.0463 * -0.0541 0.0245 **
TYPE -0.3209 0.0495 *** -0.3861 0.0587 *** -0.1551 0.0940 * -0.3628 0.0515 ***
SPECIES 0.1474 0.0501 *** 0.1007 0.0591 * 0.2801 0.0964 *** 0.1420 0.0520 ***
NEWOUT 0.4492 0.0263 *** 0.4164 0.0307 *** 0.5457 0.0522 *** 0.4379 0.0271 ***
AGE_M 0.0317 0.0022 *** 0.0364 0.0026 *** 0.0130 0.0047 *** 0.0313 0.0023 ***
FEMALE 0.2192 0.0760 *** 0.1878 0.0878 ** 0.1614 0.1633 0.1806 0.0786 **
OPCARE3 -0.1136 0.1036 -0.3195 0.1418 ** 0.2339 0.1641 0.0122 0.1104
COASTAL 0.1861 0.0898 ** 0.0670 0.1015 0.4911 0.2089 ** 0.1455 0.0934
INLAND 1.2798 0.2569 *** 1.3195 0.3138 *** 1.0688 0.4642 ** 1.2600 0.2573 ***
CONFUSE -0.5270 0.0768 *** -0.5635 0.0917 *** -0.4927 0.1515 *** -0.5596 0.0792 ***
ASCSQ -0.7504 0.1488 *** -1.0209 0.1761 *** 0.2152 0.2947 -0.7191 0.1534 ***
LL function -3403.07 -2488.474 -878.9229 -3180.17
AIC 6832.1 5002.9 1783.8 6386.3
AIC/N 1.952 1.911 2.023 1.945
N 3500 2618 882 3283
K 13 13 13 13
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Model 7:  Paid attention  Model 8: Did not pay attention
 Model 9: Removal of 
potentially protesting against 
offsets
 Model 6: Full Sample
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Model 6: The Full Sample 
The results of model 6 are similar to that of model 5, with the majority of 
coefficient signs for the parameters relating to offset attributes and individual 
characteristics remaining the same. The coefficient for the ASC was also significant 
and negative indicating a general preference for the alternative two options (i.e. 
options 1 & 2) over the default offset option. The main difference between Models 5 
and 6 is the significance of coefficients for the parameters which represent not caring 
for the environment (OPCARE3) and respondents who live along coastal Queensland 
(COASTAL). In the case of model 6, it appears that not caring for the environment 
does not significantly influence the choice of offset. However, with respect to coastal 
residents, it appears there is a positive and significant relationship between residing 
along the Queensland coastline and choosing the default offset option.  
Model 7: Paid attention to offset attributes  
Model 7 shows the results of Model 5 which is estimated over the sub-group of 
respondents who self identified as having considered all five attributes while 
completing the choice set. The results are similar to model 5. As seen by the negative 
ASC, respondents generally preferred the alternative two options (i.e. options 1 & 2) 
over the default offset option. All offset attribute coefficients were significant. With 
respect to location, respondents were less likely to choose the interstate offset option 
and were even less likely to choose the overseas offset option over the Queensland 
offset option (i.e. the state of where the impact occurred). Similarly, respondents are 
less inclined to choose an offset located further away from the impacted site 
(NEWDIST). With respect to type of offset (TYPE), respondents were again inclined 
to choose the direct offset option over the indirect offset option. The positive 
coefficient on the species parameter (SPECIES) indicates that this particular group of 
respondents were also more inclined to choose an offset which protected the more 
endangered species of shorebird. As shown by the positive and significant outcome 
parameter (NEWOUT), respondents were also happier with offsets that protected 
more shorebirds.  
In terms of individual characteristics, there is a significant and positive 
relationship between the increase in age and choosing the default offset option; as 
well as being female and choosing the default offset option. Similarly, Respondents 
of region 3 (inland Queensland) are again more likely to choose the default offset 
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option. In contrast, a significant and negative relationship exists between choosing 
the default offset option and not caring for the environment. That is, those who do 
not care for the environment are less likely to choose the default offset option. 
Confused respondents are also less likely to choose the default offset option.  
Model 8: Did not pay attention to offset attributes  
Model 8 shows the results of Model 5 estimated over the group of respondents 
who were classified as having not paid attention to all attributes during the choice set 
exercise. In this case, the ASC is not significant. All coefficients for the offset 
attribute parameters were significant except for the interstate location (LOC2). 
According to the results of model 8, there was again a dislike of offsets which would 
occur overseas in comparison to the offset to be located in the state of the impacted 
site (i.e. Queensland). The coefficient on the distance parameter (NEWDIST) was 
again significant and negative, indicating that this group of respondents did not like 
offsets which were located further away from the impacted site. The coefficient for 
the type of offset parameter (TYPE) is significant and negative which signifies these 
respondents were less inclined to choose the indirect offset over the direct offset. 
Like all previous models, the coefficients for the species (SPECIES) and outcome 
(NEWOUT) parameters are again significant and positive. This indicates that there 
was a preference for the protection of the more endangered species not affected by 
the development, as well as a preference for offsets which protect more shorebirds. 
In terms of individual characteristics, there was a significant and positive 
relationship between age and choosing the default offset option. The significant and 
positive coefficients for the COASTAL and INLAND parameters indicate that 
respondents from these regions are also more inclined to choose the default offset 
option. In contrast, only the coefficient which was significant and negative was the 
CONFUSE parameter; indicating that respondents who found the choice set 
confusing were less likely to choose the default offset option.  
Model 9: Sample removing potential protest responses  
The last model (Model 9) in Table 5.7, shows the results of model 5 estimated 
over the sample which removes respondents that indicated that they did not like 
offsets (in general, direct and indirect) and/or did not like offsets in principle. With 
respect to the ASC and offset attributes, the results are the same as model 5. That is, 
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the significant and negative ASC indicates that respondents generally preferred 
options 1 and 2 over the default offset option. With respect to offset attributes, these 
respondents show a dislike of offsets which occur interstate (LOC2) and an even 
stronger dislike of offsets which occur overseas (LOC3). The negative and 
significant distance parameter (NEWDIST) also shows that offsets which are placed 
further away from the impacted site are less preferred. The positive and significant 
coefficients for species parameter (SPECIES) indicates that the more endangered 
species is preferred relative to the impacted species; while the positive and 
significant coefficient for the outcome parameter (NEWOUT) shows a preference for 
offsets which protect a larger number of shorebirds.  
With respect to the coefficients for individual characteristics, there is a 
significant and positive relationship between getting older; being female; being a 
resident from region 3 (inland Queensland) and choosing the default offset option.  
In line with the other models, respondents of this group who found the choice set 
confusing were again less likely to choose the default offset option.  
Model using the group which were potentially protesting against offsets 
As outlined in Chapter 4, model 5 was also estimated over the sub-group that 
were identified as potentially protesting against offsets. However, when this model 
was estimated it was found that the “Hessian was not positive definite at start 
values”. This may be attributed problems in the dataset, such that the parameter to be 
estimated relates to data which are invariant (Hensher et al., 2005).   
Examining heterogeneity  
To better capture potential heterogeneity between different sub-groups within 
the sample, the sample was partitioned into a number of different groups and the 
(attribute only) model re-estimated for the subgroups. These groups included: the 
group which removes potential protest responses (i.e. removing respondents who 
indicated that they did not like offsets in general, direct or indirect offsets and/or 
stated they did not like offsets in principle); those who expressed a concern for the 
environment in general; those who expressed concern for biodiversity loss; those 
who expressed concern for migratory shorebirds; those who expressed concern for all 
three environmental issues (environment in general, biodiversity loss and migratory 
shorebirds); bird watchers and non bird watchers; respondents living in region 1 
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(Brisbane and surrounding area); respondents living in region 2 (coastal Queensland 
residents); respondents with dependent children; respondents with no children at 
home and gender. Individuals could be members of more than one group.  The 
results of these models are presented in Appendix I, as they do not allow for 
interactions between characteristics (i.e. the model only uses the offset attributes as 
explanatory variables). The results are indicative only and are not discussed further.   
 
5.4.3 Willingness to accept  
To gain a more meaningful measure of the above results, the marginal rate of 
substitution between the expected outcome of the offset and the other attributes of 
the offset were calculated. The willingness to accept (WTA) estimates of models 5 to  
9 are reported in Table 5.8 below. The results are interpreted as the additional 
number of shorebirds required to be equivalent to the default or baseline offset. The 
NS indicates the parameter coefficient was ‘not significant’ and therefore the WTA 
could not be calculated. The statistical significance of coefficients was tested using a 
Wald test and p-values; the results of which may be seen in Appendix G.  
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Table 5.8. Willingness to accept estimates  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
LOC2 684 702 963 NS 707 
 (229) (216) (274)  (230) 
LOC3 1853 1833 2499 606
#
 1933 
 (248) (232) (303) (352) (248) 
NEWDIST 116 119 113 143
#
 123 
 (56) (53) (67) (85) (56) 
TYPE 765 714 927 284
#
 828 
 (117) (110) (141) (172) (118) 
SPECIES  -271 -328 -242 -513 -324 
 (118) (111) (142) (177) (119) 
*NS – Not significant and cannot be calculated. Standard errors are in parentheses below the WTA 
estimates. Standard Errors of WTA are calculated as follows: (standard error of the non-monetary 
attribute / Coefficient of the outcome attribute NEWOUT) × 1000 (Hensher et al., 2005).  
 
# The results of the Wald and p-values test show that these variables were not significant at the 5% 
level. However as seen in Table 5.7 above, these are significant at the 10% level and were thus 
included in the WTA estimate table above.  
 
 
In terms of location, the results suggest that across all models, more birds 
would need to be protected to move the offset to an overseas location, than an 
interstate location. In terms of the amount of birds that would be required to send the 
offset to an overseas location, it is seen that most groups (except for model 8) 
generally require more than double the amount of birds that is needed to send the 
offset to an interstate location. The group requiring the most number of birds to be 
protected to move the offset to an interstate or overseas location was the group of 
respondents who self identified as having paid attention to all offset attributes during 
the choice set exercise (Model 7).  
With respect to distance, Table 5.8 shows that more than 100 additional birds 
would need to be protected for every 1000km that the offset is moved away from the 
impacted site. The WTA for the groups used in Models 5 to 7 are generally 
consistent, differing only by a slight number of birds. The group requiring the highest 
number of birds to be protected was the group of respondents who were classified as 
having not paid attention to the offset attributes during the choice set exercise (Model 
8). The group requiring the second highest number of birds was the sample which 
removed respondents who were potentially protesting against offsets (Model 9).  
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With respect to the acceptability of the indirect offset, the WTA estimates for 
most models were closest to that of the WTA for offsets occurring interstate. Upon 
closer examination, the group which requires the highest amount of birds to be 
protected to make the offset acceptable or equivalent to the default offset; was the 
group which self identified as having paid attention to the offset attributes while 
completing the choice set exercise (Model 7). The group removing missing income 
(Model 5), the full sample (Model 6) and the group removing respondents who were 
potentially protesting against offsets (Model 9) require approximately 100 – 200 
birds less than the group that paid attention to the choice set excise (Model 7). In 
contrast, the group requiring the lowest amount of birds (284) to make the indirect 
offset acceptable was the group who did not pay attention during the choice set 
exercise (Model 8).   
Respondents were willing to accept a smaller number of birds protected in an 
alternative offset if these were a more endangered species of shorebird, suggesting 
that a preference to trade-up if possible exists. The group requiring the least amount 
of endangered shorebirds to be protected was the group who did not pay attention 
during the choice set exercise (Model 8). In terms of the amount of birds, an offset 
which protects the more endangered species of shorebird would be acceptable to the 
group that did not pay attention to the choice set exercise if it protected 513 fewer 
birds. In contrast, respondents who are classified as having paid attention to all five 
offset attributes are willing to accept an offset that protects 242 less birds if they are 
of a more endangered species.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions  
6.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF AIMS OF THE THESIS  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine the potential and limits of 
incentive based mechanisms and offsets to ensure that an appropriate level of 
sustainable coastal development can be achieved. In light of current development 
trajectories along the Queensland coast, particular attention was given to coastal and 
port developments.  
In fulfilment of this aim, two main studies were undertaken. In the first study, a 
qualitative review of the current regulatory framework was conducted, which 
identified the current incentives within the system and explored the potential for 
alternative incentive based mechanisms. In the second study, the public acceptability 
for environmental offsets in Queensland was explored through the use of a choice 
experiment. Particular attention was given to the roles of distance, method and 
potential for the trading up of species. In addition, the influence of individual 
characteristics on the choice of offset was investigated.  
In the following section, the key results of these two studies are outlined and 
discussed in context of previous studies. In the next section, the contributions to 
knowledge of this thesis are presented. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
the limitations of both studies and offers recommendations for future studies to 
address these gaps.    
6.2 KEY RESULTS 
6.2.1 The potential and limitations of incentives 
In the first part of this thesis, the legal framework of dredging and dumping of 
dredge spoils was analysed. This review indicates that the legal framework is 
currently heavily influenced by international treaties and agreements, the principles 
of which have been adopted in national and state law and policies. While some 
incentives have been created to encourage decreases in damage, it was found that 
there could be scope for the use of other incentive based measures such as taxes, cap 
and trade systems or bonds. These incentive based measures may be implemented in 
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conjunction with regulations to reduce damage to the socially optimal level. 
However, even if such mechanisms were implemented, it is acknowledged that they 
are not without flaws. The two main problems identified with incentive based 
mechanisms were imperfect information with respect to the extent of the damage and 
the existence of residual damage.  
As stated previously, it is difficult to detect the extent of the damage incurred 
by the marine environment. More specifically, although some damage may be 
identifiable (e.g. damage to seagrass (Erftemeijer & Robin Lewis III, 2006), coral 
(Pollock et al., 2014), fish or other species which thrive in the dredging or dumping 
area (Bray, 2008; Synnot, 2013)), there is high scientific uncertainty with respect to 
the cost of damage (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population 
and Communities, 2012a).  In addition, the amount of damage incurred by the 
environment may also be subjected to natural forces, such as extreme weather, which 
may exacerbate the level of damage caused by dumping (Pringle, 1996; Wolanski et 
al., 1991). As such, the exact amount of damage caused directly by dumping may be 
distorted. Consequently, as the actual cost of dumping upon the marine environment 
remains largely unknown, it becomes difficult, if not impossible to set the optimal 
tax, damage quota or bond. Secondly, irrespective of which mechanism is used, it is 
evident that there will still be some residual damage from the impact in question. 
Such a result is expected, as the aim is to achieve the socially optimal level of 
damage to enable production, as opposed to eliminating damage completely (Garrod 
& Whitmarsh, 1995).  
While challenging, these issues do not mean that incentive based mechanisms 
cannot be effectively used to reduce damage. In fact, as the mitigation hierarchy calls 
for the impact to first be avoided and mitigated before turning to offsets, then 
incentive based measures could be applied in conjunction with regulation in first 
instance. However, since incentive based measures do not necessarily result in any 
restorative action, this problem may be resolved with the undertaking of an 
environmental offset.  
6.2.2 Potential for offsets 
Offsets are largely considered a “last resort” after avoidance and mitigation 
(Bos et al., 2014; Lapeyre, Froger, & Hrabanski), however there is a growing 
acceptance that offsets may play a greater role in compensating for environmental 
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damage (Lapeyre et al.). Current policy is also implicitly encouraging a greater role 
for offsets, as offset proposals often need to be developed as part of the approval 
process, often before the full impacts (and residual impacts) have been assessed (Bos 
et al., 2014). From an economic perspective, offsets may provide a net gain in overall 
social benefits if the environmental benefits of the offset exceed the costs (rather than 
just achieve a no-net loss). 
The current Australian EPBCA Environmental offset policy requires that most 
(at least 90%) of the offset should involve a direct conservation activity aimed at 
like-for-like replacement as close to the impacted site as possible (Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2012a). The WA 
study  (Rogers et al., 2014) also found that most individuals prefer an offset to be 
implemented as near to the impacted site as possible. However, the WA study also 
found that apart from environmentally concerned individuals, there was on average 
no preference for direct conservation activities.  
The results from this study also support the notion of a preference for offsets 
close to the impacted site. Though, unlike the previous WA offset study (Rogers et 
al., 2014), there was a clear preference for direct offsets over indirect offsets. 
However, this is under ceteris paribus conditions. The results of this study show that 
respondents (even when accounting for the effects of attribute attention and potential 
protest responses) are willing to consider alternative offsets (and in some cases 
indeed prefer alternative offsets) provided that the conservation benefits of them are 
sufficiently larger than the default (like-for-like) offset. It was even seen that 
respondents would be willing to accept an offsets located in areas other than the 
impacted site for the protection of a larger number of birds. More specifically, it was 
seen that respondents would be willing to accept the offset located overseas, in 
exchange for the protection of at least more than double the amount of the birds 
required to make the interstate offset acceptable.  
The public motivation behind the choice of offset location was also different to 
the reasoning of policy makers. From meetings with policy makers, two differing 
views were found. On the one hand, there was some support for offsets which were 
to occur overseas. This view was founded on scientific evidence that for a migratory 
species, overseas actions could encourage biological benefits. On the other hand, 
there was the view that while such benefits may occur, overseas offsets may not be 
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possible given that difficulty of regulating and enforcing actions in another 
jurisdiction. Hence, regulatory and administrative barriers may prevent overseas 
offset from occurring.  
While not possible under current policy, the acceptability of substituting 
species (i.e. “trading up”) was considered in the analysis. This result was consistent 
with the preferences found for the WA study, in that more support was given for the 
protection of the more endangered species, rather than the species which was 
affected by the development (Rogers et al., 2014). This may be because respondents 
thought it was necessary to protect the species which was in urgent need of 
protection, even though it was not directly affected by the development. In terms of 
how many additional birds should be protected, we found that respondents were 
generally willing to accept such offsets in exchange for the protection of a smaller 
number of more endangered birds. This result indicates that the protection of a 
smaller number of more endangered shorebirds is valued the same as the protection 
of a large number of shorebirds directly affected by the development.  
These results therefore indicate scope for the use of alternative offsets which 
protect species under greater threat than the species directly affected by the 
development. That is, there may be some support for the trading up of species in 
cases where like-for-like offsets are infeasible, such as in the case of the marine 
environment. The concept of trading up has been implied in other policies, which 
includes, but is not limited to policies in the US (Fox & Nino-Murci, 2005), South 
Africa (Brownlie & Botha, 2009), and Europe (Dickie, McAleese, Pearce, & 
Treweek, 2013). However, while greater benefits may ensue from the choice to trade 
up species, regard must be given to the consequences of selecting the protection of 
one species over another. For example Zhou et al. (2010) found that in creating a 
sustainable fishery, certain factors of selection must be considered. One such factor 
is species selection, whereby if one species is targeted over the other, this can create 
imbalances in the ecosystem, which can alter the natural levels of biodiversity. This 
analysis is equally applicable to the design of offsets. That is, if the threatened 
species is selected for conservation over the impacted species, this may lead to an 
imbalance in the ecosystem. Thus, offsets of this kind must be implemented carefully 
and in consultation with the relevant experts.  
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As noted previously, current Australian EPBCA Environmental Offsets Policy 
requires that most (at least 90%) of the offset should involve a direct conservation 
activity (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities, 2012a). When participants were directly asked whether they would 
approve the use of direct and indirect offsets, close to all respondents (94%) were 
willing to approve direct offsets in the case of coastal and marine impacts; a good 
majority of the respondents (74%) were also willing to approve the use of indirect 
offsets (see Figure 5.10). This indicates that respondents were not completely 
opposed to the idea of using indirect offset methods such as the funding of research 
or education. However, there was less trust in the ability of indirect offsets to achieve 
the desired conservation outcomes, and it is this that seems to limit its broader 
acceptability. Furthermore, some respondents were also concerned that the indirect 
offset method would be used by developers in an attempt to avoid using direct 
offsets. These opinions were held despite the background information given to 
respondents that all offsets had been verified by independent scientists and that the 
alternative offsets (including research and education) may even result in greater 
conservation benefits for shorebirds. The willingness to accept a greater number of 
birds from an indirect offset most likely reflects a lower level of utility derived from 
indirect offsets than direct offsets, much in the same way that offsets further from the 
impact produced a lower level of utility. Consequently, if indirect offsets methods 
are to be used, it must be ensured that the importance and benefits of indirect offsets, 
such as research and education, are sufficiently conveyed to all stakeholders. This is 
especially important for areas such as the marine environment, where restoration 
techniques are not yet as developed as terrestrial methods. 
The impact of individual characteristics and choice behaviour of the 
respondents on their preferences for offsets was also considered in the analysis. The 
majority of models which were estimated showed that in general, a preference for the 
default offset option was held by respondents as they get older, females and 
respondents located from region 3 (i.e. respondents from inland Queensland). In 
contrast, those less likely to choose the default offset option were confused 
respondents and in some cases (Models 5 & 7), respondents who indicated that they 
were not concerned about various environmental issues. Coastal respondents were 
only more likely to choose the default offset option when attribute attention was 
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accounted for in the model (see Models 7).  These results suggest that offsets cannot 
be designed with one homogenous group in mind. Rather, when designing offsets, it 
is in the best interests of developers and policy makers to account for the views of 
various groups of people. Alternatively, from a practical standpoint, it may be 
prudent to account for various stakeholders by designing the offset based on the 
average opinion.  
6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
In completion of this thesis, the following contributions to knowledge have 
been achieved. Firstly, through a qualitative review of the current regulatory 
framework in relation to dredging and spoil disposal, the current incentives 
embodied within the framework have been identified. From this investigation, a 
study of alternative incentive based mechanisms was conducted. More specifically, 
the potential and limitations of taxes, cap and trade systems, bonds and offsets are 
presented.  
Secondly this thesis was able to contribute to the growing body of knowledge 
with respect of the design of offsets which compensate for damage to the marine 
environment. By comparing the similarities and differences between the design of a 
terrestrial and marine offset, some gaps in knowledge with respect to marine offsets 
are identified. In an attempt to address these gaps, we present a case for the use of 
economic valuation which incorporates key ecological criteria for offset design. That 
is, through the use of a choice experiment we provide insight into what offsets are 
socially acceptable to compensate for damage to the marine environment.  
Finally, by finding the public’s marginal rate of substitution or tradeoffs 
between certain attributes, the study confirms that a broader range of offsets than 
permitted under current offset policies are generally acceptable to the public, 
provided that sufficient benefits are generated. This information provides a basis for 
the design of alternative offsets that may be used in the absence of like-for-like 
offsets. Moreover, by identifying the reasons behind public preferences for certain 
types of offset strategies, both policy makers and developers can better address their 
impacts in future.  
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6.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
With reference to the limitations of the first study, two main limitations were 
identified. Firstly, at the time of writing, many changes were occurring at both the 
Federal and Queensland levels with respect to legislation and policies surrounding 
the protection of the marine and coastal environments (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2014, 2015). Secondly, the first study mainly examined the Australian legislative and 
policy framework associated with the dredging and dumping of dredged spoils. 
Consequently, given the ever evolving nature of this topic, future studies may wish to 
build upon this study in light of these further developments. Knowledge in this area 
may also benefit from a study which examines and compares the Australian 
framework to that of other jurisdictions. Moreover, the possibility of incentive based 
mechanisms may also be revised as new information and technology are developed 
with respect to capturing the full extent of the damage caused by dredging and spoil 
dumping.   
In terms of the limitations of the second study, limitations were found with 
respect to choice of sample, choice set design and modelling.  Firstly the sample used 
for the choice experiment was confined to adult Queensland residents. This choice 
was deliberate, as the main objective of this study was to examine the preference for 
offsets of Queensland residents. While this sample was sufficient for the purpose of 
this thesis; it may be interesting to conduct a study which examines the preferences 
of residents across the nation or compare preferences across states and territories. 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the practical application of any offset policy 
also requires consultation with the relevant experts. Thus, future studies could 
concentrate on eliciting preferences of ecologists, scientists, environmental managers 
and other environmental experts. Such a study would therefore enable future 
researchers to see how closely aligned preferences are of the general public and those 
who manage and implement offset design.  
The second limitation was found in the choice set design. It is suggested that 
future studies may gain a better sense of distance decay by naming the location of the 
proposed offset site in the choice set design. This would require a more specific case-
study scenario than undertaken here, which used a non-specific location for the 
impact as well as offset. 
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Another limitation is the specification of the model used in the analysis. In this 
thesis, the MNL model was used which accounted for offset attributes, socio-
demographic characteristics and choice behaviours of respondents. This model was 
then estimated over particular sub-groups to account for attribute attention and 
potential protest answers. Future studies may wish to adopt more complex models 
which may better pick up other underlying effects.  However, given that the choice 
design only contained three options (two of which are arguably the same) and the 
objective of this thesis was to examine which attributes were the most attractive to 
respondents, this approach was sufficient for this purpose.   
Lastly, the offset study included an analysis of four alternative hypothetical 
situation questions which were used to gain a deeper understanding of where an 
offset should be placed and the reasoning behind this choice. These results indicate 
that the majority of respondents value an offset which remain as close as possible to 
the impacted site, although are willing to consider other options provided greater 
conservation benefits may result. Future studies may wish to expand on this result by 
further exploring the reasoning behind the choice to keep the offset as close to the 
impacted site as possible. Similar studies could also be undertaken in other states to 
confirm whether other respondents share similar values to that of Queensland 
residents.  
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Appendix A 
Legislative Review 
 
General protection of the natural environment 
International treaties 
The following section explores the general principles of international 
environmental law which guide the international community in the protection of the 
natural environment.  This is followed by an examination of some of the main 
environmental agreements and treaties of which Australia follows or is a signatory. 
(i) Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 
The Rio Declaration ("Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
1992,") was created as a result of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (otherwise known as the Earth Summit) (Bates, 
2013). The Rio Declaration encourages sustainable development and the use 
incentives to prevent damage to the environment. This includes, but is not limited to: 
the ‘Inter-generational Equity’ principle, which aims to ensure that the current 
generation is mindful of the ‘developmental and environmental needs’ of future 
generations (Principle 3); the creation of federal law which imposes liability upon 
polluters and allows for compensation to victims of such damage (Principle 13); the 
use of the precautionary principle such that States are to take measures to prevent 
damage if serious or irreversible damage is posed (Principle 15); the correction of 
negative externalities such that the polluter pays for the cost of their damage 
(Principle 16); and the use of environmental impact assessment (EIA) (Principle 17). 
Despite being a non-binding agreement, these principles are generally accepted by 
governments around the world and have even been incorporated into international 
agreements (Bates, 2013; Sands, 2003). The plan and mechanisms which are used to 
implement the principles contained in the Rio Declaration are outlined in Agenda 21 
(Bates, 2013; United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992). To 
ensure that the mechanisms in Agenda 21 are properly executed, several countries 
 110 Appendices 
such as Australia have undertaken regular reporting of progress to the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development (Bates, 2013). 
(ii) Convention on Biological Diversity  
Another key development of the 1992 Earth Summit was the ("Convention on 
Biological Diversity 1992,") (CBD) (Bates, 2013; Fisher, 2014). The objectives of 
the CBD include the conservation of biological diversity and to ensure components 
are used sustainably, with benefits obtained by use shared in an equitable manner 
(see CBD article 1). Like the Rio Declaration, the CBD also encourages parties to 
establish EIA procedures (see CBD article 14). Furthermore, where damage to 
biodiversity occurs, parties to the convention are to review avenues of liability and 
redress (e.g. restoration and compensation) in accordance with article 14(2) of the 
CBD. However, according to article 14(2) of the CBD, an exception to this is made 
liability should be resolved as an internal matter. Specific provision is also made for 
signatories to adopt economically and socially sound measures, such that incentives 
are created to encourage the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (CBD 
article 11). In 2006 the CBD also adopted a decision to encourage industry and 
businesses to develop guidelines for biodiversity offsets which comply with the 
provisions of the CBD (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008).    
(iii) World Heritage Convention 
Australia is also a signatory to the World Heritage Convention ("Convention 
for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972,") which 
recognises the importance of cultural and natural heritage sites (Bates, 2013). More 
specifically, parties are encouraged to undertake measures which work towards the 
protection, conservation and presentation of these sites (see article 5). According to 
article 2 of the World Heritage Convention, natural heritage sites are defined as sites 
which are of outstanding universal value and consist of: natural features including 
physical and biological formations; natural sites; and geological and physiographical 
formations which serve as habitats to threatened species.  
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(iv) Ramsar Convention 
Under the Ramsar Convention, ("Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 1971,") parties, including Australia are 
to recognise the importance of wetlands as a natural habitat and for their economic, 
cultural, scientific and recreational value (Fisher, 2014). Parties are required to 
assign at least one wetland the status of international significance, whereby the 
wetland will be included on the List of Wetlands of International Importance (see 
Ramsar Convention article 2). When deciding which sites are to be included on the 
list, parties are required to give due consideration to the management and use of 
migratory waterfowl (see Ramsar Convention article 2). In addition, parties are also 
encouraged to preserve wetlands through the creation of nature reserves (see Ramsar 
Convention article 4) (Fisher, 2014). Furthermore, if there is a loss of wetland 
resources, as a result of a change in the boundaries of a wetland to serve urgent 
natural interests, then the signatory is also required to compensate for this loss. 
Compensation should take the form of an additional reserve, scaled to match an 
adequate portion of the impacted wetland and should be located in the proximity of 
the impacted wetland or elsewhere (Ramsar Convention article 4).  
 
Federal Australian Law 
(i) Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992 
The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992 (IGAE) was made 
on 1 May 1992 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992). The agreement was created to 
encourage local, state and Commonwealth governments to cooperate with each other 
for the purposes of protecting the environment (Bates, 2013) and adopt international 
environmental protection principles as outlined above (Fisher, 2014). Some of the 
practices which were agreed upon include, inter alia: precautionary principle (IGAE 
section 3.5.1), intergenerational equity (IGAE section 3.5.2), conservation of 
biological diversity and ecological integrity (IGAE section 3.5.3) and improved 
valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms (IGAE section 3.5.4) (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 1992; Fisher, 2014).  
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(ii) Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) 
Australia’s principal source of environmental law which gives effect to 
Australia’s obligations under international environmental law as listed above is the 
("Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth),") (EPBCA) 
(Department of the Environment, 2013a). The EPBCA is also supported by the 
EPBC Regulations ("Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Regulations 2000 (Cth),"). In its objectives, the EPBCA calls for the protection of the 
environment, with a focus on matters of national environmental significance and also 
endorses the principles of ecologically sustainable development (EPBCA section 3). 
The jurisdiction of the EPBCA lies in matters of national environmental significance 
such as: world heritage sites, national heritage sites, wetlands of international 
importance under the Ramsar Convention, listed threatened species and ecological 
communities, internationally protected migratory species, Commonwealth marine 
areas, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and environments affected by nuclear 
activities (Department of the Environment, 2013c). As of 22 June 2013, matters 
involving water resources in relation to coal seam gas and large coal mining 
development are now also recognised as a matter of national environmental 
significance (see ("Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Amendment Act 2013 (Cth),")) (Department of the Environment, 2013e).  
The principles of ecologically sustainable development include: regard for 
economic, environmental, social and equitable considerations; the precautionary 
principle; the inter-generational equity principle; the requirement that primary 
consideration be given to biodiversity and ecological integrity before decisions are 
made; and the call for the promotion of improved valuation, pricing and incentive 
mechanisms (EPBCA section 3A). To achieve its objectives, promotes the use of 
bilateral agreements with States and Territories and community involvement 
(EPBCA sections 3(2)(g)). 
  An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is required under the EPBCA if 
the proposed action (e.g. project, development, undertaking, activity or series of 
activities (see EPBCA section 523)) is likely to cause a significant impact upon 
matters of national environmental significance (Elliot, 2014). The EIA process 
involves three main stages: referral, assessment and approval (Elliot, 2014). 
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Applicants who undergo this process will also bear the associated costs of instigating 
the EIA. These three stages are both thorough and complex. The assessment phase of 
the EIA can involve several stages if there is no accredited assessment process. The 
Minister can assess the action through accredited assessment process, referral 
information, preliminary documentation, public environment report, environmental 
impact statement or assessment by inquiry (EPBCA section 87) (Elliot, 2014). There 
is also the option to assess the action under strategic assessment (EPBCA section 
146). If the project is approved, the project may require more information and 
subsequent audits as per the conditions of the approval (Bates, 2013). In approving 
the project, the Minister must also take into account economic and social matters 
which may be affected by the action (e.g. principles of ecologically sustainable 
development) (EPBCA section 136). To ensure adherence to the processes within the 
EPBCA, enforcement and compliance mechanisms have been developed under the 
‘Compliance and Enforcement Policy: Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999’ (Department of the Environment, 2013b).  For example, this 
could include administrative measures, as well as civil and criminal penalties 
(Department of the Environment, 2013b).  
 
State Law 
The environmental legislation for each State and Territory also includes 
general duties to prevent polluting or damaging the environment (Tooma, 2011). 
Environmental impact assessment also exists at state and territory levels (Elliot, 
2014). 
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Regulation of dredging and tailings dumping 
International law 
Australia is also a party to international treaties which involve the protection of 
the marine environment from damage and pollution. These include: the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the London Convention and its Protocol 
and the Noumea Convention.  
(i) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
The "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982") (LOSC) not 
only provides protection for the marine environment, but also outlines the 
jurisdiction of a State with respect to activities which may be undertaken and how 
marine resources may be utilised (United Nations: Oceans and Law of the Sea, 
2011).  The LOSC works in conjunction with the Convention of Biological 
Diversity, however activities with respect to the deep seabed are primarily under the 
jurisdiction of the LOSC (Rothwell & Stephens, 2010).  The LOSC may be 
perceived as stricter than the London Convention (as discussed below), as LOSC also 
includes calls for States to enforce laws with respect to pollution of dumping 
(Rothwell & Stephens, 2010). Under the LOSC, each State is given sovereignty over 
12 nautical miles from the baseline as defined by the LOSC (see LOSC article 3). 
However parties to the LOSC are also entitled to ‘explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage’ marine life and non living resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
which extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline (see LOSC article 57) (Bates, 
2013). With respect to the protection of the sea, the LOSC calls for States to make 
laws which prevent, reduce and control sea dumping which may result in pollution 
(see LOSC article 210) (Tanaka, 2012).  
(ii) London Convention and Protocol   
Australia is a party to both the London Convention ("Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972,") and 
the London Protocol ("1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972,") (Palassis, 
2011). The London Convention calls for reasonable steps to be taken to prevent the 
pollution of the marine environment through sea dumping activities. Under the 
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London Convention, a licence may be granted to a proponent intending to dump 
material into the sea, provided the relevant authority is satisfied that: all other 
alternative avenues for dumping have been exhausted and the material to be dumped 
will not cause harm to the marine environment (Bates, 2013).    
Although the Convention and Protocol both aim to prevent dumping of wastes 
at sea, the London Protocol is stricter in its method for preventing dumping. That is, 
where the London Convention does allow dumping as a last resort provided no harm 
is caused to the marine environment; the London Protocol strictly forbids all 
dumping (Tanaka, 2012). However an exception to this is made for material which 
appears under the Protocol’s strict reverse list of approved material (International 
Maritime Organization, 2014). Inter alia, this includes: inorganic geological material 
(e.g. mining tailings) and dredged material (see London Protocol Annex I). 
Nevertheless, the Protocol still requires States to issue a licence to the proponent 
intending to dump the approved material. By restricting dumping in this way, the 
London Protocol gives effect to the precautionary principle (International Maritime 
Organization, 2014).  
 
(iii) Noumea Convention  
Australia is also a party the Noumea Convention ("Convention for the 
Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region 
(SPREP) 1986,") (Fisher, 2014). This convention obligates Australia to protect the 
200 nautical mile zone off Australia’s East Coast and Islands from pollution caused 
by sea dumping and damage from mining and dredging activities (see articles 5 & 13 
of the Noumea Convention).   
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Federal Law 
(i) Seas and Submerged Lands Act  
To give effect to the requirements of the LOSC, Australia enacted the ("Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth),") (SSLA) (M. White, 2011). The SSLA vests 
powers in the Australian federal government over the territorial sea (see SSLA 
section 6). The SSLA also grants rights and sets limits over the exclusive economic 
zone, the continental shelf and the contiguous zone (see SSLA Divisions 1A, 2 & 
2A). For example, inter alia, this includes the right to explore and exploit natural 
resources. However the SSLA also imposes limitations on the powers of the federal 
government, by preserving the jurisdiction of State government to waters within state 
limits (SSLA section 14) (Rothwell, 2011).   
(ii) Offshore Constitutional Settlement  
After the enactment of the SSLA, issues arose with respect to the division of 
power in the territorial sea between the Commonwealth and the States 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General's Department, 2014). This prompted 
the States to challenge the Commonwealth in a landmark decision known as the 
("New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case)," 
1975) (M. White, 2009). In that case, the High Court decided in favour of the 
Commonwealth, confirming the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction over the sea from the 
low water mark (M. White, 2009). This meant that the low water mark or low tide 
point was now the territorial limit for the States (Castan, 2008; M. White, 2009).  
However, after this decision, the States and Commonwealth made arrangements for 
the division of power over the territorial sea under the ‘Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement 1979’ (OCS) (Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General's 
Department, 2014).  
Significant arrangements in favour of the States were made under the OCS 
which included an extension of legislative powers of the States in relation to coastal 
waters and the return of proprietary rights and title in respect of the seabed beneath 
the territorial sea (M. White, 2009). The OCS also made jurisdictional agreements in 
respect offshore petroleum, offshore mining for other minerals, offshore fisheries, the 
Great Barrier Reef and other marine parks, marine pollution and shipping and 
navigation (Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General's Department, 2014). 
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Several pieces of legislation have since been enacted to give effect to the agreements 
made under the OCS (M. White, 2009).  
 
(iii) Environment Protection  (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 and Environment 
Protection (Sea Dumping) Regulations 1983  
Together, the EPSDA ("Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 
(Cth),") and its regulations EPSDR ("Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) 
Regulations 1983 (Cth) ") give effect to the objectives outlined in the London 
Convention and Protocol (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the 
Environment,, 2013). In terms of jurisdiction, the EPSDA applies within and outside 
Australia, as well as to every external Territory (EPSDA section 6). However, the act 
does not apply to the disposal of controlled material relating to the offshore 
processing of seabed mineral resources (EPSDA section 5). Nevertheless, all other 
sea dumping activities require applicants to obtain a permit before any dumping 
activity can commence (EPSDA section 18). The application must be in the correct 
form (EPSDA section 18(2)).  
As per EPSDR regulation 5(2)(a) & (b), the fee for a permit to dump dredged 
or excavated material is: 
 $23,500 if the volume of the material exceeds 100,000 m3;  
 $10,000 if the volume of the material does not exceed 100,000 m3. 
Once the application is submitted, the Minister must decide whether to grant 
the permit (EPSDA section 19(2)). The decision is made with reference to the 
requirements of the London Protocol and other international treaties (EPSDA section 
19(8A). More specifically, the Minister must also consider that a permit for dumping 
or loading for dumping may only be granted if the controlled material is listed in 
Annex 1 of the London Protocol and in accordance with Annex 2 of the London 
Protocol (EPSDA section 19(5)). The Minister may also publish the application in 
the Gazette (EPSDA section 25). Furthermore, if the dumping activity may affect a 
matter of national environmental significance, then advice must be sought under the 
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EPBCA (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Environment, 2013a). 
Conditions may be stipulated on the permit if granted (EPSDA section 21).  
In some cases, the Minister may limit the application of the EPSDA on certain 
regions and coastal waters of a State (EPSDA section 9(1)). However for this to 
occur, the Minister must be satisfied that the State will adhere to requirements of the 
London Protocol (EPSDA section 9(1)). Moreover, if the activity involves the 
dumping of seriously harmful material (EPSDA section 4), then the EPSDA will 
continue to apply (EPSDA section 9(2)). An offence will be committed if dumping 
occurs outside of a permit (EPSDA section 10A) and for engaging in conduct which 
breaches the conditions of a permit (EPSDA section 36). The Commonwealth 
Department of the Environment also has other mechanisms in place to ensure 
compliance with permits. This includes reference to the ‘Compliance and 
Enforcement Policy 2009’, analysing reports of conduct and the auditing, patrolling 
and investigation of activities (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the 
Environment, 2013b; Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Populations 
and Communities, 2009).  
 
(iv) National Assessment Guidelines for Dredging 2009 
The National Assessment Guidelines for Dredging 2009 (NAGD) succeed the 
former National Ocean Disposal Guidelines for Dredge Material 2002 (Department 
of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2009b). The NAGD is generally 
consulted in conjunction with the EPSDA, EPBCA and GBRMP Act when the 
process of the dumping of material arises (NAGD Part 2). Accordingly, the NAGD 
gives a detailed outline as to what applicants and regulators must do before, during 
and after dredging operations take place (see NAGD Parts 3 & 4). More specifically, 
in line with the London Convention, the guidelines first encourage the applicant to 
take reasonable measures to find alternative sites for dumping or find ways to 
minimise damage before resorting to dumping (NAGD Part 4.1). If the dumping is to 
take place, then the NAGD requires the assessment of the material to be dumped 
(NAGD Part 4.2) and an assessment of the impacts upon the environment (NAGD 
Part 4.3). If damage is identified; provision is also made under the NAGD for the 
management and monitoring of such impacts (see NAGD Part 4.4).  
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(v) Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 
The Act, Authority and supporting materials  
The ("Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth),") (GBRMP Act) and its 
regulations ("Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Regulations 1983 (Cth),") (GBRMPR) 
were created with the intention of protecting and conserving the Great Barrier Reef 
Region (GBRMP Act section 2A). To do this, the Act establishes the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) (GBRMP Act section 6). This authority is 
also approved under the EPSDA to monitor the Great Barrier Reef region (see 
GBRMP Act sections 7, 8, 30 & 31) with regards to the loading and disposal of 
dredged material (Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2009b).  
To supplement the information in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 
(Cth) in relation to dredging and spoil disposal in the marine park, the GBRMP 
Authority also makes reference to: the ‘GBRMPA’s Dredging Policy’, the ‘2009 
Memorandum of understanding between the GBRMPA and the Queensland Ports 
Association’ and the ‘Environmental Protection Agency – Disposal of materials in 
tidal waters’ (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2011a).  
Any person or entity wishing to carry out dredging and dumping activities 
within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park must first undergo an environmental 
impact assessment and obtain a permit from the GBRMP Authority  (Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority, 2011a).  
Application Process for Permit 
An application for permission must be in the approved form and must include 
the required information and necessary documents as outlined by the GBRMP 
Authority (GBRMPR regulation 88A) (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 
2011b).  If the GBRMPA believes that the granting of a permit may affect the public 
use of part of the Marine Park, the GBRMP Authority may require the applicant to 
publish details of the project in an advertisement within the surrounding areas 
affected for comment (GBRMPR regulation 88D). The GBRMP Authority must also 
publish the advertisement on their website (GBRMPR regulation 88D(3)). The 
GBRMP Authority may also ask the applicant to provide further or specific 
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information (GBRMPR regulation 88E(1)). Any failure to comply with the above 
requirements for submitting an application may result in the application being 
withdrawn (GBRMPR regulation 88D(4) & 88E(3)).  
Once such information is received, the GBRMP Authority must, within a 
reasonable time, decide whether or not to grant the application (GBRMPR regulation 
88X & 88Y). While considering the application, the GBRMP Authority must give 
due consideration to impacts on the environment, ways to handle these impacts, 
received written comments about the application, proposed impacts of the zoning 
plan if any
20
 and if the conduct requires approval or permit under the EPBCA 
(GBRMPR regulation 88Q). The GBRMP Authority may also consider, inter alia, 
the applicant’s duty to take reasonable care in their actions in order to prevent or 
minimise harm to the park (GBRMP Act section 37AA) as well as any other 
legislative obligations which may affect the project (GRMPR regulation 88R). 
Once the application is granted, it may also come with certain conditions 
(GBRMPR regulation 88ZE & 88ZF). The GBRMP Authority also reserves the right 
to modify, suspend and revoke permits (GBRMPR Division 2A.8).  
Relation to the EPBCA 
The GBRMP Act also outlines its connection to the EPBCA (GBRMP Act 
section 37AB & AC). More specifically, where the GBRMP Authority or another 
agency is responsible for granting permits under a zoning plan, they must not grant a 
permit if the proposed action is a controlled action under the EPBCA and the 
Minister has not decided under part 9 of the EPBCA to permit the action (GBRMP 
Act 37AB(2)).  
Fees 
In order to apply for a permit to conduct a project, the applicant must pay a 
non-refundable application assessment fee to the GBRMP Authority and the 
Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service. Project operators with a permit may also be 
                                                 
 
20
 See section 2.2.4 (m)(i) & (ii) and section 2.3.4(m)(i) & (ii) of the ("Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Zoning Plan 2003 (Cth),") which require permission from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority to use or enter the General Use Zone or Habitat Protection Zone for the purposes of works 
involving dredging or dumping.  
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charged a continuation fee, if their project surpasses the agreed permit expiry date 
(Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2011c).   
Offences & Penalties 
According to section 38BA of the GBRMP Act, it is an offence to engage in 
prohibited conduct or conduct in a zone without proper authorisation. Civil penalties 
also exist for unauthorised conduct in a zone (See GBRMP Act section 38BB). The 
Act also makes it an offence for a person to discharge waste into the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park without proper authorisation (GBRMP Act section 38DD(1)).  
 
 
State Law  
Sea Dumping Legislation  
At present, Western Australia is the only state which has close to identical 
legislation to the EPSDA. Though South Australia has sea dumping legislation, it 
remains un-operational (Palassis, 2011). Regardless, even if reciprocal state or 
territory legislation has been created, the EPSDA procedures will apply where the 
activities involve dumping of ‘seriously harmful material’ (EPSDA section 9(2)).  
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Recent Developments  
State and Territory EIA and bilateral agreements  
In 2013 the Federal Government announced a new simplified framework for 
environmental approvals. Under this new scheme, referred to as the One-Stop-Shop, 
approvals for matters of state and national environmental significance will now be 
determined by the States. Consequently, only a single decision will be required 
(Department of the Environment, 2013d). The Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Bilateral Agreement Implementation) Bill 
2014 has been introduced into Parliament to formally give effect to the new 
framework (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014a). All States 
and Territories have signified intent to develop draft bilateral agreement and 
Memoranda of Understanding have also been signed (Department of the 
Environment, 2013d).  
Dredging and dumping reforms 
Both the Federal and Queensland Governments have undertaken reforms to 
ensure the Great Barrier Reef retains its World Heritage status. Such reforms have 
included strategic assessments of the Great Barrier Reef and port strategies which 
restrict development and expansion of ports and related infrastructure outside major 
port areas (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, 2015). 
In addition to the above reforms, the Greens party introduced the ‘Stop 
Dumping on the Great Barrier Reef Bill 2014’. The intention of the Bill is to amend 
the national sea dumping legislation (EPSDA) to ensure that the dumping of dredge 
spoil within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area is prohibited. The Bill also 
seeks to overturn the 2013 approval to dump dredged spoil in the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park. At the time of writing, the Bill was currently before the Senate (The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b).  
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Appendix B 
Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OFFSETS IN THE MARINE AND COASTAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
A copy of this survey is available upon request.  
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Appendix C 
Variables used in analysis 
Variable Description Code 
ID The unique identification number of the 
respondent 
 
CHOICE The choice made by the respondent in 
each scenario  
1 = if chosen 
0 = if not  
ALT The number of alternatives  1 = Alternative 1 
2 = Alternative 2 
3 = Default option 
CSET The number of alternatives in each 
scenario (3) 
3 
LOC2 If offset is located in another Australian 
state or territory 
1 = another Australian state 
or territory 
0 = otherwise  
LOC3 If offset is located in another country 1 = another country 
0 = otherwise 
DIST The distance of the offset from the offset 
site in km 
100, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 
5000, 6000 
NEWDIST The ‘DIST’ variable scaled by 1000 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 
TYPE The type of offset (i.e. direct or indirect). 1 = Indirect offset 
0 = Direct offset  
SPECIES The species of shorebird that will be 
protected by the offset 
1 = More endangered species 
0 = Impacted species  
OUTCOME  The number of birds that will be protected 
by the offset 
1000 , 2000, 3000, 4000  
NEWOUT The ‘OUTCOME’ variable scaled by 
1000 
1, 2, 3, 4 
NOCERT Dummy variable which defines whether 
the respondent was not certain (includes: 
not at all & not much) of their choice set 
answer 
1 = Not certain 
0 = otherwise  
UNCRTN Dummy variable which defines whether 
the respondent was not certain (includes: 
not at all & not much) of their choice set 
answer 
1 = Not certain 
0 = otherwise 
CONFUSE Whether the respondent thought the 
choice set confusing  
1 = Confusing  
0 = not confusing 
 
CONSIDER Dummy variable which defines attention. 
A respondent is deemed to have paid 
attention if they indicated they considered 
all 5 attributes very much, reasonably or 
somewhat.  
1 = Paid attention to all 5 
attributes 
2 = Did not pay attention to 
all 5 attributes 
ATTEN4 Attribute defines respondents who paid 
very much, reasonable, somewhat or not 
much attention to all attributes 
1 = if very much, reasonable, 
somewhat or not much 
attention paid  
  
Appendices 125 
0 = otherwise 
BRISBANE Whether the respondent lives in Brisbane 
or surrounding city areas (region 1) and 
surrounding suburbs  
1 = Brisbane and surrounding 
suburbs resident 
0 = otherwise 
COASTAL Whether the respondent lives along the 
coastline (region 2) 
1 = QLD coastal resident 
0 = otherwise 
 
INLAND Whether the respondent lives in inland 
Queensland (region 3) 
1 = Inland QLD resident  
0 = otherwise  
DENV The group of respondents who do not care 
about environmental issues in general 
(includes not at all & not much)  
1 = Do not care about 
environmental issues 
0 = Otherwise 
DBIO The group of respondents who do not care 
about biodiversity loss (includes not at all 
& not much) 
1 = Do not care about 
biodiversity loss 
0 = otherwise 
DSBIRDS The group of respondents who do not care 
about migratory shorebirds (includes: not 
at all & not much)  
1 = Do not care about 
migratory shorebirds  
0 = otherwise 
CARE3 The group of respondents who care (this 
includes very, reasonably or somewhat 
concerned) about all 3 environmental 
issues (the environment in general, 
biodiversity loss and migratory 
shorebirds).  
1 = Indicated care for all 3 
environmental issues 
0 = otherwise 
OPCARE3 Dummy variable which defines the group 
of respondents who do not care about all 3 
environment issues (i.e. the environment 
in general, biodiversity loss and migratory 
shorebirds). Note that this group includes 
respondents who do not care about all 3 
issues or only care only about 1 or 2 
issues. This variable is the opposite of 
CARE3 variable.  
1 = Do not care about all 3 
issues 
0 = care about all 3 
environmental issues  
YBWATCH  Dummy variable which defines the group 
of respondents who go bird watching 
(includes very frequently, frequently and 
occasionally go bird watching) 
1 = Bird watcher 
0 = otherwise  
NBWATCH Group of respondents who do not go bird 
watching (includes never and rarely go 
bird watching) 
1 = Not a bird watcher 
0 = otherwise 
NOOFFSET Dummy variable which defines the group 
who disapprove of direct, indirect and 
offsets and general AND/OR always 
disagree with offsets in principle  
1 = Disapproves of all offsets 
0 = Otherwise  
DEPT Dummy variable which defines the group 
with dependent children 
 
1 = Has dependent children 
0 = Has no children at home 
 
 126 Appendices 
FEMALE  Dummy variable which identifies if 
respondents are female 
1 = Female 
0 = Male 
AGE_M A variable which uses the midpoint of 
each age bracket to create a continuous 
variable (note the last variable ‘over 75’ 
calculated the midpoint by taking the 15 
year interval as the end point) 
24, 38,53,68,83 
INCOME 
_M 
A variable which uses the midpoint value 
of each income bracket to create a 
continuous variable (the last variable over 
250,000 calculated the midpoint by taking 
the 50,000 interval as the end point) 
Furthermore, respondents who did not 
specify their income were coded as 0 and 
was removed from the data set before 
analysis.  
   0 
10,000 
27,500 
42,500 
60,000 
85,000 
115,000 
140,000 
175,000 
225,000 
275,000 
 
MIDINC This variable is the same as the 
‘Income_m’ variable; however zeros are 
left as blanks.  
10,000 
27,500 
42,500 
60,000 
85,000 
115,000 
140,000 
175,000 
225,000 
275,000 
 
NEWINC A variable which uses the midpoint value 
of each income bracket to create a 
continuous variable (the last variable over 
250,000 calculated the midpoint by taking 
the 50,000 interval as the end point) 
Furthermore, respondents who did not 
specify their income were left as missing 
data. Income values were also scaled by 
$1000.  
10.5, 27.5, 42.5, 60, 85, 115, 
140, 175, 225, 275 
TAFE A dummy variable which identifies 
respondents with a TAFE qualification  
1 = TAFE qualification  
0 = otherwise 
BACHPG A dummy variable which identifies 
respondents with either a university or 
post-graduate level of education  
1 = university/bachelor or 
postgraduate degree 
0 = otherwise  
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Appendix D 
Goodness of fit tests for gender 
Hypothesis 
H0: There is no difference between the gender composition of the adult 
Queensland population
21
 and the general sample 
H1: There is a difference between the gender composition of the adult 
Queensland population and the general sample 
 
The test statistic  
 
 The Chi-squared  test statistic is calculated as follows: 
  =  
 
 Male Female 
Observed Value 243 257 
Expected % 49.35% 50.65% 
Expected Value 247 253 
 
 =   +     = 0.1280 
 
Distribution of the test    
 Degrees of freedom = n – 1 (where ‘n’ is the number of classes) 
 Here there are 2 classes (male and female). 
Degrees of freedom = 2 – 1 = 1  
 
Level of significance   
The level of significance for this test is α = 0.05  
The rule 
 Reject the null hypothesis if  >   
 
Conclusion 
 Here  0.128  and   = 3.841 
 
Since  <  the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the gender 
composition of the adult Queensland population and the general sample are 
comparable.  
                                                 
 
21
 Expected % of adult Queensland population in June 2014 is derived from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2015).  
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Appendix E 
Goodness of fit tests for age 
Hypothesis 
H0: There is no difference between the age of the adult Queensland 
population
22
 and the general sample  
H1: There is a difference between the age of the adult Queensland population 
and the general sample  
 
The test statistic 
 The Chi-squared  test statistic is calculated as follows: 
  =  
 
 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 Over 75 
Observed Value 114 136 123 101 26 
Expected % 24.21% 27.13% 24.79% 17.01% 6.86% 
Expected Value 121 136 124 85 34 
 
 =   +    +     +     +      = 6.7559 
 
Distribution of the test    
 Degrees of freedom = n – 1 (where ‘n’ is the number of classes) 
 Here there are 5 age categories. 
Degrees of freedom = 5 – 1 = 4  
 
Level of significance   
The level of significance for this test is α = 0.05  
 
The rule 
 Reject the null hypothesis if  >   
 
Conclusion 
 Here  6.7559   and   = 9.488 
 Since  <  the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the age 
of the adult Queensland population and the general sample is comparable.  
                                                 
 
22
 Expected % of adult Queensland population in June 2014 is derived from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2015). 
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Appendix F 
Likelihood Ratio Test for Model Fit 
 
The likelihood ratio tests between the full base MNL model (model 1) and all subsequent 
reduced form models are show in the table below. The results show that there is no 
significant difference between the full base MNL model and the subsequent models 
estimated. However, since the majority of explanatory variables in Model 5 are statistically 
significant (see Wald test in Appendix G below), it was decided that this is the model which 
will be used. 
 
Model  Log 
Likelihood 
Function 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(DF) 
Base DF – 
New 
Model DF 
Chi square 
test 
statistic 
Level of 
Significan
ce 
Chi square 
critical 
value 
Model 1 
(Base) 
-3074.33 
 
19     
Model 2 -3074.43 
 
18 1 0.1860 
 
0.05 3.8415 
 
Model 3 -3075.04 
 
15 4 1.4108 
 
0.05 9.4877 
 
Model 4 -3075.82 
 
14 5 2.9662 
 
0.05 11.0705 
 
Model 5  -3076.16 
 
13 6 3.6619 0.05 12.5916 
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Appendix G 
 Testing of statistical significance of explanatory variables for models in 
Chapter 5  
Hypothesis 
H0: The parameter equals zero (not significant) 
H1: The parameter does not equal zero (statistically significant)  
 
The test 
The Wald statistic is calculated as:  
 
 
Level of significance   
The level of significance for this test is α = 0.05  
At a 95% confidence level, the critical Wald-value is 1.96 
The rule 
 If the Wald-test statistic (absolute value) > the critical Wald value or if the p-value is 
less than α = 0.05 then reject H0. That is, the explanatory variable is statistically significant.  
  If the Wald-test statistic (absolute value) < the critical Wald value or if p-value is 
more than α = 0.05, then do not reject H0. That is, the explanatory variable is not statistically 
significant.  
Conclusion  
In addition to the coefficients, standard error and levels of significance, the following tables 
also include the Wald-statistics (Wald) and p-values for the Wald-test (Prob|z|Z*) in the 5
th
 
and 6
th
 columns of the table respectively.  
The results of each test are provided underneath the respective table.  
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Model 1: Base Model
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3041 0.1021 *** -2.98 0.0029
LOC3 -0.8330 0.1107 *** -7.53 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0525 0.0249 ** -2.11 0.0347
TYPE -0.3411 0.0523 *** -6.53 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1214 0.0528 ** 2.3 0.0215
NEWOUT 0.4470 0.0277 *** 16.15 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0297 0.0025 *** 12.12 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1905 0.0795 ** 2.4 0.0166
OPCARE3 -0.1826 0.1125 -1.62 0.1045
DEPT -0.1039 0.0842 -1.23 0.2173
TAFE 0.0271 0.0945 0.29 0.7741
BACHPG 0.0928 0.0974 0.95 0.3407
NEWINC -0.0007 0.0009 -0.81 0.4188
COASTAL 0.1483 0.0964 1.54 0.1241
INLAND 1.3999 0.2722 *** 5.14 0.0000
YBWATCH 0.0407 0.0861 0.47 0.6367
CONFUSE -0.5004 0.0849 *** -5.9 0.0000
UNCRTN 0.0604 0.1399 0.43 0.6658
ASCSQ -0.6208 0.1866 *** -3.33 0.0009
LL function -3074.33
AIC 6186.7
AIC/N 1.96
N 3157
K 19
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level  
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05 
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 1: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
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Model 2: Removing UNCRTN
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3045 0.1021 *** -2.98 0.0029
LOC3 -0.8330 0.1107 *** -7.53 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0523 0.0249 ** -2.11 0.0352
TYPE -0.3413 0.0522 *** -6.53 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1213 0.0528 ** 2.3 0.0215
NEWOUT 0.4469 0.0277 *** 16.15 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0295 0.0024 *** 12.18 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1921 0.0794 ** 2.42 0.0156
OPCARE3 -0.1783 0.1121 -1.59 0.1116
DEPT -0.1040 0.0842 -1.24 0.2167
TAFE 0.0250 0.0943 0.26 0.7910
BACHPG 0.0932 0.0974 0.96 0.3390
NEWINC -0.0007 0.0009 -0.82 0.4146
COASTAL 0.1458 0.0962 1.51 0.1299
INLAND 1.3892 0.2709 *** 5.13 0.0000
YBWATCH 0.0388 0.0860 0.45 0.6521
CONFUSE -0.4901 0.0814 *** -6.02 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.6108 0.1851 *** -3.3 0.0010
LL function -3074.426
AIC 6184.9
AIC/N 1.959
N 3157
K 18
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level  
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 2: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
 
  
Appendices 133 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3039 0.1021 *** -2.98 0.0029
LOC3 -0.8327 0.1106 *** -7.53 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0523 0.0249 ** -2.1 0.0354
TYPE -0.3415 0.0522 *** -6.54 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1213 0.0528 ** 2.3 0.0215
NEWOUT 0.4467 0.0277 *** 16.14 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0295 0.0024 *** 12.35 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1899 0.0793 ** 2.39 0.0167
OPCARE3 -0.1883 0.1101 * -1.71 0.0873
DEPT -0.1048 0.0841 -1.25 0.2125
NEWINC -0.0005 0.0008 -0.62 0.5321
COASTAL 0.1432 0.0957 1.5 0.1347
INLAND 1.3815 0.2703 *** 5.11 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.4940 0.0811 *** -6.09 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.5671 0.1757 *** -3.23 0.0012
LL function -3075.04
AIC 6180.1
AIC/N 1.958
N 3157
K 15
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Model 3: Removing UNCRTN, BACHPG, TAFE & YBWATCH
 
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05. 
  
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 3: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
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Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3047 0.1021 *** -2.98 0.0028
LOC3 -0.8324 0.1106 *** -7.52 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0518 0.0248 ** -2.09 0.0370
TYPE -0.3416 0.0522 *** -6.54 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1211 0.0528 ** 2.29 0.0218
NEWOUT 0.4464 0.0277 *** 16.13 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0302 0.0023 *** 12.96 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1872 0.0792 ** 2.36 0.0182
OPCARE3 -0.1893 0.1101 * -1.72 0.0854
NEWINC -0.0007 0.0008 -0.83 0.4045
COASTAL 0.1447 0.0957 1.51 0.1304
INLAND 1.3677 0.2697 *** 5.07 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.4982 0.0810 *** -6.15 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.6211 0.1705 *** -3.64 0.0003
LL function -3075.82
AIC 6179.6
AIC/N 1.957
N 3157
K 14
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Model 4: Removing UNCRTN, BACHPG, TAFE, YBWATCH & DEPT
 
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 4: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
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Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3051 0.1021 *** -2.99 0.0028
LOC3 -0.8325 0.1106 *** -7.52 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0517 0.0248 ** -2.08 0.0374
TYPE -0.3416 0.0522 *** -6.54 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1210 0.0528 ** 2.29 0.0218
NEWOUT 0.4463 0.0277 *** 16.13 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0304 0.0023 *** 13.08 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1896 0.0792 ** 2.39 0.0167
OPCARE3 -0.1930 0.1099 * -1.76 0.0791
COASTAL 0.1458 0.0957 1.52 0.1274
INLAND 1.3641 0.2695 *** 5.06 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.4923 0.0807 *** -6.1 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.6809 0.1550 *** -4.39 0.0000
LL function -3076.164
AIC 6178.3
AIC/N 1.957
N 3157
K 13
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Model 5: Removing UNCRTN, BACHPG, TAFE, YBWATCH, DEPT & 
NEWINC
 
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 5: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
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Model 6: Full Sample 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3152 0.0972 *** -3.24 0.0012
LOC3 -0.8232 0.1041 *** -7.91 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0533 0.0236 ** -2.25 0.0242
TYPE -0.3209 0.0495 *** -6.48 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1474 0.0501 *** 2.94 0.0032
NEWOUT 0.4492 0.0263 *** 17.09 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0317 0.0022 *** 14.29 0.0000
FEMALE 0.2192 0.0760 *** 2.88 0.0039
OPCARE3 -0.1136 0.1036 -1.1 0.2727
COASTAL 0.1861 0.0898 ** 2.07 0.0383
INLAND 1.2798 0.2569 *** 4.98 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.5270 0.0768 *** -6.87 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.7504 0.1488 *** -5.04 0.0000
LL function -3403.07
AIC 6832.1
AIC/N 1.952
N 3500
K 13
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level  
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 6: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, COASTAL, 
INLAND & CONFUSE.  
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Model 7: Paid Attention
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.4010 0.1140 *** -3.52 0.0004
LOC3 -1.0404 0.1261 *** -8.25 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0470 0.0277 * -1.7 0.0897
TYPE -0.3861 0.0587 *** -6.57 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1007 0.0591 * 1.7 0.0884
NEWOUT 0.4164 0.0307 *** 13.57 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0364 0.0026 *** 13.88 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1878 0.0878 ** 2.14 0.0325
OPCARE3 -0.3195 0.1418 ** -2.25 0.0243
COASTAL 0.0670 0.1015 0.66 0.5095
INLAND 1.3195 0.3138 *** 4.2 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.5635 0.0917 *** -6.14 0.0000
ASCSQ -1.0209 0.1761 *** -5.8 0.0000
LL function -2488.47432
AIC 5002.9
AIC/N 1.911
N 2618
K 13
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level  
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 7: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, OPCARE3, 
INLAND & CONFUSE.  
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Model 8: Did Not Pay Attention
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.0675 0.1894 -0.36 0.7215
LOC3 -0.3308 0.1921 * -1.72 0.0851
NEWDIST -0.0779 0.0463 * -1.68 0.0924
TYPE -0.1551 0.0940 * -1.65 0.0988
SPECIES 0.2801 0.0964 *** 2.9 0.0037
NEWOUT 0.5457 0.0522 *** 10.46 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0130 0.0047 *** 2.77 0.0055
FEMALE 0.1614 0.1633 0.99 0.3230
OPCARE3 0.2339 0.1641 1.43 0.1540
COASTAL 0.4911 0.2089 ** 2.35 0.0188
INLAND 1.0688 0.4642 ** 2.3 0.0213
CONFUSE -0.4927 0.1515 *** -3.25 0.0011
ASCSQ 0.2152 0.2947 0.73 0.4653
LL function -878.9229
AIC 1783.8
AIC/N 2.023
N 882
K 13
***Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%,*Significance at 10%  
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 8: SPECIES, NEWOUT, 
AGE_M, COASTAL, INLAND & CONFUSE.  
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Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3096 0.1006 *** -3.08 0.0021
LOC3 -0.8467 0.1086 *** -7.8 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0541 0.0245 ** -2.21 0.0272
TYPE -0.3628 0.0515 *** -7.04 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1420 0.0520 *** 2.73 0.0064
NEWOUT 0.4379 0.0271 *** 16.14 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0313 0.0023 *** 13.67 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1806 0.0786 ** 2.3 0.0216
OPCARE3 0.0122 0.1104 0.11 0.9120
COASTAL 0.1455 0.0934 1.56 0.1191
INLAND 1.2600 0.2573 *** 4.9 0.0000
CONFUSE -0.5596 0.0792 *** -7.07 0.0000
ASCSQ -0.7191 0.1534 *** -4.69 0.0000
LL function -3180.17
AIC 6386.3
AIC/N 1.945
N 3283
K 13
***Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%,*Significance at 10%
Model 9: Removal of Potentially Protesting Against Offsets
 
The following explanatory variables are statistically significant given the absolute 
value of the Wald statistic is greater than 1.96 and the p-value is less than α = 0.05.  
 
Statistically significant explanatory variables for Model 9: LOC2, LOC3, 
NEWDIST, TYPE, SPECIES, NEWOUT, AGE_M, FEMALE, INLAND & 
CONFUSE.  
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Appendix H 
 Testing of IIA assumption 
 
To test for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, the 
test developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) has been attempted here (see 
tables H1 and H2 below). The test was conducted by first running the unrestricted 
model, followed by the restricted model (i.e. the model which removed an 
alternative). This was done for both models 1 and 6 (the specifications of which are 
reproduced below). The aim of the test was to examine whether the removal of the 
alternative would affect the probability of choosing the other alternatives.  
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 6 
 
 
 
The p-values for the restricted models are summarized in the table below: 
Restricted Model P-Value: Prob(C > c) 
Model 1 removing alternative 1 0.448437 
Model 1 removing alternative 2 0.359042 
Model 6 removing alternative 1 0.379390 
Model 6 removing alternative 2 0.293804 
 
For this test we use a 95% confidence level, such that α = 0.05 
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As the p-value for all of the restricted models are greater than 0.05, it appears 
we cannot reject the IIA assumption for these models. That is, it appears the models 
satisfy the IIA assumption and the removal of alternatives 1 or 2 does not affect the 
probability of choosing the remaining options. The estimates of the restricted model 
are also similar to their unrestricted counterparts. We therefore conclude that the 
models we have used follow the IIA assumption.  
The test was also attempted by removing option 3 (the default offset option). 
However, for both models 1 and 6, the following message was seen when the 
restricted model was estimated: “Could not carry Hausman test for IIA. Difference 
matrix is not positive definite”. According to Hensher et al. (2005, p.520), the test 
“...may be applied only to a limited number of model specifications”. The test will 
fail if the removal of one alternative results in no variability within the model. 
Hensher et al. (2005, p.59) also note that if the “Hessian is not positive definite at 
start values”, then this error is generally attributed to problems in the dataset. In most 
cases it arises as a result of trying to estimate a parameter where the data are 
invariant. In this case, the utility specifications for alternatives 1 and 2 are the same. 
Given this, these two options may be treated as one alternative. The removal of the 
default offset option (option 3) would thus mean there would be no variability in the 
model.
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Table H1. Testing of IIA Assumption – Model 1 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3041 0.1021 *** -3 0.0029 -0.3413 0.1581 ** -2.16 0.0309 -0.5739 0.1746 *** -3.29 0.0010
LOC3 -0.8330 0.1107 *** -7.5 0.0000 -0.6980 0.1854 *** -3.77 0.0002 -1.1796 0.2044 *** -5.77 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0525 0.0249 ** -2.1 0.0347 -0.0307 0.0363 -0.85 0.3974 -0.0149 0.0391 -0.38 0.7039
TYPE -0.3411 0.0523 *** -6.5 0.0000 -0.2571 0.0974 *** -2.64 0.0083 -0.4471 0.0984 *** -4.54 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1214 0.0528 ** 2.3 0.0215 0.0883 0.0959 0.92 0.3570 0.1242 0.1097 1.13 0.2573
NEWOUT 0.4470 0.0277 *** 16.2 0.0000 0.3935 0.0450 *** 8.75 0.0000 0.4999 0.0497 *** 10.05 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0297 0.0025 *** 12.1 0.0000 0.0294 0.0029 *** 10.06 0.0000 0.0284 0.0030 *** 9.48 0.0000
FEMALE 0.1905 0.0795 ** 2.4 0.0166 0.0385 0.0954 0.4 0.6867 0.2567 0.0973 *** 2.64 0.0083
OPCARE3 -0.1826 0.1125 -1.6 0.1045 -0.2094 0.1332 -1.57 0.1160 -0.1641 0.1381 -1.19 0.2347
DEPT -0.1039 0.0842 -1.2 0.2173 -0.0354 0.1004 -0.35 0.7247 -0.1573 0.1026 -1.53 0.1253
TAFE 0.0271 0.0945 0.29 0.7741 0.0514 0.1130 0.45 0.6496 0.0322 0.1184 0.27 0.7855
BACHPG 0.0928 0.0974 0.95 0.3407 0.2535 0.1171 ** 2.16 0.0304 -0.0762 0.1184 -0.64 0.5197
NEWINC -0.0007 0.0009 -0.8 0.4188 -0.0009 0.0010 -0.91 0.3652 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.27 0.7894
COASTAL 0.1483 0.0964 1.54 0.1241 0.1215 0.1164 1.04 0.2966 0.1842 0.1197 1.54 0.1238
INLAND 1.3999 0.2722 *** 5.14 0.0000 1.2665 0.3382 *** 3.75 0.0002 1.4314 0.3714 *** 3.85 0.0001
YBWATCH 0.0407 0.0861 0.47 0.6367 -0.0266 0.1040 -0.26 0.7982 0.0971 0.1078 0.9 0.3676
CONFUSE -0.5004 0.0849 *** -5.9 0.0000 -0.6500 0.1015 *** -6.41 0.0000 -0.2950 0.1056 *** -2.79 0.0052
UNCRTN 0.0604 0.1399 0.43 0.6658 -0.1557 0.1590 -0.98 0.3275 0.3953 0.1804 ** 2.19 0.0284
ASCSQ -0.6208 0.1866 *** -3.3 0.0009 -0.5247 0.2346 ** -2.24 0.0253 -0.6177 0.2378 *** -2.6 0.0094
LL function -3074.33 -1381.075 -1327.32
AIC 6186.7 2800.2 2692.6
AIC/N 1.96 1.216 1.209
No of obs 3500 3500 3500
Skipped 343 1198 1272
N 3157 2302 2228
K 19 19 19
ChiSqrd[19] 19.1314 20.6048
Pr(C>c) 0.448437 0.359042
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Restricted Model 1: Removing Alternative 1Unrestricted Model 1: Base Model Restricted Model 1: Removing alternative 2
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Table H2. Testing of IIA Assumption – Model 6 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3152 0.0972 *** -3.24 0.0012 -0.4003 0.1507 *** -2.66 0.0079 -0.5702 0.1660 *** -3.43 0.0006
LOC3 -0.8232 0.1041 *** -7.91 0.0000 -0.7364 0.1754 *** -4.2 0.0000 -1.1645 0.1923 *** -6.06 0.0000
NEWDIST -0.0533 0.0236 ** -2.25 0.0242 -0.0237 0.0345 -0.69 0.4910 -0.0179 0.0369 -0.48 0.6277
TYPE -0.3209 0.0495 *** -6.48 0.0000 -0.2181 0.0926 ** -2.36 0.0185 -0.4735 0.0931 *** -5.08 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1474 0.0501 *** 2.94 0.0032 0.0785 0.0909 0.86 0.3882 0.1969 0.1037 * 1.9 0.0577
NEWOUT 0.4492 0.0263 *** 17.09 0.0000 0.4038 0.0429 *** 9.41 0.0000 0.4899 0.0474 *** 10.34 0.0000
AGE_M 0.0317 0.0022 *** 14.29 0.0000 0.0308 0.0027 *** 11.47 0.0000 0.0304 0.0027 *** 11.18 0.0000
FEMALE 0.2192 0.0760 *** 2.88 0.0039 0.1027 0.0911 1.13 0.2597 0.2522 0.0927 *** 2.72 0.0065
OPCARE3 -0.1136 0.1036 -1.1 0.2727 -0.1306 0.1230 -1.06 0.2886 -0.1184 0.1266 -0.94 0.3497
COASTAL 0.1861 0.0898 ** 2.07 0.0383 0.1661 0.1087 1.53 0.1265 0.2128 0.1114 * 1.91 0.0560
INLAND 1.2798 0.2569 *** 4.98 0.0000 1.2298 0.3236 *** 3.8 0.0001 1.2267 0.3408 *** 3.6 0.0003
CONFUSE -0.5270 0.0768 *** -6.87 0.0000 -0.7017 0.0907 *** -7.73 0.0000 -0.2888 0.0949 *** -3.04 0.0024
ASCSQ -0.7504 0.1488 *** -5.04 0.0000 -0.6057 0.1920 *** -3.15 0.0016 -0.7534 0.1926 *** -3.91 0.0001
LL function -3403.07 -1523.91 -1473.45
AIC 6832.1 3073.8 2972.9
AIC/N 1.952 1.208 1.203
No of obs 3500 3500 3500
Skipped 0 955 1028
N 3500 2545 2472
K 13 13 13
ChiSqrd[13] 13.9216 15.2203
Pr(C>c) 0.37939 0.293804
***Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level,*Significance at 10% level
Restricted Model 6: Removing alternative 1Unrestricted Model 6: Full Sample Restricted Model 6: Removing alternative 2
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Appendix I 
 MNL Models using partitioning  
 
The following details the results of the preliminary study undertaken to analyse 
offset preferences of the Queensland public. In this study, two types of models are 
estimated. The first model is the full general model, which uses offset attributes and 
individual characteristics as explanatory variables. This model was estimated over 
the sample which removed observations with low confidence. The second model 
uses only the offset attributes as explanatory variables. To better capture potential 
heterogeneity between different sub-groups within the sample, the sample was 
partitioned into a number of different groups and the attribute only model re-
estimated for the subgroups. These groups included: the group which removes 
potential protest responses (i.e. removing respondents who indicated that they did not 
like offsets in general, direct or indirect offsets and/or stated they did not like offsets 
in principle); those who expressed a concern for the environment in general; those 
who expressed concern for biodiversity loss; those who expressed concern for 
migratory shorebirds; those who expressed concern for all three environmental issues 
(environment in general, biodiversity loss and migratory shorebirds); bird watchers 
and non bird watchers; respondents living in region 1 (Brisbane and surrounding 
area); respondents living in region 2 (coastal Queensland residents); respondents 
with dependent children; respondents with no children at home and gender. 
Individuals could be members of more than one group.    
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Before estimating the models below responses which were classified as 
uncertain, confused or did not pay attention at all were removed from the dataset 
before begging the choice modelling analysis. To account for uncertainty, only 
responses that were ‘very’, ‘reasonably’ or ‘somewhat’ certain of their answer given 
in the choice set were used in the analysis. That is, response which were ‘not much’ 
or ‘not at all’ certain were removed from the dataset.23 Respondents who found the 
choice set confusing were also removed from the sample
24
; as were respondents who 
indicated that they did not pay attention to each attribute. In this study, respondents 
were deemed to have paid attention if they had paid ‘very’, ‘reasonably’, ‘somewhat 
and ‘not much’ attention to each attribute.25  
In the full model, respondents who did not specify their income were dropped 
from the sample. In a similar fashion, these respondents were also removed from the 
sample before running the attribute only model over the specified sub-groups. Lastly, 
as only a small proportion of respondents were from region 3 (i.e. inland 
Queensland)
26
, these respondents were also dropped from the analysis for all models.  
All models were estimated as multinomial logit (MNL) models and were 
estimated in NLOGIT 5. The variables for these models are seen in Appendix C 
above.  
The Full General MNL Model 
The results of the full general model (Model A1) are displayed in Table I-1 
below. In terms of the characteristics of the alternative offsets, the significant and 
negative coefficients for both location parameters indicate a dislike for offsets which 
occur interstate; and an even stronger dislike for offsets which occur overseas. The 
significant and negative coefficient on the distance parameter indicates that in 
general, respondents are less likely to choose an offset which is located further away 
from the impacted site. The significant and negative coefficient for the type of offset 
parameter indicates a preference for direct offsets over indirect offsets. The 
significant and positive coefficient for the species attribute indicates that in general, 
respondents prefer the offset to protect the more endangered species of shorebird, as 
                                                 
 
23
 See the NOCERT variable in the ‘Table of variables used in the analysis’ above (Appendix C).  
24
 See the CONFUSE variable in the ‘Table of variables used in the analysis’ above (Appendix C). 
25
 See the ATTEN4 variable in the ‘Table of variables used in the analysis’ above (Appendix C).  
26
 See the INLAND variable in the ‘Table of variables used in the analysis’ above (Appendix C). 
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opposed to the species directly affected by the development. The positive and 
significant outcome parameter signifies that respondents prefer offsets which protect 
a greater number of birds.  
There is a significant positive relationship between age, income, gender and 
concern for various environmental issues and choosing the default offset option. 
More specifically, as age and income increase, the chances of choosing the default 
offset increases. A preference for the default offsets is also shown amongst females 
and those who are concerned about all three environmental issues (i.e. the 
environment in general, biodiversity loss and migratory shorebirds). The only group 
which displays a negative relationship with choosing the default offset is the group 
with dependent children. That is, respondents with dependent children are less likely 
to choose the default offset option. Education, regional distribution and bird 
watching were not statistically significant. The negative and significant ASC 
indicates that respondents generally preferred options 1 and 2 over the default offset 
option (Adamowicz, Boxall, et al., 1998), ceteris paribus.  
 Table I-1. The Full General MNL Model 
Model A1: Full Model
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
Interstate dummy (LOC2) -0.3703 0.1394 *** -2.66 0.0079
Overseas dummy (LOC3) -1.1076 0.1593 *** -6.95 0.0000
Distance from impact (km, DIST) -7.55E-05 3.38E-05 ** -2.23 0.0254
Indirect offset dummy (TYPE) -0.4551 0.0734 *** -6.2 0.0000
More endangered species dummy (SPECIES) 0.1500 0.0736 ** 2.04 0.0415
Number of birds protected (OUTCOME) 0.0005 3.80E-05 *** 12.6 0.0000
Age of respondent (AGE_M) 0.0360 0.0035 *** 10.4 0.0000
Female dummy (FEMALE) 0.4805 0.1076 *** 4.47 0.0000
Care for 3 environmental issues dummy (CARE3) 0.2764 0.1647 * 1.68 0.0933
Dependent children dummy (DEPT) -0.3255 0.1145 *** -2.84 0.0045
TAFE qualification dummy (TAFE) -0.0204 0.1295 -0.16 0.8748
University or postgrad dummy (BACHPG) -0.1224 0.1316 -0.93 0.3525
Income of respondent (INCOME_M) 1.88E-06 1.11E-06 * 1.69 0.0903
Region 2 dummy (COASTAL) 0.1982 0.1291 1.53 0.1248
Birdwatcher dummy (YBWATCH) 0.0204 0.1136 0.18 0.8573
Alternative specific constant (ASCSQ) -1.4565 0.3065 *** -4.75 0.0000
LL function -1685.9355
AIC 3403.9
AIC/N 1.877
N 1813
K 16
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level  
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Attribute only models and partitioning of data 
To account for heterogeneity, the attribute only (or specific or reduced form) 
model was estimated using a split sample method of evaluation, whereby the dataset 
was partitioned into sub-groups for analysis (Rolfe & Prayaga, 2007). This provides 
an estimate of heterogeneity between different groups without having to capture the 
full set of group-variable interactions in a main model (with subsequent estimation 
problems such as multicollinearity and loss of degrees of freedom). A downside of 
this approach is that it does potentially result in omitted variable bias as not all 
characteristics are included in every model (Campos et al., 2005; Dougherty, 2007; 
Osborne, 2014). The results of the attribute only models over the specified groups are 
given below. 
Base model and removal of potential protest answers.  
The results of the multinomial logit model which only uses the attributes of the 
offset as explanatory variables are presented in Table I-2 below. Model A2 is hereby 
referred to as the base (partitioned) model, as it is estimated using the same sample 
as Model A1. The results of the base model are consistent with the results of the full 
model above (See Table I-1 above). However, in this model, the ASC is positive and 
significant, which signifies that, on average, there was a preference for the default 
offset option (i.e. when not considering individual characteristics, on balance there 
was an overall preference for the default). As with the full model, respondents 
showed a lower preference for offsets located interstate and were even less likely to 
choose an offset located overseas. Again, the significant and negative distance 
parameter indicates that respondents were displeased with offsets located further 
away from the impacted site. The results of this model also show that respondents 
preferred the use of direct offsets which protects the more endangered species of 
shorebird, unaffected by the development. Respondents were also happier with 
offsets that protected a larger number of birds.  
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Table I-2. Base model and removal of potential protest answers  
Model A2: Base Model Model A3: Removing potential protest answers
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3525 0.1367 *** -2.6 0.0099 -0.3857 0.1414 *** -2.73 0.0064
LOC3 -1.0639 0.1577 *** -6.8 0.0000 -1.1067 0.1632 *** -6.78 0.0000
DIST -5.56E-05 3.28E-05 * -1.7 0.0902 -5.23E-05 3.39E-05 -1.54 0.1225
TYPE -0.4595 0.0730 *** -6.3 0.0000 -0.4976 0.0758 *** -6.57 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1375 0.0731 * 1.88 0.0599 0.1361 0.0757 * 1.8 0.0722
OUTCOME 0.0005 3.72E-05 *** 12.1 0.0000 0.0005 3.84E-05 *** 11.76 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.8447 0.0978 *** 8.64 0.0000 0.8439 0.1007 *** 8.38 0.0000
LL function -1767.40762 -1661.4509
AIC 3548.8 3336.9
AIC/N 1.957 1.946
N 1813 1715
K 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level  
The results of the attribute only multinomial logit model, estimated over the 
sample which removes responses that were potentially protesting against the offset 
exercise (i.e. they indicated in the follow up questions that they disliked offsets in 
general, direct and indirect offsets and/or indicated they did not like offsets in 
principle while completing the alternative hypothetical scenarios) are seen in Table I-
2 above (see Model A3). The preferences are the same as the base partitioned model 
(model A2), however the distance parameter is not significant.  
 
Testing concern for different environmental issues  
The models which were grouped according to respondents who showed 
concern for three different environmental issues are presented in Table I-3. These 
were: concern for the environment in general (Model A4), biodiversity loss (Model 
A5) and migratory shorebirds (Model A6). Again, for all groups, the results were 
consistent with the results in the previous tables. That is, the ASC was positive and 
significant for all models indicating a preference for the status quo. With respect to 
location, the preferred offset site was Queensland, followed by a site located in 
another Australian state or territory and finally an international location. The distance 
parameter was negative and statistically significant for respondents who were 
concerned for environmental issues in general (Model A4) and biodiversity loss 
(Model A5). This indicates these two groups disliked offsets which were located 
further away from the impacted site. The distance parameter was not significant for 
the group of respondents who indicated concern for migratory shorebirds.   
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The significant and negative sign for the ‘type of offset’ parameter for all three 
groups indicated a preference for the use of direct offsets as opposed to indirect 
offsets. Both the environmentally concerned group (Model A4) and the group 
concerned about migratory shorebirds (Model A6) indicated they would prefer the 
direct offset to protect the more endangered species unaffected by the development. 
However, the group concerned about biodiversity loss (Model 5) were indifferent to 
the type of species to be protected. The significant and positive sign on the outcome 
parameter for all models again indicated that respondents were happy with offsets 
which provided protection for more shorebirds. 
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Table I-3. Comparison of concern for different environmental issues  
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3349 0.1409 ** -2.38 0.0175 -0.3230 0.1424 ** -2.27 0.0233 -0.3311 0.1415 ** -2.34 0.0192
LOC3 -1.0651 0.1640 *** -6.49 0.0000 -1.0310 0.1650 *** -6.25 0.0000 -1.0986 0.1643 *** -6.69 0.0000
DIST -5.57E-05 3.39E-05 * -1.65 0.0999 -5.83E-05 3.42E-05 * -1.7 0.0886 -5.04E-05 3.39E-05 -1.49 0.1375
TYPE -0.4709 0.0754 *** -6.25 0.0000 -0.4887 0.0763 *** -6.41 0.0000 -0.4958 0.0758 *** -6.54 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1500 0.0755 ** 1.99 0.0468 0.1089 0.0763 1.43 0.1535 0.1312 0.0757 * 1.73 0.0832
OUTCOME 0.0005 3.85E-05 *** 11.83 0.0000 0.0005 3.89E-05 *** 11.84 0.0000 0.0005 3.86E-05 *** 11.64 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.8785 0.1010 *** 8.70 0.0000 0.8511 0.1018 *** 8.36 0.0000 0.8192 0.1012 *** 8.10 0.0000
LL function -1664.85 -1625.22 -1637.91
AIC 3343.7 3264.4 3289.8
AIC/N 1.95 1.951 1.958
N 1715 1673 1680
K 7 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level 
Model A4: General Environmental Issues Model A5: Biodiversity Loss Model A6: Migratory Shorebirds 
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Comparison of attitude towards environmental issues and use/ non-use values 
The results of three models which tested whether concern for the environment and the active/ non-active use of the environment had a 
significant influence upon the preferred offset choice is presented in Table I-4 below. More specifically, this includes the results of the attribute 
only multinomial logit model using the group of respondents who stated they were concerned for all three environmental issues: the environment 
in general, biodiversity loss and migratory shorebirds (Model A7); the results of the attribute only model using the group of respondents who 
used the environment (i.e. were bird watchers) (Model A8) and the results of the preferences of non-users (i.e. non-bird watchers) (Model A9).  
Table I-4. Comparison of attitude towards environmental issues and use/ non-use values   
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.3194 0.1457 ** -2.19 0.0284 -0.5265 0.2482 ** -2.12 0.0339 -0.2793 0.1641 * -1.7 0.0887
LOC3 -1.0931 0.1705 *** -6.41 0.0000 -1.1893 0.2890 *** -4.12 0.0000 -1.0098 0.1892 *** -5.34 0.0000
DIST -5.15E-05 3.49E-05 -1.47 0.1403 -3.98E-05 5.98E-05 -0.67 0.5058 -6.60E-05 3.94E-05 * -1.68 0.0934
TYPE -0.4969 0.0783 *** -6.35 0.0000 -0.6319 0.1334 *** -4.74 0.0000 -0.3890 0.0876 *** -4.44 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1269 0.0782 1.62 0.1045 0.2643 0.1332 ** 1.98 0.0472 0.0885 0.0880 1.01 0.3146
OUTCOME 0.0005 3.99E-05 *** 11.51 0.0000 0.0004 6.67E-05 *** 6.30 0.0000 0.0005 4.50E-05 *** 10.43 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.8746 0.1044 *** 8.38 0.0000 0.9254 0.1751 *** 5.29 0.0000 0.8040 0.1184 *** 6.79 0.0000
LL function -1552.04 -554.201 -1207.47
AIC 3118.1 1122.4 2428.9
AIC/N 1.945 1.909 1.983
N 1603 588 1225
K 7 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level 
Model A7: Concerned for 3 issues Model A8: Bird watchers Model A9: Non Bird Watchers
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Similar to previous models, the ASC for models A7 – A9 was again positive 
and significant, indicating that there was a general preference for the default offset 
option. With respect to the preferred offset location, all three groups indicated a 
preference for the offset to remain in Queensland. Again, despite the dislike for 
offsets occurring interstate, all three groups showed an even greater dislike for the 
offset to occur overseas.  The distance parameter was only significant for the non 
bird watcher group (Model A9), with the negative sign indicating that non users 
disliked offsets which were located further away from the impacted site.  
In line with the previous models, all three groups displayed a preference for 
direct offsets rather than indirect offsets. However, only bird watchers (Model A8) 
were keen to protect the more endangered species of shorebird, while the 
environmentally concerned and non bird watcher groups appeared indifferent to the 
type of species to be protected. With respect to outcome, the positive and significant 
sign indicate that all three groups preferred offsets which protected more shorebirds.  
 
Testing impact of regional distribution 
The impact of regional distribution was tested using respondents from region 1 
(Brisbane and surrounding cities including Sunshine and Gold Coasts) (see Model 
A10) and region 2 (Queensland coast) (see Model A11) (See Table I-5 below).  
Table I-5. Comparison of Region 1 (Brisbane and surrounding areas) and Region 2 (Coastal 
Queensland) 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.4818 0.1526 *** -3.16 0.0016 0.2060 0.3113 0.66 0.5082
LOC3 -1.1307 0.1727 *** -6.55 0.0000 -0.7518 0.3905 * -1.93 0.0542
DIST -4.41E-05 3.64E-05 -1.21 0.2251 -1.10E-04 7.68E-05 -1.45 0.1464
TYPE -0.4486 0.0808 *** -5.55 0.0000 -0.5107 0.1726 *** -2.96 0.0031
SPECIES 0.1202 0.0809 1.49 0.1374 0.2289 0.1718 1.33 0.1828
OUTCOME 0.0005 4.12E-05 *** 10.95 0.0000 0.0005 8.77E-05 *** 5.27 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.7976 0.1084 *** 7.36 0.0000 1.0754 0.2305 *** 4.67 0.0000
LL function -1437.43 -326.904
AIC 2888.9 667.8
AIC/N 1.965 1.947
N 1470 343
K 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level 
Model A10: Region 1 Model A11: Region 2
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The significant and positive sign on the ASC indicates that respondents from 
both regions had a general preference for the default offset. In terms of location, the 
preferences of region 1 (i.e. Brisbane and surrounding city regions) were generally in 
line with the previous models, such that the preferred offset site was Queensland, 
again followed by the interstate location and lastly the offset located in another 
country (see Model A10). In contrast to residents of region 1, residents of region 2 
(i.e. the coastal group) were indifferent to the offset occurring interstate (see Model 
A11). However, coastal residents also showed a dislike towards offsets occurring 
overseas. With respect to type, both groups indicated a preference for direct offsets 
as opposed to indirect offsets.  The distance and species parameters were not 
significant for either model. The outcome parameter was significant and positive for 
both models, showing that respondents from both regions were more likely to choose 
the offset which protected more shorebirds.  
 
Testing influence of children and no children at home 
The results of the attribute only model estimated over the subgroup of respondents 
with dependent children (Model A12) and the subgroup with no children at home 
(Model A13) are presented in Table I-6 below.  
Table I-6. Comparison of respondents with children and no children at home 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.1682 0.2294 -0.73 0.4636 -0.4696 0.1724 *** -2.72 0.0065
LOC3 -0.9639 0.2521 *** -3.82 0.0001 -1.1486 0.2035 *** -5.64 0.0000
DIST -1.00E-04 0.0001 * -1.88 0.0607 -3.69E-05 4.15E-05 -0.89 0.3745
TYPE -0.4507 0.1199 *** -3.76 0.0002 -0.4658 0.0923 *** -5.05 0.0000
SPECIES 0.1342 0.1200 1.12 0.2634 0.1452 0.0924 1.57 0.1163
OUTCOME 0.0005 0.0001 *** 7.55 0.0000 0.0004 4.63E-05 *** 9.62 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.4200 0.1691 ** 2.48 0.0130 1.0317 0.1217 *** 8.48 0.0000
LL function -584.236 -1164.11
AIC 1182.5 2342.2
AIC/N 2.035 1.901
N 581 1232
K 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level 
Model A12: Dependent Children Model A13: No children at home
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For both models, the ASC was significant and had a positive sign. Again, both 
groups appear to favour the status quo or default preferred offset option. The main 
difference between the two groups is the preference for offset location. The 
preferences of the group with no children at home (Model A13) are similar to the 
general sample (base partitioned model), given that there is a dislike for offsets 
located interstate and an even greater dislike for overseas offsets. Similarly, the 
group with no children at home also dislike offsets which are placed in another 
country. However, in contrast to the group with no children at home, the group with 
dependent children (Model A12) are indifferent to offsets which are placed interstate. 
The distance parameter was only significant for the group with dependent children. 
This indicates that the group with children dislike offsets which are located further 
away from the impacted site.  
Both groups showed similar preferences for the type of offset, species to be 
protected and the expected outcome of the offset. That is, both groups were: more 
likely to choose a direct offset rather than an indirect offset; indifferent to the type of 
species to be protected and were happiest with offsets that protected more birds.  
Testing the influence of gender  
As the female parameter was statistically significant for the full model, it was 
decided that a test on gender preferences was warranted. The results of female 
respondents (Model A14) and male respondents (Model A15) are presented in Table 
I-7 below.  
Table I-7. Comparison of females and males 
Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z* Coeff Std Err Sig Wald Prob|z|>Z*
LOC2 -0.2989 0.1973 -1.52 0.1298 -0.4355 0.1909 ** -2.28 0.0225
LOC3 -0.6765 0.2151 *** -3.15 0.0017 -1.5056 0.2361 *** -6.38 0.0000
DIST -6.44E-05 4.72E-05 -1.36 0.1725 -4.01E-05 4.59E-05 -0.87 0.3818
TYPE -0.4987 0.1063 *** -4.69 0.0000 -0.4443 0.1013 *** -4.39 0.0000
SPECIES -0.0258 0.1062 -0.24 0.8080 0.2876 0.1014 *** 2.84 0.0046
OUTCOME 0.0004 5.34E-05 *** 8.18 0.0000 0.0005 5.22E-05 *** 8.94 0.0000
ASCSQ 0.8131 0.1395 *** 5.83 0.0000 0.8746 0.1378 *** 6.35 0.0000
LL function -856.326 -904.633
AIC 1726.7 1823.3
AIC/N 1.973 1.944
N 875 938
K 7 7
***Significance at 1% level; **Significance at 5% level; *Significance at 10% level 
Model A15: MalesModel A14: Females
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The significant and positive sign on the ASC for both models was again 
indicative of a preference or move towards the default preferred offset option. These 
results indicate that females were indifferent to offsets occurring interstate. However 
male respondents disliked offsets which are placed interstate. Both females and 
males disliked offsets which are located overseas, however males were even less 
likely to choose overseas offsets than females. The distance parameter was not 
significant for either group.  
Both groups showed similar preferences for the type of offset used and 
expected outcome of the offset, though differed with respect to preferences for the 
type of species to be protected. It is seen that both groups preferred the use of the 
direct offset as opposed to the indirect offset. Furthermore, both groups were pleased 
with offsets that protected more birds. However, in terms of the species to be 
protected, males preferred the protection of the more endangered species of 
shorebird, whereas females remained indifferent.  
 156 Appendices 
Willingness to accept an offset 
To gain a more meaningful measure of the above results, the marginal rate of 
substitution between the expected outcome of the offset and other attributes of the 
offset were calculated. The equations used to calculate WTA are seen in Table I-8 
and the WTA estimates calculated for each group are presented in Table I-9.  
Table I-8. Calculation of willingness to accept  
Calculation for willingness to accept Interpretation of result  
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected before an 
offset located interstate would be 
acceptable. 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected before an 
offset located overseas would be 
acceptable. 
 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected per 100km 
for the offset to become acceptable. 
 
 
 
The number of additional birds that 
would need to be protected for an 
indirect offset to become acceptable.  
 
 
 
The number of additional endangered 
birds that it would take to make the offset 
acceptable.  
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Table I-9. Willingness to accept estimates   
 LOC2 
 
LOC3 
 
DIST per 
100km 
TYPE 
 
SPECIES 
 
A1 Full Model 771 2308 16
#
 948 -313
#
 
 (290) (332) (7) (153) (153) 
A2 Base Model  783 2364 12 1021 -306
#
 
 (304) (350) (7) (162) (162) 
A3 Removing Potential 
Protest Answers 
857 2459 NS 1106 -302 
 (314) (363)  (168) (168) 
A4 Concern for general 
environmental issues 
744 2367 12
#
 1046 -333 
 (313) (364) (8) (168) (168) 
A5 Concern for biodiversity 
loss 
702 2241 13
#
 1062 NS 
 (310) (359) (7) (166)  
A6 Concern for migratory 
shorebirds 
736 2441 NS 1102 -292
#
 
 (314) (365)  (168) (168) 
A7 Concern for all 3 
environmental issues 
694 2376 NS 1080 NS 
 (317) (371)  (170) (170) 
A8 Bird Watcher 1254 2832 NS 1505 -629 
 (591) (688)  (318) (317) 
A9 Non Bird Watcher 594
#
 2149 14
#
 828 NS 
 (349) (402) (8) (186)  
A10 Region 1(Brisbane & 
surrounding) 
1071 2513 NS 997 NS 
 (339) (384)  (179)  
A11 Region 2(Coastal 
Queensland) 
NS 1634
#
 NS 1110 NS 
  (849)  (375)  
A12 Respondents with 
dependent children 
NS 2008 21
#
 939 NS 
  (525) (11) (250)  
A13 Respondents with no 
children at home 
1067 2611 NS 1059 NS 
 (392) (462)  (210)  
A14 Females NS 1537 NS 1133 NS 
  (489)  (242)  
A15 Males  927 3203 NS 945 -612 
 (406) (502)  (216) (216) 
*NS – Not significant and cannot be calculated. Standard errors are in parentheses below the WTA 
estimates. Standard Errors of WTA are calculated as follows: (Standard error of the non-monetary 
attribute / Coefficient of OUTCOME). The Standard errors of the DIST attribute have been multiplied 
by 100 to reflect the same unit as the WTA estimate (Hensher et al., 2005).  
 
#The results of the Wald and p-values test show that these variables were not significant at the 5% 
level. However as seen in Tables I-1 to I-7 above, these are significant at the 10% level and were thus 
included in the WTA estimate table above.  
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With respect to the interstate location (LOC2), the groups which have the 
highest WTA are bird watchers, residents of region 1 (i.e. Brisbane and surrounding 
cities) and respondents with no children at home. Stated differently, these 
respondents require the highest amount of birds to be protected; with over 1000 
additional birds required to satisfy each group. The group with the lowest amount of 
birds required to send the offset interstate was the non bird watching group. Non bird 
watchers require approximately half of what bird watchers require before the offset 
becomes acceptable. Respondents who were indifferent to sending the offset 
interstate were residents of region 2 (i.e. coastal residents), people with dependent 
children and females.  
In contrast to an offset located interstate, it was seen that no group was 
indifferent to sending the offset overseas (LOC3). That is, the results indicate that all 
groups required a large number of birds to be protected before the overseas offset 
would become acceptable or equivalent to the default offset. The group with the 
highest WTA were males, requiring an additional 3203 birds to be protected before 
the offset would become acceptable. This was followed by bird watchers, 
respondents with no children at home and respondents from region 1 (Brisbane and 
surrounding cities). Respondents with the lowest WTA (under 2000 birds) were 
region 2 respondents (i.e. coastal residents) and females. It was seen that females 
were willing to accept approximately half the number of birds that males required 
before an overseas offset become acceptable.     
The WTA for distance is measured with respect to how many birds would need 
to be protected per 100km. As seen in Table I-9, the group with the highest WTA (21 
birds per 100 km) was the group of respondents with dependent children. This group 
was followed by the general sample estimated using the full model (16 birds per 100 
km) and non bird watchers (14 birds per 100 km). Slightly lower WTA were found 
for the group of respondents whom indicated a concern for biodiversity loss, the 
group concerned about the environment in general and the general sample using the 
attribute only base model. The distance parameter was not significant for the 
remaining groups and therefore WTA could not be calculated.  
Like WTA for the overseas offset, high WTA was also found for the type of 
offset to be used. That is, given that all groups had a preference for the use of a direct 
offset, a large number of additional birds (ranging between 828 to 1505 birds) would 
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be required to make the indirect offset (e.g. programs focused in research and 
education) acceptable or equivalent to the default offset. The group with the highest 
WTA for indirect offsets was the bird watching group. In contrast, the group with the 
lowest WTA for indirect offsets was the non bird watching group.  
In comparison to the WTA of the interstate, overseas and indirect offsets, it 
was found that a smaller number of birds were required to make an offset acceptable, 
which protects the more endangered species of shorebird.  More specifically, bird 
watchers and males require approximately 600 fewer birds of the more endangered 
birds to be protected before this type of offset is deemed equivalent to the default 
offset. Only 300 fewer birds are required to make the alternative species offset 
acceptable to: the subgroup concerned for the environment in general, the general 
sample (estimated using the full model, the base model and the model removing the 
dislike of offsets) and the subgroup which indicated concern for migratory 
shorebirds.  
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